


POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN U. P., 1950—75

ABSTRACT

THESIS
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
Doctor of Philosophy
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY
MOHAMMED ABID

Under the supervision of
Dr. M. A. KISHORE
(Reader in Political Science)



DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh,
July 1984

T2811

Abstract

The Ph.D. dissertation titled "Political Development in U.P., 1950-75", is an attempt to study the politics of Uttar Pradesh, an important State of India, politically and otherwise. Political events that took place in U.P. have had a great impact not only on its politics but have always influenced the national politics.

Traditionally U.P. has been a Congress stronghold. The Congress government at the Centre has always kept one of its confidantes as the Chief Minister in U.P. The only period of time when the Congress had to concede defeat and lose face was during the Janata phase (1977-80), BJD Alliance government (1970) and the SVD Governments in 1967 and 1970-71. It is evident that the State had a smooth sail since the First General Elections in 1952 till 1967 i.e. during the Congress regime under the Chief Ministership of C.B. Gupta, Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani, Dr Sampurnanand and G.B. Pant. Interestingly this period was devoid of any political upheaval and the existing situation offered no challenges for the state as well as the Central Congress leadership. It was a trouble free phase in the U.P. politics.

It was only in 1967 that the first signs of political turmoil started to surface in U.P. The era of alliances and coalitions started which resulted in the establishment of SVD and BKD governments in the state. It was a period of intense political activity on the part of the Opposition parties whose only aim was to oust the Congress government. The Opposition succeeded in its mission though for a short while.

It was a case of variation on the same theme when the Opposition parties again dealt a severe blow to the Congress in 1977 when the Janata came to power in U.P. All these developments and events have been fully discussed in the thesis. An attempt has been made to highlight the Opposition governments and their efforts to rout the Congress from the seat of power in U.P. There have been times when high political drama was enacted in the state - both by the Congress and the Opposition parties. References to such events and the resultant consequences are to be found in the thesis.

The study is divided into seven chapters, conclusion and bibliography. As pointed out in the preface it has been an uphill task to collect material for this study. In view of non-availability of source material, the available material was consulted. Newspaper reports, editorials and

political commentaries have been of immense help.

The first chapter deals with the political situation in U.P. from 1952 to 1967, a period of continuous Congress rule for fifteen years. The formation of the first non-Congress Samyukta Vidhayak Dal government in the state, the reasons for and the circumstances under which the SVD government was replaced by the BKD government have been discussed in this chapter. Charan Singh's important role in the U.P. politics, his defection from the Congress in 1967 and forming of the BKD have been highlighted.

Formation of the BKD government is the subject matter of the second chapter. The politics of BKD-Congress(N) merger and the efforts of BKD to stay on in power have been analysed. The events leading to the end of coalition and the imposition of President's rule in the state form a major part of this chapter. Important decisions taken by the BKD have been covered.

The third chapter relates the post-BKD developments (1970-77), the four party alliance and the formation of SVD (Samyukta Vidhayak Dal) government in U.P. Collapse of this SVD government headed by T.N. Singh, Kamalapati Tripathi's tenure till 1974 and then installation of Bahugana's ministry

have been fully discussed in this chapter.

Ram Naresh Yadav's Chief Ministership during the Janata phase in U.P., crisis and dissidence in the U.P. Janata Party and related issues and events have been discussed in the fourth chapter.

To highlight the crisis in the Central Janata leadership has become very necessary since it had a direct impact on the U.P. politics which also had a Janata government under Banarsi Das. This, Janata government's performance in U.P., crisis in the Janata and its downfall have been analysed in the detail in the fifth chapter. Major policy decisions taken by the Janata government in U.P. have also been included. It may be noted from this chapter that events upto 1980 Elections have been covered.

The sixth chapter deals with problems of leadership in U.P. Issues concerning rival leadership and Muslim politics in the State have been dealt with in this chapter.

Political defections are the bane of state politics in India and U.P. is no exception to this. Analysis of all elections in the State, formation of various governments, their fall, politics of alliances, coalitions, and defections which had a great impact on state politics have been included

in the seventh chapter.

The conclusion focuses on the most important political developments in U.P., and analysis thereof, the author's impressions and findings. The findings and observations are based mainly on the hypotheses drawn by the author out of the entire study of the topic. The author has taken the liberty of making some observations and comments in his personal capacity some of which may apparently deviate from the main study but have a bearing on the general issues referred to in the dissertation.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN U. P., 1950—75

THESIS
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
Doctor of Philosophy
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY
MOHAMMED ABID

Under the supervision of
Dr. M. A. KISHORE
(Reader in Political Science)



DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh,
July 1984

T2811



T2811

PREFACE

PREFACE

The American Political Science Association (APSA) defined the purpose of Political Science as service to the poor, oppressed and underdeveloped people to fight at home and abroad in their struggle against hierarchies, elites and institutional forms of manipulation. David Easton, a Political Scientist of Chicago, President of APSA in 1969, drew emphasis on human needs, human values, problem oriented research and protection of Civilization.

If Almond and Powell opine that attitude, belief and orientation of individuals towards political process of a political system is called political culture, then certainly structural differentiation and cultural secularization is called political development.

There are different approaches as to what political development constitutes. I feel that the scale to measure development in a society is the interest articulation and as a result interest aggregation of a political system. Of all, economic development is the basis criterion. If people are financially satisfied, they cooperate with the Government, otherwise they or their leaders in a system where more than one party system operates, are busy in opposition just to overthrow the Government and to bring another one which can meet their demands and keeps them satisfied.

India being an underdeveloped country, and the state of Uttar Pradesh, the biggest state of India and thickly populated where still majority of the people live in rural areas, with low rate of literacy and poor income alongwith being divided on caste or religious lines are completely in the strong grip of their leaders, as is revealed in this study.

Keeping in view the above mentioned factors, the present study mainly deals with struggle for power, non-Congress movements and non-Congress Governments in U.P., their failure and re-instatement of traditional monolith Congress Government in the state. The Congress had come under severe criticism due to the excesses of Emergency (1975) and the people had developed an aversion for the Congress. The rejection of Janata Government by the masses in 1980 goes to prove the level of political awareness and consciousness among the people of U.P.

Though the political situation in U.P. has been covered since 1952, the main focus of this study is on 1967 and post 1967 developments which had brought a great change in the state politics of U.P. I have discussed the formation of non-Congress and Coalition Governments, opposition moves to come together to give Congress a straight fight. From 1967 to 1971, the state witnessed many non-Congress Governments and declaration of President's rule.

Political situation during and after Emergency in U.P. has been covered in this study. An attempt has been made to prove the hypothesis that though the Congress has been re-established in the state, the people of the state are capable of replacing it if it again crosses its limits as far as Constitutional provisions are concerned, leading to Emergency like excesses. In the 1980s Governments are likely to fall for lessor reasons.

Attempts have also been made in this study to highlight the features of rural leadership in U.P., and the role and involvement of village level leaders in state politics. The frustration among Muslims of the state, their feeling of deprivation and of being ignored by the Government in various aspects, their efforts to come to a common platform, their involvement and role in the state politics — all have been discussed in this study. The problem of political defections in U.P. and its contribution to instability and failure of Coalition Governments also forms part of this thesis.

The conclusion is based on what I have read, learned and observed. Being a student of Political Science, I might have been vocal and made some overstatements, for which I am open to correction and criticism. No motives have been attributed to any one. This is the study of a research student and should be accepted as such.

Collecting material for my thesis, I had to face many problems. In the absence of any major work on any Congress or non-Congress Government in Uttar Pradesh, collection of material was a difficult and tiresome job. Thus I have based my work on Journals and election reports, but mainly on newspapers. Much has been written on the Emergency period, the fall of Congress and the formation of Janata Government. But no work has been done on the Janata Government in U.P., its problems, functioning, achievements and reasons for its fall. I earnestly hope that this study will help those students who might be working on state politics in India, specially the politics of Uttar Pradesh.

It is my pleasant duty to acknowledge the help received from the following:

I have no words to express my sincere gratitude to Dr M.A. Kishore, Reader in the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, under whose inspiring guidance this study has been completed. Without his constant encouragement and valuable suggestions, it would have not been possible for me to complete this work.

I acknowledge my profound sense of gratefulness to Prof. S.A.H. Bilgrami, Chairman, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, for his continuous help, encouragement and keen interest in the completion of my work.


I owe thanks to the staff of the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University, and the Sapru House Library, New Delhi for their help and cooperation. I am also thankful to the staff of the U.P. Legislature Library, Lucknow for their kind help.

I am obliged to Charan Singh and N.D. Tiwari for granting me interviews which helped me a great deal in understanding the U.P. politics and to form ideas. Besides this thanks to Mr Brahm Dutt and Mr Subhash C. Kashyap for their books from which I have extensively quoted.

I am beholden to my parents, my father in law Mr Syed Shahid Ali and my friend Shamsul Hasan for their continuous encouragement.

My affectionate thanks to my wife, Seema, who helped me taking away from my shoulders many of the domestic responsibilities.

I am thankful to Mr S.M. Qamar Alam for his careful and painstaking typing of the manuscript.



Mohammed Abid

July 1, 1984

Department of Political Science
Aligarh Muslim University
Aligarh.

CONTENTS

PREFACE

PROLOGUE

1	Congress rule in U.P., 1952-67	
2	Formation of SVD Government in U.P.	6
3	Formation of BKD	10
4	Efforts of BKD to topple the SVD Government in U.P.	12
5	President's rule in U.P.	17
6	Mid-Term Poll 1969	18
7	Congress(N) and BKD joint move to topple the Gupta Ministry	20

CHAPTER II BKD GOVERNMENT IN U.P.

1	Formation of BKD Government in U.P.	30
2	BKD-New Congress Coalition	36
3	BKD-Congress(N) merger issue and split in the BKD	47
4	Expansion of Charan Singh Ministry	
5	Law and Order Under the BKD Government	57
6	BKD Rejects Merger	60
7	Congress(R)-BKD Relations strained	62
8	The Policy of Congress(O) and Jana Sangh Towards the BKD Government	64
9	Congress(R) Decision to end the Coalition in U.P.	65
10	BKD Moves the High Court for Writ	77
11	President's rule in U.P.	85
12	Major Decisions Taken by BKD Government	89

CHAPTER III POST BKD DEVELOPMENTS, 1970-77

(A) Political Situation in U.P.

1	Alliance of Four Opposition Parties	94
2	The SVD Government	95
3	Defections in SVD Government and its Collapse	98
4	Congress(N) Government in U.P. and 1974 General Elections	99
5	Split in the BKD and Formation of BLD	102

contd....

	(B) <u>Emergency and Non-Congress Movement</u> ...	104
	6 Jayaprakash Narayan Movement ...	107
	7 BLD and the Pre Emergency Movements ...	110
	8 Opposition Parties in Disarray ...	115
CHAPTER IV	<u>JANATA PHASE IN U.P. & RAM NARESH YADAV'S CHIEF MINISTERSHIP</u>	
	1 Analysis of Assembly Elections (May 10-14, 1977) ...	134
	2 Yadav Elected Leader in U.P. ...	136
	3 Rebels for the removal of R.N.Yadav ...	140
	4 Crisis in the U.P. Janata Party ...	144
	5 Dissidence in U.P. Janata ...	150
CHAPTER V	<u>JANATA PHASE IN U.P.</u>	
	(A) <u>Crisis in Central Leadership</u> ...	167
	1 Resignation of Morarji Desai ...	168
	2 Congress-Janata(S) alliance ...	170
	(B) <u>Janata Government During Banarsi Das's Chief Ministership: Crisis in the Party and its end</u> ..	177
	(C) <u>Some of the Decisions taken and Promises made by the Janata Government in U.P.</u>	191
CHAPTER VI	<u>PATTERN OF LEADERSHIP IN U.P.</u>	
	(A) <u>Rural Leadership</u>	
	1 Panchayati Raj Institutions and their Impact on Rural Leadership ...	211
	(B) <u>Muslim Politics</u> ...	219
CHAPTER VII	<u>ELECTIONS AND DEFECTIONS IN U.P.</u>	
	(A) <u>Elections</u> ...	229
	(B) <u>Political Defections in U.P. Politics</u> ..	241
	<u>CONCLUSION</u>	
	<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>	

PROLOGUE

Congress rule in UP, 1952-67

The State of Uttar Pradesh has been a stronghold of Congress ever since independence, even though the Congress Party was divided within its ranks. In fact the Congress exercised enormous influence in the State of Uttar Pradesh even before independence. After independence G.B. Pant became the Chief Minister as the Congress had an overwhelming majority in the first General Elections. Out of a total of 430 seats, it won 390 seats. At that time the socialists and Independents were the principal opposition parties with a strength of 19 and 14 respectively in the Assembly.

In 1955, G.B. Pant was invited to join the Union Council of Ministers. After Pant's resignation Dr. Sampurnannd took over as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. In the Second General Elections the Congress maintained its overwhelming majority but the strength of opposition in the Assembly had increased and PSP, Jana Sangh and Communists became the principal opposition parties. No threat was posed to the claim of Sampurnannd because of his eminence and his senior position in the cabinet of G.B. Pant. Even C.B. Gupta who was a strong candidate for the Chief Ministership conceded Dr. Sampurnannd's claim.

Dr Sampurnanand continued to lead the government till 1960. Though he enjoyed majority support in the State Legislature, he failed to control the Party organization. Dr Sampurnanand's candidate for the PCC Presidentship, Munishwar Dutt Upadhyaya, was defeated by the rival group and Sampurnanand tendered his resignation.

After the exit of Sampurnanand, C.B. Gupta became the leader of the Congress Legislature Party and there was no open contest for the Chief Ministership. It was felt that with the assumption of Chief Ministership by C.B. Gupta, there will be no factionalism at the State level and the State would have a stable government. It may be noted that C.B. Gupta became the leader of the government by virtue of his unanimous election by Party and not due to intervention of the Party High Command.

In the Third General Elections there were many more Political Parties on the scene to contest the elections in U.P. The efforts of opposition Parties reduced the strength of Congress in the Third General Elections just to 249 as against 286 in 1957 and 390 in 1952. The Socialists secured 24 seats, Jana Sangh - 49, Independents 31 and PSP 38.¹ But this election too did not pose any threat to the continuing

1. Poplai, S.L., 1962 General Elections in India, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1962, p. 21

stronghold of Congress in the State.

C.B. Gupta who took over as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in 1960 continued to be in chair till August 1963, when he quit office under the Kamagaj Plan. Mrs. Sucheta Kriplani became the new Chief Minister and earned the distinction of being the first woman Chief Minister of a State in India. It may be noted that the election of Mrs. Sucheta Kriplani was not unopposed; she had to face a rival in Kamapati Tripathi. Though there were factions within the Congress ranks the Congress Party continued to head the Government till 1967.

In the Fourth General Elections the Congress failed to secure a clearcut majority in the State Legislature, although it emerged as the single largest Party. In March 1967 the Congress formed a Ministry under C.B. Gupta with the support of Independent members. However, this Ministry could not survive because of frequent defections. In the meanwhile, the non-Congress political parties at the initiative of Jana Sangh formed the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD) with Ram Chandra Vikal, an independent MLA, as its leader. Subsequently, Charan Singh, a prominent member of the Congress left the Party and joined Jana Congress. This Party also merged itself with the SVD and Charan Singh was elected as its new leader.

Thus the ground was clear for the formation of the first non-Congress Government in Uttar Pradesh under Charan Singh.

The establishment of a non-Congress Government in UP can be attributed to the efforts of opposition parties.

Kerala was the first State where an alliance was made to oust the Congress, and a non-Congress government was formed. But immediately President's rule was imposed and then in February 1961, mid term elections took place where the Congress got some more seats compared to its performance in 1957. The same thing was repeated when the Government of India declared that the elected administration having collapsed a replacement was made by the direct rule of President. Kerala did not have a stable government in the State for years. In 1963 there was a mid term poll which returned the Communist Party in near majority to the Assembly. Some of the Communists elected had been in detention under the Defence of India Rules. The Communist Party made an announcement that with the help of some non-Communist members, who had promised support, it was in a position to form a Government, and claimed that it should not be deprived of the constitutional right to form a ministry as a majority Coalition Party. The Centre did not respond; on the contrary it dissolved the newly elected Assembly and

continued the President's rule.

The February (1967) General Elections were held against this background. Most of the people grew sore over what they regarded as abuse by the Congress Party of the constitutional provision meant for emergencies. All opposition parties were distressed and annoyed. From this arose a bitter feeling, and many of those who had been voting for the Congress became its opponents. The opposition Parties of the State grew more conscious and stood solidly against the Congress. They formed an United Left Front to give Congress a straight fight in every constituency.

The Fourth General Elections can be considered as a major watershed in the political development of India as well as that of Uttar Pradesh. Apart from proving the basic soundness of Indian democracy, it completely altered the pattern of political power which emerged after the Fourth General Elections. It was qualitatively different from the situation that had so far prevailed. Hitherto, the Indian National Congress exercised virtually unchallenged monopoly of power at the Centre as well as in the States. The Fourth General Elections ended the era of one Party domination. Though the Congress retained power at the Centre, its majority in the Lok Sabha was drastically reduced. In eight of the Seventeen States the Congress

lost its majority (as shown in the table on the next page) and non-Congress coalition governments came into power.

In the State of Uttar Pradesh, (one out of the eight non-Congress States) the biggest State of India, the Congress could secure only 198 seats (Total seats - 425).¹ The opposition in U.P. which moved into the treasury benches on April 1, 1967, after the fall of Congress government, consisted of eight parties. The Jana Sangh had 97 seats, SSP - 44, Communist (R) - 14, Swatantra - 12, PSP - 11, Republican - 9, and the Communist (L) one seat only.²

2. Formation of SVD Government in U.P.

In a dramatic move to oust the Congress from power all the opposition parties came together and formed a SVD government (Samyukta Vidhayak Dal) in U.P. in 1967. Their combined strength was 188 in a House of 425. The 37 independents held the balance but later on they lent their support to the Congress.³ At that time there were two candidates for leadership - Charan Singh and C.B. Gupta. But the Central leadership chose C.B. Gupta in the belief that he commanded the support

1. Ram Gopal, Spotlight on Democracy in India, Pustak Kendra, Lucknow, 1970, p. 99; Also see: Shastri, KN. Ramnath. An Analytical Study of 1967 General Elections in India, V.B. Prakashan, Agra, 1968.

2. Gopal, Ram, op.cit., p. 112

3. Ibid., p. 102

Party Position in the State Assembly Elections, 1967

S.No.	States	Total seats	Cong- ress	Swatan- tra	Jana Sangh	SSP	CPI	CPM	PSP	Others	Indepen- dents.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1.	Andhra Pradesh	287	165	29	3	1	10	-	-	2	68
2.	Assam	126	73	2	-	4	10	9	5	9	25
3.	Bihar	318	128	3	27	47	24	4	18	1	46
4.	Gujarat	168	93	64	1	-	-	-	3	1	46
5.	Haryana	81	48	3	12	-	-	-	-	2	16
6.	Jammu & Kashmir	75	61	-	3	-	-	-	-	8	3
7.	Kerala	133	09	-	-	19	19	52	-	19	15
8.	Madhya Pradesh	296	167	7	78	10	1	-	9	-	24
9.	Tamil Nadu (Madras)	234	49	20	-	2	2	11	5	138	8
10.	Maharashtra	270	203	-	4	4	11	1	7	24	16
11.	Mysore (Karnataka)	216	126	16	4	6	2	-	29	9	34

continued

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
12.	Orissa	140	31	49	-	2	7	1	21	17	12
13.	Punjab	104	48	-	9	1	6	2	-	29	9
14.	Rajasthan	184	89	49	22	8	1	-	-	-	15
15.	Uttar Pradesh	425	198	12	98	44	14	1	11	8	39
16.	W. Bengal	210	127	1	1	7	16	43	7	47	31
<u>UNION TERRITORIES</u>											
	Goa	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	2
	Himachal Pradesh	60	34	1	7	-	2	-	-	-	16
	Manipur	30	16	-	-	4	1	-	-	-	9
	Tripura	30	27	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-

of the majority. But Charan Singh staked his claim and offered himself as a candidate for the leadership. The Central leaders sent an observer to Lucknow to persuade Charan Singh to withdraw his candidature. The agreement leading to Charan Singh's withdrawal was said to have made it incumbent upon C.B. Gupta to consult Charan Singh in the choice of the personnel for the ministry. Charan Singh made some proposals and Gupta turned them down. The former therefore refused to join the ministry. But on the day when the Assembly was in session, some 30 members of the Congress met at Charan Singh's house and discussed the possibility of their leaving Congress Party. On April 1, 1967, 17 of the Congress members crossed the floor in the Assembly with their leader Charan Singh, announcing that "Gupta's intransigence had compelled them to take the painful decision."¹

The Assembly was that day to accept or to reject the Governor's address, a policy statement of the Government. The opposition moved an amendment and carried it through with the support of defectors from the Congress. The Congress government had to bow out and Charan Singh, the leader of SVD took over as the Chief Minister of U.P. For the first time in U.P. a

1. Dutt, Brahm, Five Headed Monster, Surge Publications, New Delhi, 1978, p. 1

Coalition government of assorted parties was thus formed.

3. Formation of BKD

Prof. Humayun Kabir was the first to take an initiative to form an all-India political party to fight the reactionary forces and to replace the Congress in course of time. He had invited all the important non-Congress leaders from different States to meet at Delhi on December 6-7, 1966 to review the situation and take a decision. About 75 leaders representing all the States met and decided to form an All India party, namely Kranti Dal.¹

The alternate party was launched with an aim "to promote the ideal of nationalism and democratic socialism, with emphasis on democracy than Socialism." The new party felt that the Congress had professed the old ideas but it lost the spirit, initiative and capacity to enforce them. Besides this the Congress started losing its members day by day who either were to form a new political party or to join the newly formed anti Congress parties.

1. Kashyap, Subhash, C., Indian Political Parties, Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, 1971, p.283.

Since the elections were due in 1967, and the time being short, the party could not be officially formed and therefore could not contest the 1967 elections.

On April 9, 1967 Mumanyun Kabir called a meeting of all the then Chief Ministers of non-Congress State governments and other important leaders.¹ This meeting was held at Delhi where all the leaders who were present agreed in principle that an All India Party be formed but decided to discuss the matter further. Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, the then Chief Minister of Bihar, invited all Chief Ministers of non-Congress governments, presidents and secretaries of like minded parties and some other important leaders from different States to meet on May 14-16, 1967 at Patna. The Convention lasted for three days and had finally decided to form the Bhartiya Kranti Dal (BKD).

According to the Steering Committee of the BKD the main aim and objective of the Party was "to work according to the philosophy of Mahatama Gandhi to create a democratic society, free from economic, political and social exploitation." During the party convention on November 11 & 12, 1967 the draft of the Constitution of the Party was approved and adopted.

1. Kashyap, Subhash, C., Indian Political Parties, Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, 1971, p.283.

The BKD did not contest the elections of 1967. But it started to take an active part in political activity.

4. Efforts of BKD to topple the SVD Government in U.P.

In U.P. where the SVD government was formed in 1967 Charan Singh was urged to resign from the leadership of the SVD government and to join the BKD. A few months after the formation of SVD government in U.P. an atmosphere of uncertainty was created by some constituents of the Coalition government. The BKD in a unanimous resolution said: "the party executive considered the political situation in the State and sorrowfully noted that the activities of some constituents of the SVD were increasingly creating difficulties for the government, which not only prevented it from giving the necessary attention to public affairs, but were undermining the administration."¹

The BKD Executive was of the opinion that such an atmosphere of uncertainty could not be permitted to continue for long, and it therefore authorised its leader Charan Singh to take any action he considered appropriate in the public interest. On December 16, 1967 Charan Singh mooted his resignation from the leadership of the SVD Coalition at a joint meeting of legislators and the State Executive of his party, the Bhartiya Kranti Dal.² On the resignation of Charan Singh,

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, December 17, 1967

2. Ibid.

there were allegations and counter allegations. The SSP leader Raj Narain accused Charan Singh of violating all the agreements.

While Charan Singh kept on forcing his resignation for the second time in three months, the ruling coalition parties requested him to continue as Chief Minister and promised to devise a machinery to ensure proper conduct of the coalition and the government. These promises were made in an unanimous resolution of the General Body of SVD-while this resolution was passed on by the Chief Minister to a high power Committee of his own party for consideration, the BKD had unanimously decided that Charan Singh should certainly resign. A committee of nine was constituted on December 17, 1967 to take a decision on Charan Singh's own proposal that he be allowed to resign.¹

After the Chief Minister had resigned, Jhar Khande Rai (CPI), a former Food and Civil Supplies Minister suggested that the whole issue of resignation be taken up by the coordination committee. Charan Singh rejected the proposal and said that "when he had to resign in August, 1967, he had sent his resignation to the Coordination Committee but that body cared little to carry out the promises it had made, when it persuaded him to withdraw the resignation." Therefore, he said, he did not give his resignation directly to the general body, but was prepared to send the same to the Governor instead. Ugra Sen

1. The Statesman, Delhi, Dec 17, 1967

had confessed that the Coordination Committee of which he was the Secretary and Convenor, had failed to fulfill the assurance made in August, but this time they would give a better account. Ram Chandra Vikal (Ind) Minister of Forests, who was the leader of the SVD before Charan Singh joined it, had declared that the coalition could not exist without Charan Singh and that his continuing as Chief Minister was also a popular wish. On December 19, 1967 the Congress demanded the resignation of Charan Singh since there was a serious crisis in the Coalition government.¹ On voting the SVD government was defeated on a snap vote but the Congress opposition failed to take advantage of this to bring a vote of no Confidence against Charan Singh.

The third national conference of the SSP which was held on January 1, 1968 adopted a resolution directing the party's five ministers in UP to resign from the SVD Ministry immediately in protest against the non implementation of accepted minimum programmes, particularly land revenue abolition, release of detenus and discontinuing of use of English in administration.²

1. The Statesman, Delhi, Dec 20, 1967

2. The Times of India, Delhi, Jan 2, 1968

On the other side the national executive of PSP, in a resolution directed its legislators in U.P and Bihar to insist on the government for the abolition of land revenue and introduction of graded sales tax. On January 5, 1968 the Governor accepted the resignation of three SSP ministers in U.P. and two deputy ministers from the State Cabinet.¹ Charan Singh alleged that the SSP tactics were aimed at the coming elections. He said: "due to coming General Elections these leaders are making ground to win the favour of cultivators, State government employee and the people in general."²

As a result of the resignation of Ministers and Deputy Ministers from the SSP, two Ministers, one Deputy Minister and one Parliamentary Secretary were sworn in on January 8, 1968 raising the strength of the Council of Ministers of U.P. to 22, all being independents.³ In spite of the rise in Charan Singh's Ministry, a great threat to the Ministry developed as the Working Committee of the U.P. Unit of Jana Sangh warned the Chief Minister that if he did not change his arbitrary ways the SVD might be left with no alternative but to elect a new leader in his place.

-
1. The Times of India, Delhi, Jan 6, 1968
 2. Ibid, Jan 7, 1968
 3. Ibid, Jan 9, 1968

The ministerial crisis deepened further more on the decision of Chief Minister Charan Singh to boycott the meeting of the Coordination Committee and the general body of the SVD being held in Lucknow to take stock of the latest developments in the State. Charan Singh's complaint was that since he had not been consulted about the holdings of these meetings, he and other members of his party did not propose to attend them. He felt that the Jana Sangh and other constituent units of the Dal should have sounded him before Calling these meeting because he was still the leader of the SVD.

On February 17, 1968 Charan Singh had resigned and advised the Governor to dissolve the Assembly and to order mid term elections unless another leader elected by the SVD was thought capable of forming the government. After Charan Singh's resignation was accepted by the Governor, the SVD requested and tried to persuade Charan Singh to continue as its leader. But Charan Singh was not agreeable to accept the leadership anymore. On the confusion created by the SVD and its obvious failure to elect a leader acceptable to all its constituents after Charan Singh's resignation, the Governor of U.P. sent a report to the Centre recommending takeover of the State administration by the President.

5. President's rule in U.P.

On February 25, 1968 President's rule was declared in U.P. and the Assembly had been dissolved in view of the political stalemate there.¹ After his resignation from the SVD government and the dissolution of Assembly, Charan Singh formally launched the Bhartiya Kranti Dal in September 1968, which, however had come into being earlier in November 1967.

After the dissolution of the U.P. Assembly, elections were declared to be held in U.P., Bihar, Punjab, Haryana and West Bengal. In U.P. the elections aimed to secure a stable government. Preparations were made by all political parties: the Congress, Jana Sangh, the leftist parties and the BKD, to contest the mid term elections. The Jana Sangh which won 98 seats in the 1969 elections and emerged as the second largest party in U.P., decided to contest all the 425 seats.² There was a revolt of large number of SSP workers in U.P. and some of them left the Party, some joining the Congress and others joining the BKD. Those members of the Party who belonged to Scheduled Castes joined the Republican Party. Among the leftist Parties, the PSP and the Communist Parties were very weak. The PSP objected to Marxist Communists, and the Communists were opposed to the Jana Sangh. This made the

1. The Statesman, Delhi, Feb 26, 1968

2. Mathur, R.N., 'Mid Term Elections in U.P.', Indian Political Science Review, Delhi, Volume IV, 1969-70, p.192

pattern of disunity in the anti-Congress rank complete.¹

The Party which offered formidable challenge to the Congress Party was the BKD. It commanded solid support of the underprivileged and backward classes, whereas in the Congress list for elections Caste Hindus predominated. The BKD list contained 51 Rajputs, 36 Muslims, 17 Banias, 48 Ahirs, 88 Harijans, 10 Jats, 5 from backward communities and 26 others. The Congress list contained 115 Brahmins alone besides representatives of other castes.

6. Mid Term Poll 1969

Following table shows the Party position in the 1969 Mid-term Poll in U.P.:

Party	Seats won	Percentage of votes polled
Congress	211	33.69
Jana Sangh	49	17.93
Swatantra	5	1.25
BKD	98	21.29
CPI	4	3.08
CPM	1	0.19
SSP	33	7.82

contd...

1. Mathur R.N., 'Mid Term Elections in U.P.' Indian Political Science Review, Delhi, volume IV, 1969-70 p.193.

Party	Seats won	Percentage of votes polled
PSP	3	1.72
Republican Party	1	3.48
Hindu Maha Sabha	1	-
RPM	1	12.12
Forward Block	-	0.07
Independents	18	7.09

In the mid-term poll the Congress had secured the largest number of seats (211 out of 425) and 33.69% of the votes polled with BKD trailing behind as the second highest, thereby becoming the biggest opposition party in the Assembly. The smaller parties were practically wiped out. The strength of the independents was reduced to 18 from 37 in 1967. The dominance of the upper castes was broken. Further development that took place was that government in U.P. became very unstable. The Congress party headed by C.B. Gupta with the support of Independents and Swatantra formed a Ministry on February 16, 1969.¹ The Gupta Ministry could not last for a long time and stability shaken due to split in the Congress. The New Congress under the leadership of Kamalapati Tripathi joined hands with the BKD to topple the C.B. Gupta Ministry.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 17, 1969

7. Congress (N) and BKD joint move to topple the Gupta Ministry

The New Congress had joined hands with the BKD to topple the Gupta Ministry but the question of leadership that in coalition government who will be the leader, was very confusing. Both the New Congress and the BKD were interested in their leaders to head the government. For the solution of this issue both the leaders, Kamlapati Tripathi and Charan Singh met on January 27, 1970 and declared that the issue of leadership would be resolved to the satisfaction of both; they had not reached any agreement as to who would head the alternate government in case the Gupta Ministry fell.¹

The New Congress Legislature Party in U.P. which met on February 3, 1970 passed a resolution authorising its leader Kamlapati Tripathi to hold negotiations with other political parties to topple the government headed by C.B. Gupta. The resolution also authorised Tripathi to enrol the party legislators who were keen to join it.²

On February 5, 1970 H.N. Bahuguna, the New Congress General Secretary, sought President V.V. Giri's intervention for ensuring that the minority government of C.B. Gupta in U.P. should not be allowed.³ According to Bahuguna the no confidence

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Jan 28, 1970

2. Ibid, Feb 4, 1970

3. Ibid, Feb 7, 1970

motion should get precedence over the debate on the Governor's address to a joint session of the legislators. The address would be the policy statement of the minority government.¹ The fear of the New Congress legislators that the Assembly might be adjourned immediately after the debate on Governor's address without taking the no confidence motion was also conveyed by him to the President.

On the issue of leadership, Charan Singh declared that "even if he were not made the leader of the combined opposition, the BKD would extend full support to Kamalapati Tripathi unconditionally in toppling the minority government headed by C.B. Gupta and forming an alternative government."²

On February 10, 1970 C.B. Gupta tendered his resignation to the Governor advising him to invite the opposition leader Charan Singh to form the government. The Governor B. Gopala Reddy accepted the resignation of Gupta but asked him to

-
1. A no confidence motion against the C.B. Gupta government was tabled by the BKD Gen. Secretary, Shiv Raj Singh. In a House of 425, those who had publicly voiced no confidence against C.B. Gupta numbered 233. They included 125 of the New Congress, 95 from BKD, 7 from SSP, 4 from CPI, one each from CPM and Republican Party.
 2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 7, 1970
 3. Ibid., Feb 6, 1970

continue till alternative arrangements were made. The Jana Sangh and SSP endorsed Gupta's recommendation that the BKD leader be invited to form the government. But the Governor said that he would consult legal opinion before he gave his decision.

Paying rich tributes to C.B. Gupta, Charan Singh said: "when summoned I will not flinch from shouldering the responsibility of the high office."¹ He said that Gupta deserved all the thanks of the people of state for "saving them from the ordeal of another mid-term poll which some of the politicians seemed to be working for."² He also thanked the Jana Sangh and SSP for endorsing Gupta's recommendation for calling him to form the government.

Following is the text of C.B. Gupta's resignation letter:³

My dear Shri Rajpal,

"I have devoted more than 50 years of my life in the service of the country in pursuance of my convictions. Democratic way of living has been a part of my life and I hold democracy as the achievement of the dream of the father of the nation. Unfortunately, the country has been passing through peril. Authoritarian trends have raised their ugly head, forces of disruption and disintegration are active. Public life is being polluted by horse trading elements with extra territorial loyalties are also

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 6, 1970

2. Ibid., Feb 11, 1970

3. Ibid., Feb 6, 1970

trying to harm the nation to an irreparable extent. Discipline is the mainstay of democracy and the same has also been at ransom. This has very much harmed us and our orderly progress has been checkmated. It seems now that there is definite style to plunge the State in the whirlwind of another mid term poll. This is no solution to our problems and the State has already suffered a lot in the past. In the larger interests of the State, I have decided to relinquish the office that I hold and to my mind the leader of opposition Mr Charan Singh may be called upon to succeed me to shoulder the responsibility of the office. He has been my valued colleague for a long time.

"It is in pursuance of authority given to me by the legislature party which held its meeting on 9th Feb. 1970 and authorised me to take such a step. As deem proper that I make the statement. But before I part I may say in fairness to all that I owe a sense of gratitude and appreciation to the Jana Sangh, the Samyukta Socialist Party, the Swatantra Party, the Praja Socialist Party and the Independents for their valuable support and coordination to me on the basis of a definite programme. I am also thankful to my own party colleagues who imposed confidence in me and whose unstinted loyalty was a source of strength to me all these years. I am confident that on the basis of same programme the support and confidence of the above parties will be available to the new government headed by Mr Charan Singh.

"I hereby resign as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and request you to kindly postpone the session of the legislature which was to start from tomorrow to Feb.23."

Yours sincerely,

C.B. Gupta

The New Congress leader Bahuguna however asserted that the Governor must invite Kamlapati Tripathi, leader of the largest group in the Assembly to form a ministry, and only when he expressed his inability to do so, could he ask the leader of any other party to form a government. He said that it was not in the competence of the Chief Minister, who had resigned because he had been reduced to minority in the assembly, to recommend to the Governor who should be the next Chief Minister.

On February 11, 1970, the New Congress Legislature Party leader Kamlapati Tripathi met Governor Gopala Reddy to stake his claim as leader of the largest single party to form the government.¹ Claiming majority support, he told the Governor that if he did not have it, his government could be voted out on the floor of the house; it would be grossly unfair to deny him the first opportunity to form the government, said Tripathi.

The Central leaders were still hopeful of preventing the BKD - Old Congress Coalition from forming the government in U.P. They wanted the Governor to give Kamlapati Tripathi a chance to form a ministry and hoped that he would be able to

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 12, 1970

do so because many MLAs from the Old Congress, the BKD as well as Jana Sangh and SSP were not to support Charan Singh for Chief Ministership.¹ The New Congress President Jagjivan Ram hinted that it was still possible to form government with BKD support. He said: "the final act is not yet over, the drama is still going on. What is the sanctity of C.B. Gupta's advice to the Governor when he has lost majority? If it is contended by anybody that he had not lost the majority then let the Assembly decide." He further said that he had yet not given hope of an understanding with the BKD.²

Meanwhile the SSP legislature party in a meeting unanimously pledged its support to Charan Singh on the basis of a "time bound concrete socialistic programme." It felt that "this was necessary to frustrate the efforts of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for imposing President's rule." Through another resolution the party reaffirmed its full confidence in its leader Anant Ram Jaiswal, and authorised him to take necessary steps in connection with the formation of government under Charan Singh's leadership.³

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 12, 1970

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., Feb 13, 1970

On February 14, 1970, the New AICC treasurer B.P. Mishra announced that "full accord had been reached between the two parties ... the agreement provided for the formation of a single Party government headed by the BKD Party leader Charan Singh with the New Congress supporting it from outside.

The Coordination Committee of the Old Congress, SSP, Jana Sangh and Swatantra selected former FWD Minister Girdhari Lal for leading the alliance and sent a letter to the Governor withdrawing the support it had pledged to Charan Singh following C.B. Gupta's resignation. After the formal announcement of alliance between the New Congress and BKD, the Old Congress informed the Governor about Girdhari Lal's election as leader and urged that he should be invited to form the ministry.¹

Charan Singh said that his party never made any comment about forming government with the help of the alliance. About the stability of the government by cooperation between the New Congress and BKD, he said that the strength of New Congress was 138 while his party had about 100 members in the 425 member State Assembly. When asked by the Governor Gopala Reddy to give him the exact figure of the strength of respective alliances Charan Singh claimed 240 including 96 of his party.²

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 15, 1970

2. Ibid.

Girdhari Lal, leader of the four party alliance, namely SSP, Jana Sangh, Kisan Mazdoor Party (KMP) and Swatantra, claimed 220 members.

Charan Singh requested the Governor to summon the House on February 26, 1970, while Girdhari Lal wanted the House to be summoned on February 23. The resigning Chief Minister C.B. Gupta had also suggested the House to be summoned on February 23. Under constitutional provisions the House should have met on or before February 28, 1970 when the six months interval since the last session would have expired. The Assembly Speaker and the Council Chairman, accompanied by their secretaries, also met the Governor and advised him that he was competent to call the House any day he liked.

Before Girdhari Lal met the Governor, a delegation consisting of old Congress legislature Party Secretary Krishnanand Rai, PSP leader Raj Narain, SSP Legislative Party leader A.R. Jaiswal and Jana Sangh leader Tripathi met Gopala Reddy and delivered to him a letter from C.B. Gupta informing him that Girdhari Lal had been elected leader of the alliance and requested him that he be invited to form the government. The letter also withdrew support to Charan Singh. C.B. Gupta said in his letter that he was not defeated on the floor of the House. He had resigned and recommended Charan Singh's name

for being invited to form the government on his "solemn commitment to the economic programme of the alliance." But he said that since Charan Singh had now declined to accept the programme, and broken the agreement, he was free to suggest another name and that he was doing so in favour of Girdhari Lal.

About the New Congress - BKD alliance Charan Singh had not agreed to give in writing that the BKD will be supporting the Indira Gandhi government in Parliament. Charan Singh was of the view that it was not necessary to put it in writing. The agreement was understood to cover mainly three conditions: (i) the BKD would form the one party government by Charan Singh, (ii) the New Congress would give full support; and (iii) after working together when the leaders came closer and consider it timely the New Congress would join the ministry, making it a coalition government.

On February 15, 1970 President V.V. Giri had asked the U.P. and Bihar Governors to exercise their constitutional power and not be guided by any political considerations in permitting the formation of new Ministries in their respective States.¹ Leaders of the Old Congress felt disturbed that the institution

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 17, 1970

of Governor was being abused. They felt that the summoning of U.P. Governor to Delhi by the Prime Minister amounted to exercising undue influence on him in favour of her group which was reflected in the statement, issued by the Governor. They took strongest objection to this and urged the President to intervene and to "stop the subversion of the constitution."

In a statement S.D. Mishra, the Old Congress Secretary, said that "the part played by Charan Singh in U.P. Politics would be recorded as a black deed in the history of democracy." He said that the BKD chief, by changing his stand all of a sudden and making alliance with the New Congress, had "not only stabbed Mr Gupta in the back but had also gone against the wishes of some of the members of his own party who had invited the move of alliance between C.B. Gupta and Charan Singh."

On February 16, 1970 it was declared that the Charan Singh government was likely to be sworn in the next day. The New Congress had agreed to give its full support to Charan Singh in the formation of the Ministry accordingly.

CHAPTER - II

EKD GOVERNMENT IN U.P.

Formation of BKD Government in U.P.

Charan Singh, the BKD leader returned to power for the second time on February 17, 1970, exactly after two years after he resigned as the SVD Chief Minister, with his swearing in by the Governor Gopala Reddy as Chief Minister at the head of a 10 member Single Party Ministry.¹ Six other Ministers and three Deputy Ministers were also administered the oath of office and secrecy. The ceremony was also attended by the New Congress Party leader Kamalapati Tripathi with some of his party men and speaker A.G. Kher, but none from the alliance led by the Old Congress was present.

On February 17, 1970 Charan Singh met the Governor with the list of his supporters. An hour later the rival candidate Girdhari Lal (Old Congress) supported by the leaders of BSP, Jana Sangh, Swatantra and old Congress also met the Governor. The Governor invited Charan Singh to form the Ministry. The same day, the oath taking ceremony took place.

In his first meeting with the Governor Charan Singh claimed a strength of 235 legislators, including 96 of BKD, 13 of New Congress, five Communists and three others. On the other hand Girdhari Lal claimed the support of 236 legislators including 129 of the Old Congress. Two New Congress members also

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 18, 1970

personally intimated to the Governor their decision to support Girdhari Lal. Two BKD members who met the Governor claimed 21 other members of their Party behind them to support Girdhari Lal.

Speaking at the oath taking ceremony, Chief Minister Charan Singh assured the people of the State that his government would do the best through hard work and clean and efficient administration. He regretted that though the State was backward and underdeveloped, the Congress government indulged only in slogans. There was need to find realistic solution to the problems howsoever unpopular they might be.¹

On the formation of Charan Singh Ministry, the Old Congress, Jana Sangh and the SSP alliance alleged that the Governor, B. Gopala Reddy was persuaded by the Central Government to invite Charan Singh to form the Ministry. They criticised the manner in which the Charan Singh Government had been sworn and alleged that "democratic norms and well known constitutional principles had not only been ignored but violated."

The Old Congress President Nijalingappa, criticising Indira Gandhi said: "the swearing in of Charan Singh Ministry in U.P. is a shot in the arm of Mrs. Gandhi's Congress." He

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 18, 1970

summed up his party's reaction by taking exception to Governor Gopala Reddy's conduct. According to him the Governor had acted under pressure from New Delhi in inviting Charan Singh to form a Ministry "without verifying the claim of the SVD leader Girdhari Lal, particularly when nearly 50 MLAs were common in the lists submitted by the two leaders." He described the BKD Chairman as the "King of defectors" and complained that "Politicians in India had lost honesty, integrity and political morality. Every Indian ought to hang his head in shame at what happened recently in Bihar and U.P."

Nijalingappa thought that Charan Singh's defection had been brought about by Mrs Gandhi. He also declared that he would never like to have alliance with the BKD even if some opportunity comes. He further said that horse trading was practiced on large scale. Nijalingappa demanded that the U.P. legislators should meet immediately so that the strength of new Government could be tested. He predicted that these governments would not last as they had come into existence without any moral basis.¹

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 19, 1970

The Coordination Committee of the alliance of Old Congress, SSP, Jana Sangh, Swatantra, KMP and Independents expressed its "firm determination to launch an agitation if Charan Singh Ministry imposed land revenue on the economic holdings and profession tax, and reversed other measures taken by the Gupta's Government under its 13 point programme to bring relief to the various sectors of the people." The Committee also decided "to put up stiff fight on the floor of the legislature for the retention of the programme and for its further implementations." Besides exemptions of uneconomic holdings from land revenue and abolition of profession taxes, the programme also provided for the government undertaking the responsibility of distribution of teachers' salaries through its agencies, redistribution of land to the Harijans and the landless, 45% recruitment for Harijans in services until the reserved quota of 18% was filled, and compulsory use of Hindi for all administrative work and facilities for proper development of Urdu language.

The Coordination Committee accused the Governor of installing Charan Singh's Ministry as "part of a conspiracy to strengthen the Prime Minister's hands." It contended that "Reddy had taken a decision in favour of the BKD leaders without verifying the claim of both sides." It alleged that the Governor had already decided to commission Charan Singh even

before the rival candidate Girdhari Lal had put his case before him. "This was evident from the fact that the order had already been issued for making arrangements for the oath taking ceremony before these interviews. The whole process was carried out in a surreptitious and conspiratorial manner. While Mr Gupta got the invitation after the oath taking ceremony was over, the retiring Minister and leaders of various opposition groups forming the alliance never received it."

The Committee further pointed out that BKD workers were making public announcements on loudspeakers from early morning that Charan Singh would be sworn in at 2.40 PM. The ceremony did take place at this very time, showing that all the decisions had been taken much in advance.

In a letter to the Governor former Chief Minister C.B. Gupta said that the BKD-New Congress alliance could not provide a stable government in the absence of agreement on such burning issue like exemption of uneconomic holdings from land revenue. It was not known what was the nature of the reported alliance between the two parties nor was it known that there could be any reasonable likelihood of the two groups holding together even if they had majority support, which they had not.¹ It was

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 19, 1970

further said that "the opposition will make the motion of thanks for the Governor's address and the issue of no confidence against the Charan Singh Ministry, if it did not accept the Old Congress alliance's economic programme. The motion will provide the first opportunity for a trial of strength between the two sides on the floor of the Assembly."

Girdhari Lal was confident of toppling the Government. He said that "an opposition deputation will meet the President before the session to post him with the correct position and to protest against the Governor's arbitrary action." He said that the opposition has completely lost its faith in the Governor for his partiality and apprehended that the House might be adjourned to prevent government from being defeated. He alleged that the process of assessment started by Dr Reddy was "only a make believe to camouflage the decision he had already taken to invite the BKD leader to form the Ministry." In support Girdhari Lal claimed that the party legislator had over heard telephonic talk between Delhi and the Government House in Lucknow, in which clear instructions were given to install the BKD Ministry at 2.00 PM.¹

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 20, 1970

2. BKD - New Congress Coalition

While on one hand the opposition alliance was putting forward its claim to a majority Charan Singh on the other was persuading Indira Gandhi that New Congress should join his Ministry soon so as to clear the atmosphere of instability in the State. Charan Singh was not personally averse to the merger proposal but was not finding it too easy to carry the majority with him in this regard. He also sought Indira Gandhi's help in dropping the C.B. Gupta Government's measure exempting economic holdings from revenue. According to Charan Singh, one of the reasons why such a drastic step should not be taken was: extremely poor percapita taxation in the State. While the average per capita in Punjab, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Gujarat, Haryana and Tamil Nadu was more than Rs. 400, it was only Rs. 306 in U.P., one of the lowest taxed States figuring fourth from bottom.¹

Charan Singh was said to be determined to abolish the scheme which had the unqualified backing of New Congress and a section of his own party. His problem seemed to be that another section of his party backed by big and politically influential farmers was opposed to the measure. Those farmers were disappoint-

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 23, 1970

ted because "the scheme not only benefited very small land holders but had the danger of an increased land revenue on the bigger ones to make up for the loss."¹ A proposal mooted by Charan Singh was that instead of abolishing land revenue on small holdings, the amount collected from them should be ploughed back in the shape of fertiliser subsidies and irrigation facilities.² Charan Singh promised his best efforts to secure a favourable decision from the BKD National Executive for the support of Indira Government through the BKD parliamentary members. The 14 member BKD Parliamentary group was sharply divided on whether the party should reciprocate the party gesture in U.P. towards the BKD by giving conditional support to Indira Gandhi's Government. Some members opposed the proposal and felt that the cooperation should depend on the merit of each issue. Ultimately it was resolved to refer the matter to the National Executive. As regards the merger issue, the BKD General Secretary Prakash Vir Shastri ruled out its prospects in the foreseeable future. In response to Bihar Chief Minister Daroga Rai's request it was decided that Vice President Rai Kumbha Ram Arya and Secretary S.K. Sinha should visit Patna for consultations with

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 23, 1970

2. Ibid.

BKD MLAs and issue appropriate directions to them.

Kamlapati Tripathi had talks with Indira Gandhi on February 24, 1970 regarding the formation of Ministry in alliance with BKD under Charan Singh's leadership. During the meeting Charan Singh urged such coalition to lend stability to the administration instead of supporting his Government from outside. He, with Tripathi and Indira Gandhi, had also agreed to accept nominees of the New Congress in the proposed Coalition.¹ He was said to have favoured a 21 member team including himself excluding the Junior Ministers. While agreeing that the party should join Charan Singh's Ministry without unnecessary delay, the New UPCC Executive Parliamentary Board and the Legislature Party authorised Kamlapati Tripathi to take a decision about the timing, personnel and the number of its representatives. The New Congress had also proposed a coordination agency between the two parties.²

On April 18, 1970 it was stated that the New Congress would formally enter into a coalition with BKD when the Charan Singh Ministry was to be expanded, about two months after its installation. As many as 27 New Congress representatives, 14 Cabinet Ministers, 17 Ministers of State and 6 Deputy Ministers,

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 25, 1970

2. Ibid., Feb 26, 1970

besides one BKD Minister would be sworn in by the Governor, which would have raised the strength of the Council of Ministers to 38. Originally the Council of Ministers was comprised of only 10 members; 7 cabinet Ministers including the Chief Minister and 3 Deputy Ministers, all belonging to the BKD.

The Chief Minister said that the Ministry would be further expanded sometime later to include some BKD men. Representation to the two parties was being given on the basis of their representative strength in the Assembly going by the figure of fifty as the final strength of the Ministry. The BKD was to have 21 representatives and the New Congress 29. Charan Singh was not in favour of having a Deputy Chief Minister. Kamalapati Tripathi kept himself out. The one BKD addition was to be Bishan Lal of Moradabad with cabinet rank. The New Congress list of 14 Cabinet Ministers headed by Chaturbhuj Sharma, who would be No. 2 in the Ministry, consisted of 9 Ministers who resigned from Gupta cabinet following the split in the party in addition to former PWD Minister J.P. Rawat, former Agriculture Minister Genda Singh, former Minister Baldev Singh Arya and two new comers B.S. Avasthi and Ram Lakhan, Harijan members from Banaras. Besides Nine Cabinet Ministers including Sharma, there were seven Ministers of State and six Deputy Ministers.¹

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Apr 19, 1970

Later on in a statement Charan Singh said that three more men from BKD would be included in his cabinet. He indicated that this would be after the Tanda by-election on May 17, 1970, which, acting State BKD Chairman Jai Ram Verma was contesting. With three men coming, the number of representatives of his party was to rise to 11 in the 25 men cabinet; fourteen Congressmen were already there. Charan Singh said that he had not consulted the New Congress leaders about the allocation of portfolios, which he had done on his own but generally the New Congress Ministers were satisfied with it.¹

On the day of opening of the joint session of the U.P. Legislature on February 26, 1970 a chorus of "shame shame", and "Governor go back" and loud thumping of desks emerged from the opposition benches. Ignoring Opposition leader Girdhari Lal's protest Governor Gopala Reddy started reading his address. The SSP leader A.R. Jaiswal and Jana Sangh leader Madhav Prasad Tripathi charged the Governor with acting in a partisan manner against the constitution in installing a minority government headed by Charan Singh "to retain his own job."² The opposition, they said "would not bear him", (the Governor).

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Apr 26, 1970

2. Ibid., Feb 27, 1970

Immediately after when the upper House met separately the entire opposition walked out following the rejection of Chairman Virendra Swaroop of his contention that the Governor had left the Chamber without reading his address at the joint session and so that the address should not be repeated to the House formally. Ruling out the objection the Chairman said that he was sitting by Governor's side and he heard him. Quoting a Calcutta High Court ruling he said that the validity of Governor's performance in usual conditions could not be questioned even if it was irregular.

In a separate sitting of the Assembly, the opposition did not raise this objection when A.G. Kher repeated the address of the Governor and fixed four days for its discussion. At the ~~fag~~^{end} and when the speaker announced that he had received a notice from Kamlapati Tripathi seeking to express regret of the House at the insulting behaviour meted out by some members to Reddy, the Old Congress Secretary Krishnanand Rai and some opposition members opposed it and declared that the "Governor deserved it because of his action."

On February 26, 1970 the Speaker announced in the Assembly that a notice of breach of privilege had been received against Chief Minister Charan Singh "for announcing at a public meeting on February 25, 1970 certain important decisions of the Cabinet barely 12 hours before the Assembly session to have

opened." The Chief Minister contended that this question has been raised many times in the House and the Speaker had ruled that this could not be considered a breach of privilege. A similar ruling had been given in the Parliament also. Charan Singh said he would produce the ruling later if the chair wanted it. The speaker said that as far as he could remember he had said that as a matter of etiquette the Government should announce important decisions on the floor of the House when it was in session and not outside. But it could not be a matter of breach of privilege. He said, he would, however, study the issue further and give the decision later.

Finance Minister Balbir Singh later presented in the Assembly supplementary budget totalling Rs. 78.45 crores. Irrigations Minister Virendra Verma presented supplementary demand to the council earlier in the day. There was a great tension in the air as members assembled for the joint session. In anticipation of trouble the visitors galleries had been closed for the day and a big police force guarded the corridors outside. As Chief Minister Charan Singh took his seat, followed by Kamalapati Tripathi next to him, they were greeted with cheers from the BKD and New Congress benches and with shouts of "shame shame" from the Opposition. C.B. Gupta sat quietly in one of the rear rows. Tension grew up further in the Assembly

as the Governor entered the House.

In his protest speech the SSP leader A.R. Jaiswal said that "the Governor had violated his oath of allegiance to the Constitution by swearing in Charan Singh as Chief Minister on the basis of the list he had himself declared bogus." He alleged that Dr Reddy has eaten his words to save his job. Jana Sangh's Madhav Prasad Tripathi said that "Dr Reddy had ceased to be the Governor as he had taken a partial decision to get an extension or another job. Instead of using his own discretion he went to Delhi for consultations with Prime Minister and the President." The decision to install Charan Singh Ministry, Tripathi charged, "was guided by personal interest and no sense of fair play and justice could be expected from the high office he held."

As reported in the press the noisy first day debate on the Governor's address in the U.P. Assembly on February 27, 1970 was "marked by a bitter two hour indictment of Chief Minister Charan Singh by SSP group leader Anant Ram Jaiswal." Jaiswal, who moved an amendment to the motion of thanks on behalf of the Opposition leader Girdhari Lal "regretting that no motion had been made of the ordinances by the Gupta Ministry for exemption of 6.25 acres from land revenue", accused Charan Singh of "conducting deceptive house trading with both sides for getting

Chief Ministership" and said: "such a leader could never give a clean and efficient administration to the State."

Moving the motion of thanks Ganda Singh (New Congress) said that the address was not the last word about the Government policies: There would be occasion to reconsider certain issues.¹ The SSP leader A.R. Jaiswal charged the Chief Minister with constantly shifting his stand for retaining or acquiring power. He said that one of the main reasons given by Charan Singh for breaking with Gupta was that he could ^{not} agree to land revenue exemption, yet under the pressure of New Congress which was committed to it, he had now agreed to it for the fear of being toppled.²

On March 6, 1970 the U.P. Assembly adopted by voice vote the motion of thanks on the Governor's address with the Old Congress, SSP and Jana Sangh groups abstaining, after the speaker had declared "division procedure irregular". He however confirmed his ruling that the Opposition amendment had also been lost. On March 22, 1970 Charan Singh scored a convincing victory when a no-confidence motion against him was rejected by the Assembly by a large margin of 67 votes. The House then was adjourned upto April 28, 1970. The Hindustan Times

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 28, 1970

2. Ibid.

wrote: "In what came to be the first lobby division challenged by Opposition against the new Ministry, as many as 236 voted against the motion and 169 for it."¹ After declaring the motion lost, the Speaker announced that according to the figures submitted by various previous groups their respective strength was as follows:²

New Congress	...	136
Congress (O)	...	96
BKD	...	94
Jana Sangh	...	44
SSP	...	32
Communist (R)	...	4
Communist (M)	...	1
Republican	...	1
Swatantra	...	4
Muslim League	...	2
Independents	...	4
Unattached	...	2
Praja Socialist Party	...	3
Hindu Sabha	...	1
KMP	...	1
Vacant	...	1

1. The Hindustan Times, Feb 28, 1970

2. Ibid., March 22, 1970

Chief Minister Charan Singh said that the Opposition had probably tabled the no-confidence motion misled by certain rumours which did not fructify. The new announcement he made was that "all Hill areas of Kumaun and Uttar Khand division except Nainital district would be declared dry within a few days." He said that he was opposed to the exemption of land revenue but since it had been made a political issue and one of sentiments by almost all parties, he had per force to agree to exempt holding upto 3.125 acres. He made it clear that he was not going to withdraw the enhanced irrigation rates. Personally he was opposed to ceiling as well.

But certain defects in the existing law had to be removed and therefore a Bill was to be brought in the monsoon session. The land to be released by the Ceiling measure would not be enough to solve the economic problems. Nevertheless Charan Singh stood by the policy decision he had announced about ceiling, though its details were to be settled in consultation with the BKD and the New Congress and at a later stage by the agreement of the House itself. There was no difference of opinion about it in the ruling alliance, he said. He also rejected the demand for withdrawal of professional tax and disbursement of salaries of aided schools through Government treasuries. The House later passed by a voice vote the Zila Parishad and Block Committee (Emergency Provision) Act.

Opinion was divided in the BKD State Executive on the key question of the Party merger with the New Congress. It was clear that even those favouring the merger could not envisage it in the immediate future. Some senior BKD leaders including Industries Minister Virendra Verma felt that in the absence of any formal offer from the New Congress Working Committee or the Prime Minister it would be only "sheer surrender" on the part of BKD to talk of merger. Udit Narain Sharma who had submitted a note to the BKD National Executive calling for merger read out its contents to the executive members and explained it at length. He and Education Minister P. Mishra strongly supported the merger move. Acting President Jai Ram Verma said that the Prime Minister had in her talk with BKD leader several times pressed for merger, though it was no pre condition for a coalition government nor was there any pressure applied. He felt the merger was desirable but wanted the party to make up its mind either way soon.

3. BKD-Congress (N) merger issue and split in the BKD

The party leadership had authorised the Chief Minister to settle several key issues relating to the future set up of the BKD, both in government and the organization. The joint meeting of the Executive Committee of the organisational and legislature wings of the BKD, authorised Chief Minister Charan

Singh to take "all such steps in this connection as he may deem fit." nothing that the merger between the BKD and Congress(N) was a "ticklish talk more easily thought of than implemented." The resolution pointed out that the question would have to be taken to the National Executive. The meeting decided to call a State Convention of the party representatives from districts at Lucknow on June 27 and 28, 1970. The State BKD was seriously seized of the problem of merger. In a meeting held in April, 1970 the majority of its members in favour of merger differed a final decision for a future date. The resolution said: "In order that democracy may prosper the BKD has believed all along in polarisation of like minded parties and groups in the country. The BKD has, interalia, stood for social justice. The BKD finds itself nearer to the New Congress as compared with other political parties and groups in the country." The resolution added: "The BKD believes in the removal of poverty, reduction in disparities of income and elimination of unemployment. The country needs turning more to Mahatma Gandhi than to any other source." Saying that the accusation preferred in the memorandum by some New Congress members to the Prime Minister against the BKD ministers only served to undermine the confidence of the people in the government stability, the resolution said: "In fact BKD ministers are extending the same treatment to the

Congress legislators as to their own partymen. Nor is the Chief Minister acting in a partisan manner or as the leader of the BKD alone." As regards the distribution of portfolios, except in one "inevitable case" where it consisted of five departments, Charan Singh allotted to all the ex-ministers of the Congress those very departments they held previously, the resolutions added.¹

When news about the merger appeared in the newspapers a spokesman of the party said: "We only read in newspapers about the merger move in U.P. but the point had never come before the National Executive. So far as the National Executive is concerned, it decided against the merger and that decision stands." It was also explained that the BKD was not merely a party of U.P. but spread all over the country and was an all India organisation. If a decision to merge with Congress (in U.P.) was taken it would not affect the party organisation at national level. The BKD claimed that it was the major partner in the coalition government in Orissa as Jana Congress was nothing but BKD with a different name. In fact the Jana Congress had adopted the BKD Constitution and its leader Pavitra Mohan Pradhan was one of the Vice-Presidents of BKD.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 27, 1970

In Rajasthan the BKD had eleven members in the Assembly and though the Swatantra Party was the official Opposition the BKD had turned out to be the principal Opposition party in the state particularly after it led a mighty Kisan movement and got more than 30,000 people to court imprisonment.

On the eve of the crucial BKD National Executive meeting in July 1970 Charan Singh met Mrs. Indira Gandhi to discuss the problems connected with BKD's proposed merger with the New Congress. He also met his senior party colleagues and asked them to sort out the differences of opinion. He said that "in the larger interest of the country, the party should not mind losing its identity; after all most BKD members were former Congressmen who had left the party due to bossism. They should identify themselves with the forces emerging in the New Congress after the split." This view was not shared by several BKD leaders. The pro and anti merger groups had taken rigid positions and the party might not have been able to avoid a split if the majority view was sought to be imposed. Those opposing the merger were also expected to press that the National Executive was not competent to wind up the organisation and therefore a National Convention was to be called to discuss the merger issue.

The U.P. State BKD Chairman Jai Ram Verma opened the debate in the National Executive meeting. In his 70 minute speech he explained the two resolutions of the State BKD which had virtually recommended merger. J.R. Verma pointed out that in the circumstances of the country at that time "the task of developing BKD into an All India live political force might take more than a decade while the need for the various democratic elements in the country to present one consolidated front to the growing threat of extreme communism and fissiparous tendencies were urgent." According to J.R. Verma, the country was in a bad shape in 1967 but the situation had further deteriorated requiring a reappraisal of the whole situation. "It was in this context that the BKD should respond to the appeal of the Prime Minister who had called upon the like minded parties, in particular the BKD to participate in national resurgence." He agreed that "the Congress (N) did not possess everything good and the reason prompting the BKD leader to have separate organisation had not completely been eliminated, but the approach of both the parties to the problem of the man in the street was much in common."

On July 5, 1970, the BKD National Executive shelved the issue of merger with Congress (N) indefinitely, authorising its Chairman Charan Singh to study the situation in all its aspects

and report back to the party. This, according to the Hindustan Times, "caused a wave of disappointment in the New Congress circles, but leaders were reluctant to comment."¹ The UPCC(N) Chief, Kamalapati Tripathi said that it was not necessary to react to all the formulations of other political parties, though he admitted he would have been happy if the BKD had decided for merger.²

The anti merger lobby overwhelmingly outnumbered the supporters of the merger; only three out of fourteen executive members present being in favour of merger. The merger group scored victory in that the executive did not reject the proposal outright. It was believed that Charan Singh, after meeting Mrs. Indira Gandhi would discuss the terms and conditions of merger with the Congress(N). If there was a firm assurance that the BKD members would be reasonably accommodated at the Centre and in the States both in the government and in the organisation Charan Singh could have persuaded his colleagues to a merger. However Charan Singh warned the executive that the BKD might have to pay the price for its separate existence. He was obviously suggesting that the Congress(N) might withdraw itself from the government in U.P.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 6, 1970

2. Ibid.

On July 5, 1970 the first attack was made by S.K. Sinha (Bihar) who had been vigorously campaigning against the party losing its identity. He was followed by another joint secretary Moti Ram Shastri who was also vehemently opposed to the idea of merger. Prakash Vir Shastri was perhaps the most outspoken critic of the merger moves. Most of the invitees holding executive position in their respective States disapproved the merger proposal characterising it as "an attempt to liquidate a really democratic nationalist organisation committed to follow the path of Mahatma Gandhi." They refused to accept the contention that any basic change in the country's politics had taken place requiring the BKD to consider such a step. On the other hand they felt that "it might be more desirable to wait and watch and keep the options open." The three advocates of the merger were Udit Narain Sharma, Jai Ram Verma who opened the debate and M.S. Oberai. Their principal argument was that "the circumstances since the congress split had basically altered the political situation; in the larger interest of the country, the BKD should help the process of polarisation and the nearest possible organisation to the BKD was the Congress(N)." An alternate resolution sought to be moved by Narain Naik (Maharashtra) was applauded by several members but in view of the alternate decision giving authority to Charan Singh to review the whole

situation it was not pressed.

The resolution called for "helping the formation of a new party of socialism, spurning any move to join hands with the Old Congress and its allies." It argued that the efforts of certain parties to form an alliance in Parliament was "a clear indication that those who want the status quo to continue are getting together fast. There are also indications that the Congress(N) may not continue as Congress for long. The question of merger with Congress(N) therefore does not arise." Referring to the circumstances in U.P. and Bihar the resolution said: "The BKD is prepared to work in coalition on an All India basis with Congress(N) and other like minded parties on the basis of a clear cut and time bound socialist programme. Through such initial cooperation these parties should come together and form a new party of Socialism (Samajwadi Dal)"¹ During the discussions Charan Singh said: "I did not give any decision in favour of against the merger issue."¹

There was a high level meeting which the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had with her senior cabinet colleagues Jagjivan Ram, Y.B. Chavan and Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, where it was decided

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 6, 1970

that the Congress(N) would not withdraw from the BKD coalition in U.P. However, the hope was still entertained in the Congress(N) circles that the last has not been heard on the subject and that the Chief Minister Charan Singh might succeed in persuading the BKD to a merger. The UPCC(N) president Kamlapati Tripathi was also present at the meeting when the U.P. situation was discussed. Though he was put out by the BKD decision, he had not given up the hope that Charan Singh would be able to carry the executive with him on the merger issue at a more opportune moment later. This was the impression Charan Singh gave to Mrs. Gandhi when he met her after the BKD decision. Charan Singh reportedly told Mrs. Gandhi that he needed some more time to persuade his party executive to accept the merger proposal. But Congress(N) sources maintained that "in view of the overtures made to the BKD by Congress(O) the executive was perhaps thinking over this matter in an entirely different context." They also said that "he was probably trying to strike a political bargain by delaying merger."

The Executive Committee of the Rajasthan unit of the BKD strongly opposed the merger of BKD with Congress(N). It said that such talk created an atmosphere of instability and misunderstanding, and this damaged the image of BKD. Besides this, only the National Executive was capable of taking such

a decision on merger. Chairman Ram Kiran Joshi said that most of the state units were opposed to the merger and he did not think the National Executive would decide otherwise.

4. Expansion of Charan Singh Ministry

Charan Singh had proposed to expand his Ministry in the third week of July 1970. This had to be done mainly to include the BKD representatives to complete his party quota in the Ministry. The Chief Minister was entitled to add three cabinet Ministers, 7 Ministers of State and 3 Deputy Ministers. But he was not to appoint so many Ministers as the total strength of the Ministry would have been too big.¹ He was to appoint some Ministers for the time being and add a few later in the second phase. There were 22 cabinet Ministers out of which 15 belonged to the Congress(N). Among the 9 Deputy Ministers only three were from BKD. When the Ministry was expanded on April 19, 1970 to include Congress(N) representatives only one BKD Minister was taken in. It was given out then that the BKD quota would be completed later.

The Charan Singh Ministry was expanded on July 19, 1970 for the second time to induct two more Cabinet Ministers, 2 Ministers of State and a Deputy Minister, all belonging to the

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 8, 1970

BKD, raising its strength to 46. Ram Kinkar, a Deputy Minister was promoted to the Cabinet rank. In the 46 member Ministry the Congress(N) now had a share of 26, comprising 13 Cabinet Ministers, 7 Ministers of States and 6 Deputy Ministers. The BKD had 10 Cabinet Ministers, 2 Ministers of State and 8 Deputy Ministers. Originally a 10 member BKD Ministry led by Charan Singh was installed on Feb. 17, 1970 to make a Coalition Ministry. It was expanded for the first time on April 19, 1970 to include Congress(N) representatives; since the BKD quota was not completed it was then decided that the Ministry would soon be expanded but the expansion was delayed due to a by-election and the budget session of the Assembly.¹

5. Law and Order Under the BKD Government

The Chief Minister Charan Singh made it very clear that the U.P. government would deal firmly with unlawful activities whether by politicians, students or land grabbers. He said: "I would like to tell all the potential law breakers that the law will take its inexorable course and no intercession on anybody's behalf or appeals for mercy will be heard."²

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 8, 1970

2. The Statesman, New Delhi, Aug 5, 1970

An ordinance for preventive detention of people was issued on August 5, 1970. The maximum period of detention was fixed at an year. Under this ordinance some students were arrested in Kanpur and Lucknow. In protest and anger they burnt the BKD flag.

R.K. Sinha, General Secretary of the Congress(R) parliamentary party criticised the "repressive policy" of the U.P. government towards the students, public servants and the working class. He said that "U.P. should not be ruled by the promulgation of undemocratic ordinance such as the Preventive Detention Ordinance and the Universities (Amendment) Ordinance," He alleged that "the BKD members of the Parliament were determined to oppose the policies of Mrs. Gandhi's government; the Congress party in U.P. could not therefore extend the unconditional support to Charan Singh for all times to come." He said that the Congress MPs resented the attitude of Charan Singh.¹

Justifying the ordinances Charan Singh told a press conference that Assam, Andhra and Maharashtra governments also had promulgated ordinances to provide for preventive detention. All the governments except that of Orissa were Congress governments

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Aug 11, 1970

In taking preventive detention measures the U.P. government was in very good company. The Chief Minister pointed out that "the communists had all along been opposed to preventive detention. They were living in the world of their own fantasy, far removed from reality." Adding that the legislation was not aimed at curbing legitimate political activities of any party but only at intercepting and keeping under detention those about whose dangerous and subversive intention the government had no doubt, Charan Singh said: "So far nobody had been arrested under preventive detention measures."¹ He further added that "the people of U.P. are not living in darkness as slaves but in the light of full freedom and security; the prophets of doom who have forecasted a reign of terror and police shooting following the promulgation of the ordinance had been proved to be utterly wrong." According to the Chief Minister no land grabbing had taken place in his state though some political parties had launched an agitation. He told a press conference that arrests so far made in the State for violating prohibitory orders had totalled 3,248 including 6 members of Parliament and 11 MLAs.

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Aug 18, 1970

6. BKD Rejects Merger

The BKD National Executive met on August 27, 1970, wrote The Statesman, "dragged its feet on the merger issue as the idea was overwhelmingly opposed to join the Congress(R)"¹ The BKD dropped the idea of merger with the Congress(R), thus ending the prolonged uncertainty about its future. It took care, according to press reports, "not to assume a position that may appear to have even a slight element of hostility." It expressed the hope that the coalition government in U.P. would continue to function as before. At the same time Charan Singh visualised close cooperation between the BKD and the Congress(R) at the time of General Elections. The BKD, he said, "did not propose to initiate talks for an alliance with any other party."² A resolution adopted by the BKD Executive on August 28, 1970 announced the party's resolve against merger without assigning any reason. Presumably the party leadership did not want to create a public controversy on this issue and upset the delicate balance of the U.P. coalition.

In Parliament there would be no shift in the party's attitude and it would continue to function as an opposition group, but in particular circumstances might support the govern-

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Aug 29, 1970

2. Ibid.

ment after consulting its Chairman.¹

In his talk with Mrs. Gandhi, Charan Singh stressed that "the BKD stand on merger should not be allowed to strain the functioning of the U.P. coalition", and cited the cooperative spirit shown by the Congress(R) and BKD Ministers in taking important decisions." His party would continue to maintain this amity, Charan Singh said, and requested the Prime Minister to ensure reciprocity by the Congress(R) unit.²

The UPCC(R) declared after the joint meeting of its executive and the State Parliamentary Board that it did not want to wreak the coalition. A letter was sent to Charan Singh clearly indicating that the policies of the Congress(R) consisting five points: (i) Nationalisation of Sugar factories; (ii) land reform (lowering the ceiling and quick distribution of surplus land; (iii) formation of a Cabinet sub committee to deal with transfers and postings; (iv) outlining of minimum programmes and the setting up of a coordination committee; (v) the meeting adopted a resolution promising continuity of employment to the staff of private sector firm acquired by the government; this had immediate relevance to the electricity supply firms acquired by the UPSEB.

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Aug 29, 1970

2. Ibid.

7. Congress(R) - BKD Relations Strained

The strain of uneasy partnership between the BKD and the Congress(R) had come out into the open. The BKD General Secretary Shiv Swarup Singh openly accused the Congress(R) of "trying to nibble at the members of its coalition partners." He also alleged that H.N. Bahuguna, General Secretary of AICC(R) had met junior Ministers and legislators belonging to the BKD and offered them ministerships in a different government from the present, provided they help in forming such a government by quitting the BKD.¹

Shiv Swarup Singh made it clear in a report that the BKD was opposed to "throwing the State into another mid term election. The party would try its level best to avoid it even if other parties wanted it. But in the eventuality of the mid term poll, the party would be prepared to face the electorate." It was pointed out that "soon after the formation of the coalition government the Congress(R) had allegedly started negotiations with the Congress(O). In case the coalition government comes to collapse, said Shiv Swarup Singh, all possible efforts would be made to work out an alternative, so that a mid term poll was not held.

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sep 6, 1970

To forestall possible difficulties from Congress(R) for the coalition government, Charan Singh had established contact with the Congress(O) central leaders through a trusted lieutenant on August 7, 1970.¹ The Congress(O), it appeared, had reacted positively to Charan Singh's feelers. With the Congress(R) disillusioned by the BKD MPs votes against the privy Purses Bill, the position of coalition government in U.P. had become untenable. Its High Command, it appeared, had given a free hand to the State unit to plan its strategy in the light of the new situation. In the next few days it appeared both the Congress(R) and the BKD would be consolidating themselves and each one was hopeful of the support of a sizeable section from the other's rank. The war of words between the two parties had meanwhile intensified. On August 27, 1970 Bahuguna denied the charge labelled by U.P. BKD Secretary Shiv Swarup Singh that he was engineering defections from the BKD rank. Obviously Singh was in search of an alibi to cover up the growing frustration and disappointment among well meaning people about the role of the BKD, Bahuguna said.²

The UPCC(R) President Kamalapati Tripathi sent a letter to Charan Singh requesting him to call a session of the Vidhan Sabha not later than the end of the month (September 1970) so

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sep 6, 1970

2. Ibid.

that all issues concerning important policy matters may be thrashed out in the House. He also said that after the BKD vote in Rajya Sabha on the Privy Purses issue it was impossible for the Congress(R) to support the BKD government. In his letter to Charan Singh Tripathi stated that the Chief Minister had publicly accepted that the Congress(R) Bombay resolution on economic policy of which the abolition of the Privy Purses and privileges of the former rulers was an important item. Tripathi's letter said: "We depended upon your good faith. Voting of your party members under your direction on the Privy Purses bill has proved to be the last straw. You have thus created a situation under which the support of Congress(R) party to your government has become well nigh impossible."¹ It was also pointed out that the Congress(R) had good reasons to believe that Charan Singh was negotiating with other parties including Congress(O), the Jana Sangh and others which had been opposed to Chief Minister and the Congress(R) policies. Charan Singh and his party were expected to respect the policies of Congress(R).

8. The Policy of Congress(O) and Jana Sangh Towards the BKD Government

The Congress(O) and Jana Sangh leaders in U.P. were understood to have agreed that no talk should be initiated by

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sep 9, 1970

them with the BKD until the government was defeated on the floor of the House. They were of the view that a joint front would be formed immediately consisting of the Congress(O), the Jana Sangh and the SSP "in order to counter any attempt by the Congress(R) to form a government in the State on the basis of the party strength." The three parties had a combined strength of 172 against 146 of the Congress(R) in a House of 425.¹

The Jana Sangh leader Nabajit Deshmukh had a meeting with the Congress(O) leader C.B. Gupta and later appraised A.B. Vajpayee on the outcome of this talk. The top leadership of the SSP demanded the immediate removal of Charan Singh. The demand came in a statement issued by the central party office signed by Ram Sevak Yadav, Madhu Limaye, Raj Narain, Arjun Singh Bhadoria and George Fernandes. On September 9, 1970 George Fernandes, General Secretary of the SSP said that "his party would neither enter into an alliance nor support the BKD in forming alternative government in U.P." He added: "We would not want the Charan Singh government to last a single moment."

2. Congress(R) Decision to end the Coalition in U.P.

The Congress(R) High Command was not contemplating any rapprochement with Charan Singh, and as far as the party was concerned, the coalition with the BKD in the U.P. had virtually

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sep 9, 1970

come to an end. The High Command was said to have made up its mind that "coalition with Charan Singh was totally untenable ... It had to be broken off even if that led to the imposition of President's rule in the State."

The Congress(R) effort now was to see Charan Singh's defeat on the floor of the House which was scheduled to meet on October 6, 1970. Charan Singh was not in a position to reconstitute his Cabinet by dropping the Congress(R) Ministers before that, since by doing so he would put his own majority in doubt. He was trying to secure support from the Congress(O) and Jana Sangh to tide over the crisis that had overtaken his Government. Originally it appeared that the support would be forthcoming since the aim of both the Congress(O) and the Sangh normally was to see the Congress(R) out of power in U.P. But as days passed the BKD appeared to be more and more disillusioned with earlier promises of help from Congress(O) and Jana Sangh.

The Congress(R) High Command on September 18, 1970 gave the green signal to its U.P. unit to part company with BKD in case the context remains unchanged.¹ In the assessment given by Kamalapati Tripathi to Mrs. Gandhi and Jagjivan Ram, two points

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sep 19, 1970

stood out: first the congress(R) strength had improved in the last few days, and second the Jana Sangh and Congress(O) may not come to the Ministry though they might join hands with him later.¹ In case Charan Singh was ousted from power, Tripathi visualised hopeful possibilities for the Congress(R).

A joint meeting of the BKD legislators and Executive Committees of various districts and town committee which was held on September 23, 1970 gave full authority to Charan Singh to take the decision he thought proper in the political situation in the State. A resolution passed by party activists gave a free hand to their leader, to take a decision in the interest of the people and the party. 44 of the 96 legislators including MPs took part in the deliberations. Some wanted the coalition with the Congress(R) to continue if possible, others were inclined to negotiate with other parties so that government could be formed and another mid term election avoided.²

The BKD-Congress(R) coalition finally disintegrated on September 24, 1970. The Chief Minister Charan Singh relieved 13 Congress(R) Ministers of their portfolios and asked them to resign. They did not resign. Instead the leader of the

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 19, 1970

2. Ibid., ' 2

Congress(R) Legislative Party K. Tripathi wrote to the Governor requesting him to ask Charan Singh to resign since the Congress(R) had withdrawn its support and that Charan Singh no longer commanded majority in the House.¹ At her press conference Mrs. Indira Gandhi expressed the hope that it might not be necessary to resort to President's Rule in the State, but admitted that anything could happen. Charan Singh asked several of his Congress(R) colleagues (but not all) in a letter addressed to them individually to resign from the government. Since the Congress(R) Ministers had precipitated a constitutional crisis by refusing to resign, Charan Singh might have had to tender his and his government's resignation to weed out the undesirables. But that would have opened the way for Kamalapati Tripathi to claim as the leader of the single largest party in the Assembly, an opportunity to prove that he can form a stable government.²

Charan Singh had significantly excluded some important Congress(R) Ministers who were not asked to resign: Chaturbhuj Sharma, Narain Dutt Tewari and Jagan Prasad Rawat and a few others - all were close to Charan Singh. The exclusion could be an attempt to drive a wedge in Congress(R) ranks. Those

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 19, 1970

2. Ibid.

asked by the Chief Minister to resign were: Mrs. Vidyawati Rathore, Baldeo Singh, Laxmi Shanker, Dr. Sita Ram, Atiqur Rehman (all Ministers); Dharam Dutt Ved, Mahmood Ali Khan, Narain Singh Bisht, Raj Mangal Pande, Narain Gupta, Gopi Dixit, Dr. Mrs. Rajendra Kumari (all Ministers of State); Bhagwati Singh, Bir Bahadur Singh and Om Prakash Singh (all Deputy Ministers). All except Om Prakash Singh belonged to the Congress(R).

Charan Singh declared that he was prepared to face a trial of strength in the assembly. The BKD, he said, "felt that the Congress(R) needed an overhaul and complete orientation of its policies and programmes. That was why the BKD National Executive had decided to drop the merger proposal." He further added that as far as he was concerned, he was in favour of continuing the present coalition.

The leaders of Congress(O), Jana Sangh and SSP handed over a letter to the Governor asking him to let Charan Singh continue as Chief Minister. The leaders of these parties said in the letter that they were against the Congress(R) and its leadership, and so no action should be taken on Kamalapati Tripathi's request that Charan Singh be dismissed.¹

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 26, 1970

On the Congress(R) side the reasoning was that the coalition stayed and that the opposition was only to Charan Singh's leadership. 24 of the Congress(R) Ministers (2 were out of station) submitted to the Governor a letter pointing out that the party was in majority when the coalition government was formed and since Charan Singh had himself announced a break from the majority group, he was in minority and should resign. They requested the Governor to direct Charan Singh to resign if he failed to resign on his own.¹

The opposition leaders who met the Governor declared that the mere withdrawal of Congress support did not necessarily and conclusively reduce the Chief Minister and his government into a minority unless the same was established on the floor of the House. The opposition parties advised the Governor in the same letter that he should dismiss the Ministers whom Charan Singh had asked to resign. The opposition parties made the point that the advice of the Chief Minister on this matter was binding on the Governor. There had been much reluctance among the political parties to straight away support Charan Singh till terms for a new coalition were settled between them and the BKD.

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 26, 1970

The opposition parties submitted to the Governor a statement of the comparative strength of the different parties and groups in the Assembly. According to ~~it~~ the Congress(O) and its allies mustered 171 against 199 members of the Congress(R) and its allies, and 9 occupying an intermediate position between the two. The statement gave the strength of the BKD as 80 and with the BKD added to Congress a new leader could claim the support of 250 members in the House of 425, one seat being vacant.¹

On September 26, 1970 Kamlapati Tripathi wrote to the Governor and claimed that he could form a stable government to succeed Charan Singh. He requested the Governor to demand the resignation of Charan Singh on the ground of loss of majority in the House.² But on the other hand the Congress(O), Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties wrote to the Governor tending their support to Charan Singh and telling that with their support Charan Singh enjoyed majority in the House.³ Tripathi cautioned the Governor against trusting in the advice of Charan Singh. He said that "if once the principle of accepting the advice of Chief Minister who had lost his majority was agreed it would lead to several problems."⁴ Tripathi was referring to Charan Singh's advice to

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 26, 1970

2. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 27, 1970

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

the Governor that all the Congress(R) Ministers should be dismissed.

On September 27, 1970 the Governor had passed orders concerning with Charan Singh's action of withdrawing of portfolios from 13 Congress Ministers of the Cabinet rank. The Governor entrusted those portfolios to the Chief Minister.¹ The Governor had not yet taken decision on Chief Minister's advice that all the 26 Congress(R) ministers should be removed from office.

The Congress(R), in a counter move, withdrew its support on the same day to the six month old coalition government. All the Congress(R) Ministers, through a letter to the Governor, demanded the dismissal of Chief Minister on the ground that he did not enjoy the support of the majority party. Sharply reacting to their demand for his resignation Charan Singh recommended to the Governor the dismissal of all 26 Congress(R) Ministers on the ground of break of discipline. The National Executive of the PSP was of the view that Charan Singh should have resigned from office after his announcement of the termination of BKD-Congress(R) coalition. "This break up of the coalition," according to the PSP, "had reduced his support in the Assembly to a manifest minority."

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 27, 1970

After obtaining the opinion of the Attorney General the Governor B.Gopala Reddy asked Charan Singh to resign by the evening of September 28, 1970.¹ Charan Singh wrote to the Governor that he needed time to give a detailed reply and he also requested the Governor to provide him with the Attorney General's opinion on the basis of which he had asked him to resign. The Governor sent him a copy of the same.² Some opposition party leaders had consultation with Charan Singh on the possibility of forming a Samyukta Vichayak Dal (SVD). The legislators of the BKD, Jana Sangh and Congress(O) who were not present in the town were understood to have been directed to present themselves so that they could be mustered to appear before the Governor if necessary.

In a letter to the Governor Tripathi said that in case Charan Singh resigns, he should be invited to form the Ministry.³ The UPCC(R) executive passed a resolution saying that the Governor should have asked the Chief Minister to resign immediately after the withdrawal of Congress(R) from the coalition. However the meeting considered the action of the Governor in demanding the resignation of Chief Minister appropriate and constitutional

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 29, 1970

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

and requested him that "failing immediate submission of resignation, the Governor may be pleased to withdraw his pleasure from the Chief Minister Charan Singh." The meeting urged the Governor that Tripathi was not only the leader of the largest party in the Legislature but also commanded the support of other members in the U.P. Legislative Assembly. He was competent to form a stable government and hence he should be called upon to form the new Ministry.

The resolution also said: "Experience of partnership with Charan Singh for a few months had made it clear that the interests of the working class, peasants, women, students and political workers were not safe in his hands. This led to deep difference over policies and programmes between Charan Singh and Congress (R)". Thereafter the resolution added: "Charan Singh decided to openly align himself with the rightist forces. The manner in which the rightist parties came to his rescue only confirmed that those forces of reaction could go to any length to thwart the progressive policies of the Congress(R)."

Soon after the Governor wrote to Charan Singh, Giridhari Lal(C-O) who was leader of the opposition said that he should be invited to form an alternate government. Ram Kiran Singh, the PSP leader, urged the Governor to invite Tripathi to form

the government.¹ The Governor in his letter to Charan Singh told him that the matter of his having obtained the support of other parties can be gone into at the time of the question of a new government after his resignation.

C.B. Gupta (C-0), in a letter to the Governor, had protested against the demand for Charan Singh's resignation. He said that the post of Attorney General being political his opinion was not impartial. Dr. R.C. Shukla, Secretary of the State PSP thought that the Governor had acted beyond the limit of constitutional propriety in asking Charan Singh to resign.² Archarya Kripalani, in a statement said that by not waiting for the meeting of the Assembly the Governor had made suspect the impartiality of his office. Ugra Sen, Chairman of the State PSP said that "since a no confidence motion against Charan Singh had already been tabled in the Assembly the Governor's action in asking Charan Singh to resign was an insult to the House."³

C.B. Gupta wrote to the Governor:

"You will kindly consider the matter and not blindly accept the opinion of Attorney General, whose office being political is in the grip of the government in power at the centre. And it is well known that the Prime Minister wants her own party to come in power or failing that President's rule. The Attorney General's opinion is

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 29, 1970

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

therefore not like the verdict of the Supreme Court coming from an impartial judicial body. It is to be examined in the light of the provision of the constitution and practice of parliamentary democracy in other countries on which our constitutional conventions and provisions are so largely based ... The meeting of the Legislative Assembly is fixed for October 6, 1970 where it can be constitutionally and indisputably established whether the Chief Minister commands or does not command a majority. If you do not want to wait for the meeting of legislature on October sixth, you may call it at the earliest you can for a proper determination of the question. That is what the constitution provides for, and that is what, I may add, is your sacred duty to enforce regardless of advice from the centre or any one else. To do otherwise would be making a mockery of our constitution, democratic practices and traditions. The question who is in and who remains Chief Minister is not so important as the maintenance and preservation of our democracy, its constitutional conventions and traditions. I therefore appeal to you to be true to your oath as Governor, and not to be misled or pressurised by a partisan centre. The office of the Governor exists to save and preserve the constitution in conditions of political pressure. It may involve some risk and sacrifice on your part, But that will be worthwhile for preserving our democracy and saving it from dictatorship ... I write this as I have laboured, worked for, and am still working for the establishment and strengthening of democratic traditions, and resigned my office twice as Chief Minister in pursuance of it. The consequences of disregard evasion of the constitution will be disastrous as it will lead the people to lose their

faith in democracy and democratic process." 1

10. BKD Moves the High Court for Writ

The Congress(R) asked the Governor to recommend to the Centre the imposition of President's rule in U.P. Meanwhile the BKD and the opposition parties continued to fight back against the Governor's move asking Charan Singh to resign. The BKD moved the Lucknow bench of the Allahabad High Court for a writ of mandamus to restrain the Governor from dismissing the Charan Singh Ministry on the ground that such action by the Governor would be malafide owing to political pressure from Congress(R) government at the Centre. The BKD petition was only partly heard on September 29, 1970 by the Bench and arguments relating to its admissibility, because of Governor's immunity under the constitution, were to be continued next day.²

The General Secretary of the UPCC(R) and Syed Ali Zaheer, one of the party's constitutional experts asked the Governor to take action under Article 356 of the Constitution since Charan Singh had refused to oblige the Governor with his resignation though he was asked to do so.

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 30, 1970

2. Ibid.

Charan Singh's main argument was that since the Assembly was meeting only eight days later, there seemed to be little point in his resigning or being dismissed, and an adhoc government being installed to face the Assembly or in the Governor assessing through legislators parades, the respective strength of the claimants to Chief Ministership. Charan Singh also reminded the Governor that he himself in April 1968 had enunciated and acted upon the Speaker's Conference recommendation that the question of majority or minority support should be tested on the floor of the House and there alone. The Governor had himself set a precedent which he was not following in the present case.¹

Raj Bahadur Dwivedi, Secretary of the State BKD filed a petition before the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court alleging that "the Governor's letter asking Charan Singh to resign was malafide." "In the present instance, "as the petition contended, "the Governor was acting malafide being under political pressure from the centre." "The Prime Minister," the petition alleged "had cut short her tour and rushed to the government house and was understood to have discussed the matter with the Governor thereby leading to the legal advice tendered by State Advocate General being ignored. The Chief Minister had asked for

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 30, 1970

the resignation of 13 of his colleagues belonging to the Congress(R) which he was competent to do under article 164 of the constitution."¹ The petition also contended that "the Attorney General's opinion was biased because his was a political office." The petition also claimed that "with the opposition of three opposition parties the Chief Minister commanded a following of 223 in a house of 426 and was prepared to face the House on October 6th or earlier."²

The following was the text of Charan Singh's letter to the Governor: "My reply to your letter of this morning asking me to tender my resignation by the evening is as follows:

"You rely upon the opinion of the Attorney General while you had simultaneously asked for the opinion of Advocate General also. It seems you did not wait for his opinion to arrive which it did this morning, before you reached your conclusion and wrote to me perhaps ... As the coalition government is now no longer in existence. I cannot, under the constitution, function as the Chief Minister any longer. Now may I point out to you in all humility that the constitution does not speak of one party of multiparty government at all? It speaks of the state government whether it is manned by one political party or more than one, being immaterial so the Attorney General's reasoning on the basis of the coalition government no longer existing is fallacious in the extreme.

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 30, 1970

2. Ibid.

"A Chief Minister's position cannot be called illegal or unconstitutional simply because his party does not enjoy a majority in the House all by itself. That a majority government can function with the support of other parties is clear from the case of the present central government headed by itself. That a majority government can function with the support of other parties is clear from the case of the present central government headed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The case of a purely PSP ministry led by Mr. Thanu Pillai, which functioned for a considerable time in Kerala supported from outside as it was by Congress which constituted the majority is well known to constitutional history in our country.

"There have been many minority governments in England also both in 19th and 20th centuries which functioned for years and years together. Whether a government ~~starts~~ as a minority government or is later reduced to a minority is immaterial. Our legislative Assembly is already under summons and it is on the floor of the house as you yourself and others have said to many times that claim of majority and minority can and should be tested.

"One of the guidelines which was unanimously framed by the Presiding Officers Conference in April 1968 and upon which you took a stand when the minority government of C.B. Gupta was functioning in the State, ran as follows: "The question whether the Chief Minister has lost the confidence of the assembly shall at all time be tested in the assembly." Governor Dharam Vira of West Bengal had dismissed the Chief Minister Ajoy Mookerjee for evading the legislature; here in case I fail to resign you propose to dismiss me while the assembly is scheduled to meet on

October 6th which is hardly a week away. A monstrous situation indeed, the Governor asking the Chief Minister to resign the government that he is in minority, and yet not allowing him to prove his majority on the floor of the house. I may tell you, I am prepared to face the assembly even earlier, say, on September 30th or October 1st, only if you summon it as you can under rule 4(2) of the Rules of Business of the Assembly.

"In exactly a similar case, viz., when the Jana Sangh had withdrawn itself from Akali Dal coalition government in Punjab recently, thus reducing it to a minority and demanded the removal of the Chief Minister. The Governor instead of calling upon the Chief Minister to resign asked for the summoning of the assembly.

"You had sought the opinion of the Attorney General on September 25th, 1970. A day after, however, viz., on September 26th, 1970 the Jana Sangh the Swatantra and the Congress (O) sent you their letters of unqualified support to the government. According to the papers in Speaker's secretariat, their support amounts to a figure between 235 and 240. I may add, however, as I told you in my previous letter that acceptance of my advice regarding removal of certain minister did not turn on whether I commanded a majority or minority in the house at the time. As Jennings, an eminent authority on constitutional law had pointed out, a minister can and ought to be removed on the advice of the Prime Minister although the minister may enjoy majority in the House of Commons. For in the case, the Prime Minister could be thrown out by an adverse vote of the House, but in as much as the minister was appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, he has to go out in any case if the Prime Minister so desires. Yet another point, the Attorney General's opinion is presumably based on the assumption that the present government began or came into being as coalition ministry whereas in fact it was started on February 17th as

a purely BKD ministry, of course with Congress(R) support. A coalition government was actually formed two months later, viz., on April 9. The only change that has occurred since is that the position of Congress(R) has taken up by the other parties, viz., the Jana Sangh the Swatantra and the Congress(O).

"... I hope to be forgiven if I say that the Governor who has written this morning a letter to me appears to be a different person from the one whom I saw on September 24th who seemed to be convinced of the propriety of my stand and wanted to consult the legal rememberancer simply for formality's sake as also from the Governor who told leaders of Jana Sangh and Congress(O) on September 26th that their support to the present government had materially changed the situation. Even after accepting my resignation or dismissing me as you please you will obviously have a government in order that the business of the House is transacted on October 6th and the following days. What is the method which you want to adopt in order to choose a leader of government in my place? Ostensibly either by asking all the members of the assembly to appear before you in order to express their wishes in this regard of taking an adhoc decision without reference to any principle.

"May I enquire whether any of these courses will be proper or constitutional? Is this how we propose to preserve democracy in our country? You must have made up your mind either way by now. I hope you would not mind disclosing it to me. You have said that the correct stage of evaluating the quantum of my support will arrive when the question of formation of new government comes up after my resignation. May I enquire

why it can not be gone into today? Should it be necessary for me first to resign or to get dismissed before you can go into the quantum of my support? If that is your stand, may I respectfully enquire raison d'etre behind it? Cannot a Chief Minister change partners? If not, may I know where the prohibition is contained, in which Article of the constitution please? Is there a convention to this effect in any of the parliamentary democracies of the world? If so, where? After I have heard from you, I will let you know my final reply." 1

On September 30, 1970 Charan Singh cabled to the President of India V.V. Giri who was in Russia, requesting him not to sign any order for President's Rule in U.P. till his return to India. "Constitutional propriety and natural justice require that you should be fully informed and hear the other side before reaching any conclusion," Charan Singh said in his cable.²

Charan Singh told some newspaper reporters that "the Supreme Court in a judgement had emphasised that the President must personally satisfy himself about a situation before issuing orders." The BKD and the opposition parties had planned a legislators' march to Raj Bhawan to protest against the denial of an opportunity to run the administration. A Coordination Committee formed by the Congress(O), Jana Sangh, SSP, Swatantra

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 30, 1970

2. Ibid., Oct 1, 1970

and the BKD decided that MLAs belonging to these parties should parade themselves before the Governor in protest against his recommendation for President's Rule in the State, as well as to show their strength. The Committee in a resolution alleged that "the Governor had acted in a partisan spirit so that the Assembly could be dissolved and the Congress(R) policy of holding a fresh election furthered."¹

In New Delhi the SSP leader Limaye demanded removal of the U.P. Governor B. Gopala Reddy "for his partisan conduct in the State constitutional crisis. No Governor or President can usurp the powers of legislature or remove a government or give it confidence." But he reiterated his party's 'hatred' for Charan Singh's politics.² The Jana Sangh leader Nanaji Deshmukh described the Governor's action as "a murder of the constitution and rape of democracy. We shall fight such dictatorial methods of Mrs. Gandhi with all the power at our command," he added.³

In Bombay the Swatantra Party General Secretary R.C. Koopers charged Mrs. Gandhi's government with "resorting to devious means to seek power in U.P." He said that "loss of the State to Congress(R) would be a shattering blow to Mrs. Gandhi's prestige and plans."⁴

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Oct 1, 1970

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

K.K. Bhattacharya, Vice-President of the Allahabad High Court Bar Association and a constitutional lawyer said in Allahabad that in his opinion the Governor could not ask the Chief Minister to resign or to dismiss him in the present circumstances.¹ The Governor of the Punjab PPCC(O) Mohanlal accused the Governor of being a tool in the hands of the centre.² Karpoori Thakur, Chairman of SBP said: "The Governor has nakedly and unashamedly acted in the interest of the Prime Minister."

11. President's rule in U.P.

Governor B. Gopala Reddy asked Charan Singh to resign by the evening of September 28, 1970 and President V.V. Giri signed a proclamation taking over the administration of U.P. and suspended the State Assembly on October 1, 1970.

A day before the proclamation of emergency in Uttar Pradesh, on September 30, 1970, the principal opposition parties, the Congress(O), Jana Sangh, Swatantra and BKD asked for an emergency session of Parliament to review the political developments in U.P., to move a motion of no confidence against the government if

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Oct 1, 1970

2. Ibid.

such a session materialised. They also sent a cable to V.V. Giri in Kiev (USSR) stating that the U.P. Governor could have tested the strength of Charan Singh's government on the floor of the Assembly which was due to meet shortly.

The statement added: "It was significant that the same Governor only the day before approved of two ordinances recommended by the Chief Minister and in fact accepted the Chief Minister's advice to divest 13 Ministers of their portfolios. The Chief Minister claimed that he enjoyed majority in the Assembly as before. The Congress(O) Jana Sangh and Swatantra had officially extended their support to his government in such a situation." The statement said that "In spite of all known facts the U.P. government and the Legislative Assembly were suspended for whatsoever period, the people of the State had no forum of redress. It then becomes necessary to call an emergency session of Parliament."

Two Congress(O) leaders M.S. Gupnada Swamy and Nawal Kishore called for observance of October 2, 1970 as "save the constitution and save democracy day."¹

The Governor in his report of a constitutional breakdown in the State had asked only for the Assembly suspension presumably anticipating the possibility of an alternative government being

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Oct 1, 1970

formed. According to constitutional procedure the President's rule would come into force after a notification from the Home Ministry. It was the first time that the President had signed an order in a foreign country imposing President's rule in a State. U.P. had gone under the President rule for the second time since 1967.

On the same day in Lucknow Charan Singh said that Mrs. Gandhi "had tried to draw him out of U.P. Politics by offering him on July 3, 1970 the Home Portfolio at the Centre.¹ He had not found the offer attractive because "the Home Ministership had been downgraded after the June 27, 1970 reshuffle and departments such as the CBI, and relation with States were taken out of its purview."

Charan Singh further said that the imposition of President's rule in the State was "a denial of the right of the Assembly to determine not only the question of majority but also of stability." He further said:

"If the Congress(R) could not attain a majority all constitutional process would be suspended in U.P. This had happened but it would be worth while to recall how the Congress(R) had shifted its ground. At first my removal was sought because it was alleged

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Oct 1, 1970

that I had lost majority. Then it was contended that the majority in the Council of Ministers wanted my removal. Later it was argued that I should have been dismissed because I had refused to resign when I was asked to do so by the Governor. When I had asked for the removal certain ministers consequent on their own and their leadership's attempt to wean members of BKD, the Assembly was due to meet only about 10 days ahead. Also it became manifest that despite the withdrawal of Congress(R) support the government continued to enjoy a majority in the House.

"So far as the majority in the council of Ministers wanting my removal is concerned, it was not due to any friction in the working of the council, but because of external pressure following the withdrawal of Congress(R) from the coalition. In fact once its leadership had decided upon withdrawal which it was proclaiming from the House tops for weeks past. It is the Congress(R) ministers who should have resigned far before I had to ask for their removal. I had not refused to comply with the Governor's letter asking me to resign. I had sought only some clarifications vital to the functioning of representative government and promised to reply to the governor after receipt of his clarification." 1

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Oct 1, 1970

Major Decision Taken by BKD Government

Following were the major decisions taken by the BKD Government which was in power for only seven months (Feb 17 - Sep 28, 1970)

a. Takeover of Sugar Mills: On Feb 21, 1970 the BKD Government in U.P. had decided to take over the Sugar Industries and to set up a Committee to suggest the form and procedure for doing it. Chief Minister Charan Singh who announced the decision at a press conference after the Cabinet meeting, did not make it clear whether it would mean nationalization, co-operativisation or some other form of social control. He said that the committee headed by the Irrigation Minister Virendra Verma would suggest how compensation would be paid to the owners and in what form shares would be given to the farmers.

"A law should be enacted empowering the State government to acquire sugar mills by the payment of bonds but after this, the government should transfer the Units gradually to cane growers by selling out the shares to them but by deducting the money from their cane juice price," said Charan Singh. The government had also passed a resolution protesting against the Centre's failure to increase the minimum statutory price of cane and demanded that it should be raised to Rs. 10 per quintal with immediate effect. As recommended by the Indian Sugar Cane

Development Committee, this was necessary to ensure the growers a fair return from the cultivation of sugar cane, and also to put an end to the constant cycle of fluctuation in production. The resolution said: "During the last three years there had been a considerable increase in the cost of cultivation of sugar cane. The cost of major agricultural inputs like fertilisers, irrigation and labour had increased substantially. The present prices being paid to cultivators by sugar factories as compared with other crops did not provide an adequate return to the grower and/^{was}likely to lead to the reduction of the area under cane, thereby jeopardising the sugar industry."

b. Curb on Gurrh Lifted : Another important decision by the Cabinet to bring relief to the farmers was to lift all the restrictions on the movement of Gurrh from the State. So far only edible Gurrh was allowed to be exported. Now the other type used for the manufacture of alcohol was also permitted to be exported.

c. Purchase of Wheat : The State government took another important decision to purchase 3 lakh tonnes of wheat during the fourth rabi crop season in conformity with its policy of not to allow the prices to fall considerably to the prejudice of the cultivators.

d. Law Commission for the State: To recommend measures to reform procedural law and to expedite justice, the BKD government had also decided to set up a Law Commission under the Chairmanship of J.K. Tandon, a retired High Court Judge.

e. Elections to Zila Parishads: The issue of elections to Zila Parishads was also considered where elections had not been held for as long as 8 or 9 years where office bearers had been nominated or their term extended.

f. Decision on Land Ceiling of 30 Acres: On February 23, 1970 the BKD Government took a major decision involving land ceiling limit to 30 acres per family and withdrawing the much abused exemption granted to fruit growers and cooperative farmers. The fruit growers and cooperatives could possess as much land as they could without limit. The limit however was 45 acres for Bundelkhand, the Tarai and the Kalamur range in Mirzapur district. By doing this the government wanted to release several Lakhs of acres of land for distribution to the landless. Earlier the ceiling limit was 40 acres for a family of five with the provision that there could be an addition of 8 acres with each additional unit subject to an overall maximum of 64 acres. Now the term 'family' had been redefined to include an adult, his spouse and minor children with no number fixed, but the ceiling limit would remain 30 acres whatever may be the size of the unit.

In Bundelkhand, Tarai and Kaṣamur range the limit hitherto was 80 acres with a maximum of 126 With additional unit. Now the uniform limit in these areas was to be 45 acres. Earlier the growers and cooperative farms had no limit. But now the limit of 30 acres would apply to growers also. While in the case of cooperative farms, the total permissible area would be calculated on the basis of 30 acres for each member the remaining would have to be surrendered. It was pointed out that making use of these concessions influential people built farms and acquired thousand of acres with fake entries. So far educational institutions were also exempted from the Ceiling Act. Now there was no limit for universities and postgraduate agricultural colleges. But for Degree and Intermediate Colleges there was a restriction of 60 acres.

g. Proprietary rights to the tenants: Another important decision taken by the BKD Government was with regard to the transfer of proprietary rights of the house sights in urban areas to tenants so that they might become owners of land also and not merely the building material of the house built on such land. This was expected to bring relief to lakhs of poor people living in the suburban areas who had to get their land lease renewed with ever increasing rent.

h. Land Revenue Concessions: The BKD Government on ^FFebruary 25, 1970 had decided to exempt land holdings upto 3.125 acres only from land revenue. The former government had exempted land holding upto 6.25 acres from land revenue through an ordinance. It was said that the ^{cis}decision would come into force from July 1970. While announcing the new decision Charan Singh said that the benefit of exemption from revenue would be available to holding upto 12.5 acres. But after cabinet meeting he declared that the question of 12.5 acres has been reconsidered and studied in all its implications, and that a decision would be taken later. The decision exempting 3.125 acres from land revenue would cost the State Exchequer a loss of Rs. 7 crores per year as against Rs. 11 crores entailed in Gupta's ordinance. The exemption was meant to benefit roughly half the land holders in the State.

CHAPTER - III

POST BKD DEVELOPMENTS, 1970-77

- (A) Political Situation in U.P.
- (B) Emergency and Non-Congress Movement

Alliance of Four Opposition Parties

While the Congress(R) General Secretary H.N. Bahuguna said on October 2, 1970 that his party would certainly form a ministry in U.P., four other parties, Congress(O), Jana Saigh, Swatantra and BKD got together to form a United Front and agitated for the early convening of the U.P. Assembly. These parties were not talking to form a ministry in U.P. but, "were mobilizing forces to demonstrate that the action taken to prevent Charan Singh proving his majority on the floor of the House and promulgation of President's rule in the State were both unconstitutional and morally wrong."

The four party alliance failed to agree on their joint leadership, while the Congress(R) asked the Governor to invite it to form a government "obviously to present a fait accompli to Parliament when it had to meet on November 9, 1970."

On October 7, 1970 Charan Singh withdrew the contest for the leadership of the revived SVD in U.P. He issued the following statement:

"It is being propagated in certain quarters that the SVD has not come into friction because of my insistence on being elected as its leader. This is not entirely correct. I have expressed it as my desire to friends of the BKD more than once that

they should allow me to retire. But they would not. I made a last attempt today and fortunately they have agreed to my proposal though much against their better judgement.

"This is just to declare to the people that I am no longer a candidate for leadership of the proposed SVD and would extend wholehearted support to my friend whom the Parties opposed to the Prime Minister may elect to this office of great responsibility. It should be the aim of all those who are concerned with the future of the country, to ensure that the conspiracy of Prime Minister to become a dictator or handover the country to communism is defeated and democracy saved. She split her organization into two parts for the sake of her personal power. She has now decided to subvert the constitution itself to that end." 1

2. The S.V.D. Government

Legislators belonging to the Congress(O), BKD, Jana Sangh, SSP and the Swatantra and some independents failed to arrive at a decision on the leadership issue of the proposed SVD at a joint meeting. The matter then was referred to the national leadership of the Parties.

Welding themselves into a new Samyukta Vidhayak Dal, the five U.P. Parties chose T.N. Singh, a Congress(O) member of Rajya Sabha, as their leader soon after they staked a claim

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Oct 8, 1970

to form a Ministry in the State on the support of 250 members in a House of 426. The deputy leadership was expected to go to the BKD. The Governor was immediately informed and asked to invite T.N. Singh to form a popular Ministry. The BKD was asked to nominate one of its members as deputy leader who would^{be} the deputy Chief Minister if the SVD government was formed.

Kamlapati Tripathi submitted a memo to the Governor on October 14, 1970 which said that duly formed SVD of U.P. was "neither a recognized party in the Assembly nor was it known to be functioning outside the House." He said that his party could provide a stable and progressive government in the State.¹

The leaders of eight opposition parties - BKD, SSP, Swatantra, Congress(O), Jana Sangh, CPI(M), Soshit Dal and Vishal Haryana had decided to meet the President and to ask him to urge the Governor to invite T.N. Singh to form the government in U.P. The U.P. Congress(R) leaders Kamlapati Tripathi and H.N. Bahuguna also asserted the claim of their party to form the government in U.P. The delay in calling upon T.N. Singh to form the government and delay in submitting his report to the President had added doubt and suspense in the minds of the opposition parties.

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Oct 12, 1970

The SVD leader T.N. Singh was sworn in as Chief Minister on October 18, 1970.¹ Girdhari Lal Congress(O) and Virendra Verma (BKD) were administered the oath of office as Cabinet Ministers by the Governor. Initially it was a three member Cabinet.

The total strength of the T.N. Singh Ministry was expected to be 33 (24 Ministers of cabinet rank and 9 junior Ministers). The BKD and Congress(O) were supposed to have eight members of the Cabinet rank, Jana Sangh four, SSP three, Swatantra one, and the junior Ministers were to be more or less in the same proportion. The Congress(O) quota included the Chief Minister.

The constituents of the SVD had agreed that the Chief Minister T.N. Singh (C-O) would exchange views with their representatives later and also finalise proper shape of the Coordination Committee for the purpose of such deliberations. Charan Singh told later on that in a meeting of SVD leaders it was decided that the Chief Minister would call leaders of the SVD constituents for consultations whenever found necessary.

In the mid-term poll to the Lok Sabha in 1971, the BKD contested 67 seats in U.P. but won only one although the total percentage of valid votes it obtained there worked out

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, Oct 19, 1970

to 12.7 percent i.e. next to the Congress(R). In other States the BKD contested 33 seats but won no seat.

Soon after the Mid Term Poll to the Lok Sabha, the U.P. Chief Minister, T.N. Singh declared that he would quit on March 18. He said that he would be placing his resignation before the SVD General Body on March 18, 1971 and ask it to elect a new leader.¹ He also informed the BKD Chairman, Charan Singh. The SVD General Body rejected the resignation of T.N. Singh the same day and asked him to continue as the leader.

3. Defections in SVD Government and its Collapse

In a surprise move many BKD MLAs defected from the Party and joined the Congress(N). The first defection was made on March 17, 1971 when D.P. Bora, MLA and Secretary of the State BKD and Party Whip in the Assembly decided to join the Congress(N). He said that "the SVD government had bred instability and failed to deliver the goods and that is why the people had voted for Mrs. Indira Gandhi." 14 Independent MLAs who had left the BKD a few months ago also joined the Congress(N).² Tej Bahadur Ganjwar and Sattar Ahmad (both BKD) left their party on March 22, 1971. They said that they did so because of differences with their party leader Charan Singh.³

-
1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 16, 1971
 2. Ibid., March 18, 1971
 3. Ibid., March 28, 1971

With over a dozen more SVD members including two Cabinet Ministers and two Deputy Ministers defecting to Congress(N) the T.N. Singh Ministry lost its majority in U.P.

The Congress(N) with 212 members urged the Governor to dissolve the SVD Ministry. The Congress(N) could count among its allies CPI-4, CPM-1, PSP-3, Republican-1 and Muslim Majlis-1. The opposition could thus muster an official strength of 222 in an effective House of 416 members. It also claimed the support of the Independents and two SSP rebels. The five parties constituting the SVD had a total strength of 189, the break up being: Congress(O)-64, BKD-61, Jana Sangh-41, and SSP-19.¹

4. Congress(N) Government in U.P. and 1974 General Elections

The five and a half months old SVD government headed by T.N. Singh which was sworn in on October 18, 1970 came to an end on April 3, 1971. Following the defections on larger scale and fall of the government, the Governor B. Gopala Reddy immediately invited the Congress(N) leader Kamlapati Tripathi to form a Ministry.² Kamlapati Tripathi was sworn in as the

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 28, 1971

2. Ibid., March 31, 1971

Chief Minister of U.P. on the same day.

The Government headed by Kamlapati Tripathi lasted till the General Elections of March 1974 where the Congress was returned to power with a majority of 213 seats in the 425 member Assembly. The Partywise position was:¹

Party	Seats contested	Seats won
Congress	403	213
Congress(O)	388	10
Jana Sangh	401	61
BKD	396	106
SP	226	5
CPI	40	16
CPI(M)	36	2
Muslim League	51	1
Swatantra	211	1
LTS	63	-
Others	308	2
Independents	116	5

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 2, 1974

On March 5, 1974 after the General Elections an eleven member Cabinet headed by the Chief Minister H.N. Bahuguna was installed in U.P.¹ The Governor Akbar Ali Khan administered the oath of office and secrecy to the new Ministers.

Within 24 hours of its installation the Cabinet was expanded to include A.R. Jaiswal as Cabinet Minister and A.C. Grice was renominated as the member of the U.P. Assembly to represent the Anglo Indian community.

Charan Singh accused the Congress of resorting to "illegal and dishonest practices in securing their election victory." In a statement he charged some civil servants of having done active work for the success of the Congress against law and rules.²

The triple alliance consisting of the BKD, SSP, and Muslim Majlis had urged the Governor "not to recognize Bahuguna's illegal Government nor deliver his address as prepared by it to the joint session of the State Legislature on March 2, 1974."

The BKD had also accused the Government of "repression following the arrest of thousands of Party workers on false charges." It further alleged that some BKD men had even been murdered.³

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 6, 1974

2. Ibid., March 13, 1974

3. Ibid., March 17, 1974

5. Split in the BKD and Formation of BLD

The first split in the BKD occurred when its National Executive by a majority vote, expelled its Chairman Charan Singh from the Party and elected the Party's treasurer M.S. Oberoi as the new Chairman on July 23, 1974. In a surprise move, seven of the twelve National Executive members of the Party met in Delhi on 23rd July 1974 resolved against the merger of the party with 6 other opposition parties and unanimously expelled Charan Singh. It was alleged that he had not consulted the National Executive before announcing the Party's merger with other opposition parties.

On July 26, 1974 the BKD Parliamentary group expelled the party's newly elected Chairman and party's erstwhile treasurer, hotel magnate M.S. Oberoi on the charges of his anti party activities.

Charan Singh had maintained that he continued to be the elected Chairman of the Party and asserted that the group of executive members nominated by him had no right to oust him from the Chairmanship.

The BKD State Executive, under the Chairmanship of Charan Singh, terminated the primary membership of party MLAs who in a joint statement declared that "they have shifted the area of

their operation to Delhi under the direct patronage of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi." The Executive also terminated the Primary membership of Jai Ram Verma, State Chairman of the BKD rival faction and Prithvi Nath Sethi, Primary membership of Shyam Lal Yadav, Zainul Basher and Balwant was also terminated by the Executive. After these expulsions the BKD strength in the Assembly had been reduced from 107 to 101.

On July 20, 1974 Charan Singh had declared that with the coalition of seven opposition parties namely BKD (Charan Singh group), Swatantra Party (Pitloo Modi group), Lok Tantra Kisan Dal (a group broken from Jana Sangh), Utkal Congress (Orissa), Kisan Mazdoor Party (Haryana) and Khetra Zamindar Sabha of Punjab, he was forming a new political party, the Bhartiya Lok Dal (BLD).¹ A resolution in this regard was passed on August 29, 1974 by the coalition of opposition parties and on the same day Charan Singh had declared the formation of the new political party. Charan Singh was unanimously elected as Chairman of the BLD.²

This newly formed Political Party claimed to be the national opposition and to be an alternative to the Congress.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 21, 1974

2. The Statesman, New Delhi, Aug 30, 1974

B. Emergency and Non-Congress Movement

A Non-Congress SVD (Samyukta Vidhayak Dal) Government was formed in U.P. in 1967. This was the first success achieved by these Parties in capturing political power in the State providing an alternate to the monolith Congress. These governments formed from time to time were founded on a negative basis, namely non-Congressism. A common agreed programme had, no doubt, been chalked out, but soon after the formation of these governments, the inner contradictions among the various constituents began to surface as a result of which none of these governments could last for more than two years at a time. In the absence of a common ideology, these SVD governments were bound to meet this fate.

The constituents of these governments included the Communist party on the extreme and Jana Sangh on the other. It was clearly an agreement based on political expediency. During this period, no attempt to forge a united non-congress party as a national alternative could succeed. The relations among them became very strained and there were allegations and counter allegations. The SSP and its leader Raj Narain accused Charan Singh of violating all agreements. Although later on they were to join hands with him in the formation of Bhartiya Lok Dal and Janata Party. These allegations were o. very

serious nature. Charan Singh was accused even of accepting money from the industrialists and of its misuse.

On April 1, 1967 Charan Singh left the Congress and was elected leader of SVD.¹ In a letter to Smt. Indira Gandhi, he explained his reasons for leaving the party. In September, 1968, Charan Singh formed the Bhartiya Kranti Dal. It was a party which tried to project an alternative to both capitalism and socialism. The alternative was to be within the broad framework of Gandhian thought. The basic principles were enunciated in a brochure "Aims and Principles of Bharatiya Kranti Dal" published in amended form in 1973.

It was declared in 11 articles that "the BKD does not believe either in a system known as capitalism under which individuals enjoy unrestricted freedom to exploit the economic needs of others or in a system known as socialism or communism, under which the state possesses an unlimited power to curb or take away the economic freedom of entire people. The BKD believes in the middle Gandhian path, an economy based overwhelmingly on self employment. It believed in a system of private property where exploitation is reduced to minimum, if not eliminated altogether. In BKD's view democracy is found

1. Dutt Braham, Five Headed Monster, Surge Publications, New Delhi, 1978, p.1

upon the ownership of property. Indeed a wide dispersion of property is the only assurance that democracy is safe. There can be no democracy in a system where only few individuals at the top, i.e. the rulers or politicians own or control everything, where political and economic powers are vested in the same hands."

The most important factor which marked off the BKD from other political parties was its view about the method of political agitations. It was the most significant contribution of Charan Singh to the political methodology of those days. Unfortunately this was diluted later where BKD dissolved itself to take the form of BLD and still further when it went to form the Janata Party. This change was due to the influence of SSP a group which gave top priority to political agitations of a different sort.

The articles of BKD (published) stated: "The BKD stands for the preservation and strengthening of democracy and of the rule of law in the country and will not tolerate anything that injures it. It does not believe in such political agitations and propagandas as designed to promote breach of law. Such methods are bound to foster disrespect for law in the minds of people and eventually pave the way for dictatorship." In fact the last sentence proved to be prophetic when in 1975 such

methods were adopted, and led to the kind of events which culminated in the declaration of emergency. It goes to the credit of Charan Singh that he maintained this view in the subsequent years also. Although, to accommodate various political groups he had to drop this from the declared policy of the new organization which he formed or of which he was the main architect. Had he insisted on his methodology and were he to succeed in bringing round others to accept it, the history of India would have been different and events which took place would not have taken place at all.

6. Jayaprakash Narayan Movement

The BLD had not joined the J.P Movement as it wanted to keep its identity of a Parliamentary opposition party. The BLD National Executive, which met in June 1975, decided not to join the J.P. Movement but emphasized the need of uniting the opposition parties and challenging the ruling ~~the~~ ruling party (the Congress(N)) to hold elections. It was felt that this course would enable the democratic opposition to capture power at the centre and in the States also.¹

On June 21, 22 and 23, 1975 just 3 days before the declaration of Emergency, the Working Committee of the BLD, Congress(O), Jana Sangh and Socialist Party met jointly.²

1. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.10

2. Ibid.

Charan Singh made a strong plea for forming a new party and dissolving the old ones. He said that this was the only course open. Morarji Desai, who had presided over the meeting, disagreed. He was in favour of Gujarat type Morcha. He claimed that the Morcha experiment had been successful in Gujarat could succeed elsewhere also. The Jana Sangh leaders were reluctant to dissolve their party but were ready to join a federal structure.

The Socialist Party President George Fernandes was against any party merger. He pleaded that political parties are formed on the basis of ideologies and the ideologies can not merge. He was all for a United Struggle. The meeting ended without reaching an agreement. This was the greatest tragedy that could happen to a country. Had the opposition parties agreed to form a joint front to challenge the ruling party to hold elections, things would have been different. Electoral challenge would not have resulted in the type of confrontation that developed. Instead of adopting this course on the 25 June, 1975 a Sangharsh Samiti was formed to launch a struggle for the removal of the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi. Charan Singh did not attend any meeting of the opposition leaders after the 2nd June 1975. On June 25, 1975 Jayaprakash Narain, Morarji Desai, Nanaji Deshmukh, Asoka Mehta and others came to the U.P. Niwas in Delhi where Charan Singh was staying. The

announcement for the formation of Sangharsh Samiti and launching a satyagraha at New Delhi was made, although, the satyagraha was of a very limited nature. Some of them, particularly Nanaji Deshmukh and Raj Narain were of the view that the scope of struggle could be widened and it could take the shape of a national struggle to oust the Prime Minister. Deshmukh said that 10 Lakh RSS Swayansewaks were ready to join the struggle. The rallies were held in the third week of June 1975.¹

Here a fact may be mentioned that after the failure of joint meeting of the different working committees to agree on the formation of party, some BLD leaders, particularly Piloo Modi, proposed on June 23, 1975 that the BLD should merge into Congress(O). Brahma Dutt, Lok Dal MLC of U.P., had gone to Lucknow to bring certain papers for Charan Singh. When he returned Charan Singh told him about this proposal. Brahma Dutt was not happy about it. It was felt by all BLD leaders that no useful purpose would be served by their joining the Congress(O). It was decided to call a meeting of the National Executive of the BLD to consider this proposal. This meeting could not be held as the leaders were arrested on June 26, 1975. The proposal to join the Congress(O) was again discussed by the BLD in 1976, but it was not acceptable to the majority.

1. Brahm Dutt, Op cit., p.12

7. B.L.D. and the Pre Emergency Movements

During the months April to August, 1974 attempts to form a democratic opposition to the ruling party were continued. Talks were held with the leaders of the Congress(O), Jana Sangh, D.M.K. and others. These attempts met with a partial success and resulted in the formation of the Bharatiya Lok Dal. The B.L.D. was inaugurated on August 29, 1974.¹ On August 25 just 3 days before the decision of BKD to take the form of BLD, Jaya Prakash Narayan visited Lucknow. He inaugurated a Youth and Students Conference. Charan Singh, Raj Narain, C.B. Gupta and Nanaji Deshmukh met him. Jaya Prakash advised them to unite and lead the youth and students in a movement. He told them that there was a lot of enthusiasm in the young men and if all the leaders rose above party politics, success could be achieved.²

On August 18 and 19, 1974 the Congress(O) decided to launch a movement against corruption and the rising prices in U.P.³ The Congress(O) also considered the formation of the BLD. The Congress(O) leaders were of the view that if the BLD makes satisfactory progress the Congress(O) should consider to join it, but there was no unanimity about cooperating with other

1. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.12

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

opposition parties.

On October 12, 1974 Charan Singh said at Kanpur that the BLD supports the J.P. Movement in Bihar, but for the present the BLD will give top priority to the organization.¹ He was not for joining or starting a Bihar type movement in U.P. On October 13, 1974, the Executive Committee of the U.P. BLD met at Lucknow. It was decided to hold demonstrations on the December 5, 1974 against the rising prices, unemployment and famine conditions in U.P. Raj Narain wanted the BLD to join the struggle of total revolution. He appealed to all opposition parties to join the BLD, but neither the opposition parties nor BLD itself was influenced by his views. Raj Narain issued an 11-point charter of demands drafted by him. The demands were:²

- (i) All political, economic and moral corruption should end;
- (ii) Unemployed people should be given employment or allowance;
- (iii) Essential commodities should be available at cheaper rates;
- (iv) The price of sugarcane should be Rs. 20 per quintal and the price of sugar should not exceed Rs. 300/- per quintal;
- (v) The price of paddy to be paid to the farmer should not be less than Rs. 100/- per quintal. There should

1. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.12

2. The Times of India, New Delhi, Oct 14, 1974

be a just balance in the prices of the agricultural products and the goods manufactured by factories;

- (vi) Enhanced rate of land revenue and electricity should be withdrawn;
- (vii) The ordinance about the electoral expenses should be withdrawn;
- (viii) All the adults attaining the age of 18 years should be given right to vote;
- (ix) Education, medicine, manure and water should be inexpensive;
- (x) The Educational and electoral system should be completely changed; and
- (xi) There should be no firing on the unarmed people.

On November 25, 1974 a Conference of opposition parties was held in New Delhi presided over by Charan Singh.¹ It was decided to extend the J.P. Movement to the whole country. After this Conference an impression was created that ELD had joined the J.P. Movement. But it was not a fact. To remove this impression, Shri Krishna Bajpai, General Secretary of the U.P. State ELD issued a circular which expressed the views of the party. It was stated in the circular that the J.P. Movement would cause public awakening but partyless democracy of which J.P. was talking was not possible in the country in the circumstances that prevailed at that time. J.P. has not accepted the

1. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.13

request made by Charan Singh to lead the new party. On the one hand he was challenging Indira Gandhi to hold elections and on the other he was hesitating to lead a national party.

The Executive Committee of U.P. State BLD met on January 28, 1975 and decided to celebrate "Save Democracy Day". It decided to warn the people about "the coming danger and to act in a manner which might save democracy in the country." In this programme also, the BLD decided to go alone.¹

On March 6, 1975 the BLD participated in the demonstration held in New Delhi under the leadership of Jaya Prakash Narayan.² Several opposition parties participated in this demonstration. They submitted a memorandum to the President of India in which they demanded dissolution of the Bihar Assembly. The memorandum included the demands that the provisions of Emergency, MISA, DIR and other such provisions as were against the freedom of the citizens should be repealed. Students, teachers and the non-teaching staff should be allowed to form their own unions. The workers of public sector should be given a right to organize their unions. There were certain other economic demands also.

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Jan 29, 1975

2. Naik, A.J. The Great Janata Revolution, Chand & Comp. New Delhi, 1977. p. 29

After the 2-day meeting of BLD National Executive, a resolution was passed that Indira Gandhi had no moral right to continue as the Prime Minister after the Allahabad High Court Judgement.

On June 26, 1975 Charan Singh was arrested under MISA from U.P. Niwas, New Delhi.¹ This news was not much shocking under the prevailing circumstances. People were so demoralized that there was no sign of any protest or agitation. People seemed to be quite apathetic, business was normal and people were going to their offices as usual. No excitement was visible in the buses and taxis.

In the fourth week of July 1975 the Legislative Council and the Assembly of U.P. met.² On July 30, 1975, Brahm Dutt (member of U.P. Legislative Council) wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Legislative Council informing him that the BLD Jana Sangh and Congress(O) had decided to boycott the session because of the restriction imposed on their functioning.³

1. Naik, A.J., The Great Janata Revolution, Chand & Comp., New Delhi, 1977. p. 43

2. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.19

3. Ibid.

8. Opposition Parties in Disarray

In the meantime, several meetings of the opposition parties in the U.P Legislature were called to discuss the steps to be taken. The legislators were not ready even to forgo their D.A. and they advanced the argument that in the Parliament also, the opposition members had decided to go to the House so that they could draw their D.A., but would not participate in the proceedings. Brahm Dutt opposed this. By going to the House and drawing D.A., their participation would be on record. Majority of the BLD members, who were outside the jails were of the view that they should issue a statement condemning the declaration of Emergency and the arrests clarifying at the same time that the BLD was functioning as a responsible opposition party and had nothing to do with the alleged subversive activities. There was so much confusion among the leaders and legislators that no regular resolution could be passed.

The Jana Sangh legislators were panicky and they did not want to cooperate with allied parties. Nobody could persuade the president and the secretary of the BLD to convene a meeting of the State Executive. All the time the president, Bhanupratap Singh who was a member of the Rajya Sabha, was staying at Delhi. He was trying to contact Congress MPs and

was in search of a solution. Nobody paid any attention to him. The meeting was fixed for August 24, 1975. In the meantime, there was no organized protest against the arrest of Charan Singh and others. Shri Krishna Bajpai (Party Secretary) offered satyagraha at Kanpur with some of his friends and this was repeated at a few more places. Generally the response from the party workers was very poor. They were not ready to associate with these activities. It is strange that the districts of Meerut and Muzaffarnagar were also without any sign of commotion. Charan Singh publicly rebuked the people when they came out of jail for this apathy. During this period C.B. Gupta also, who was very outspoken in his criticism of the Government, could not give any line of action.

On August 15, 1975, Brahm Dutt addressed a few meetings in Dehradun district. The C.I.D. had received instructions to watch his activities but they did not interfere with his movements. There he met important workers of the opposition parties, but could not inspire them for any demonstration of protest. He returned to Lucknow on 18 August. Later on he was told that if he had travelled by train on 23 August, he would have been apprehended as there were instructions to arrest him at Dehradun.¹

1. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.20;
Also see: Kamal KL & Meyer RC, Democratic Politics in India,
Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1977

The saddest experience was to come on August 24, 1975 when the State Executive of U.P., BLD was to meet. The meeting was to be held in the Royal Hotel in the room of Kali Charan, an MLA, who was one of the secretaries of the party. The meeting was to commence at 10.00 a.m. but the BLD President who had come from Delhi, did not turn up even till 11.30 a.m. He had somehow received the information that he might be arrested so he was quietly sitting in the house of the Party treasurer. This gentleman also preferred to remain in hiding in the house of a Congress leader and did not dare to contact members waiting for meeting. Police officers and C.I.D. had arrived at the Hotel by 10 in the morning. Most of the party members were so frightened that even the secretary in whose room the meeting was to be held, was seen leaving the Royal Hotel through a back door. He was not ready for arrest. At about 12.00 noon, Jagdish Narain Saxena and MLA, Smt. Gayatri Devi (Mrs. Charan Singh) and Brahm Dutt were arrested. When all the three came out of the Hotel, a message was received that Smt. Gayatri Devi was not to be arrested. Both Brahm Dutt and Jagdish Narain Saxena were taken to Hazrat Ganj Kotwali. But to their surprise, they found the BLD President and Treasurer of the party already there. In the afternoon, all of them were taken to the cantonment station where a magistrate noted their statements and served them with a notice.

On the same night they were shifted to the District Jail, Lucknow. Smt. Gayatri Devi was released the next day probably on the intervention of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. There were about 100 people in a compound known as 'reformatory'. Out of them, 60 belonged to RSS and its different front organizations the rest of them were from BLD, Congress(O) and Socialist Party. A few Anand Margis and Jamat-e-Islami people were also there.

In the Jail the most shocking and surprising thing was that the relations among the political prisoners were very much strained. The prisoners, who were practically in confrontation with each other, were divided into two camps. In one camp were the RSS and some BLD men, the other camp consisted of the majority of BLD leaders and members of Congress(O) and the Socialist party. The differences were mostly personal. There were complaints that the RSS men were so much demoralized that most of them had sent written apologies.¹

There were regular meetings in the jail for discussing different topics. The RSS men, Anand Margis and Jamat-e-Islami people had their own gatherings. While the Anand Margis and Jamat-e-Islami people were more concerned with their religious functions, the RSS people regularly had their separate discussions.

1. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.11

The general feeling was that they considered the Congress raj to be a Ravana raj. In their opinion the non-RSS opposition leaders were like vibhishana who belonged to the same family. They thought that merely replacing the Ravana raj with Vibhishan raj was not enough; what was required was to establish Ram raj. This could come only through the RSS. Most of the non-RSS persons were of the opinion that adjustment with these elements was not possible.¹

During August 1975, prisoners detained in jails were becoming anxious to be released. RSS men had already made attempts to obtain their release. It was decided to file habeas corpus applications in the High Court, so that the petitioners might have an opportunity of going out of the Jail. After the Supreme Court judgement that such applications could not be entertained and after the President's order suspending fundamental rights, these petitions were suspended in January and February, 1976. Although some of the hard core supported the action of Jana Sangharsh Samiti and the other groups, the majority was in favour of suspension of such activities, as these activities were merely prolonging the detention period.

On October 15, 1976 the Jana Sangharsh Samiti gave a call for Satyagraha.² Satya Pal Malik who offered Satyagrah in

1. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.12

2. The Statesman, New Delhi, Oct 16, 1976

Garh Mukteshwar fair in Meerut district was detained in Fatehgarh jail but later on transferred to Tihar Jail where Charan Singh was detained. But Charan Singh was released on March 7, 1976.

On December 1, 1975 Brahm Dutt was transferred to Varanasi Central jail.¹ Since he had to appear before the High Court, in January he was transferred to Lucknow. In Varanasi jail there were about 70 or 80 detenus, where the atmosphere was similar to that of Lucknow. In Model jail Lucknow there were about 40 detenus who were divided into two groups - the RSS group and the non-RSS group.

One of the close associates of Jaya Prakash and convenor of the Sangharsh Samiti, Mahavir Bhai was also in this jail. He was also not adverse to the idea of reconciliation. N.G. Gora and H.M. Patel, who were leaders of opposition groups in the Parliament were making attempts in this direction. They had decided not to boycott the Parliament Session and wrote some letters to Mrs. Indira Gandhi. On January 11, 1976 N.G. Gora wrote to Mrs. Indira Gandhi. She asked the opposition to abandon the path of obstruction and violence and to create an atmosphere helpful cooperation for a dialogue.²

1. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.24

2. Ibid.; Also see Pandit, C.S., End of An Era, (The Rise and Fall of Indira Gandhi), Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1977, p.87

On February 15, 1976 Mrs. Indira Gandhi gave a call at Bharatpur.¹ She asked the opposition parties to follow the path of democracy so that democratic system could function in the country. A large majority of the people detained in the jails were in favour of a national reconciliation. Only a hard core opposed it. People started becoming disillusioned about J.P.'s capacity to find out a solution. This was the atmosphere by the end of February, 1976.

In March 1976 elections to the Rajya Sabha were declared. Bhanu Pratap Singh, an MLE was one of the candidates of the BLD. After assurance from the then Chief Minister of U.P., N.D. Tewari that Bhanu Pratap Singh would not be arrested and Charan Singh would be provided a shadow of his choice, they participated in elections. All the BLD leaders were elected to the Rajya Sabha. Most of the opposition candidates were outside the jail and those who were inside the jail were allowed to vote by postal ballot. One Jana Sangh nominee was also elected.

The Congress(O), although it had only 8 members in the Assembly, did put up a candidate. The BLD, Jana Sangh and Congress(O) decided to vote together on a set pattern. Subse-

1. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.24;
Also see Pandit, C.S., End of An Era, (The Rise and Fall of Indira Gandhi), Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1977, p.93

quently it was discovered that the actual voting that took place was against the spirit of the agreement. But inspite of this, the results were as expected. Several meetings took place attended by the representatives of BLD, Congress(O) and Jana Sangh. The Socialist Party had only 2 members in the Assembly and both of them were in prison. These 4 parties decided to form a united group inside the U.P. Legislature. Charan Singh was elected as the leader of that group, and Brahm Dutt was the leader of the united group in the U.P. Legislative Council. This group was called Lok Paksh.¹ Formation of Lok Paksh was described as another step towards the opposition unity.

On March 20 and 21, 1976 Jaya Prakash Narain invited leaders of opposition parties. It was decided to form a new party. A Steering Committee was appointed to draft the policy and programmes. The Committee drafted 'Approach Paper'. In fact, some talks had already started in Tihar jail. On April 4, 1976 the BLD appointed a Sub-Committee to consider this draft.² An alternate draft was sent and Charan Singh suggested that the Lok Sangharsh Samiti movement should be withdrawn for the formation of an alternative party. The Acting General Secretary forwarded the draft to the Convenor of the Steering Committee, together with a copy of Charan Singh's reaction to 'Approach paper'.

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, 24 March, 1976

2. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.33

When the leaders of the four parties again met in Bombay on 22,23 May,1976, surprisingly there was no talk or discussion either on the Approach Paper or the alternative draft prepared by the BLD. In fact no other party had in any manner communicated its reaction to any of the two papers. At the last moment, on May 23,1976 when the BLD leaders were about to leave they were assured that their ideas had been or would be incorporated in the Approach Paper. It was on this assurance that the BLD leaders agreed to the launching of the New Party by Jayaprakash Narain. They made it clear that the joining of Lok Dal in the New Party was conditional on merger of other parties.

On July 8,1976 Jayaprakash Narayan announced the formation of a new party in the presence of Charan Singh, Bhanu Pratap Singh, Brahm Dutt (all BLD), Asoka Mehta, Manubhai Patel, (Congress(O), N.G. Gorey (Socialist), O.P. Tyagi and Sat Prakash (Bharatiya Jana Sangh).¹

On November 8,1976 Charan Singh wrote a letter to Jayaprakash Narayan that he himself should take initiative to launch a new party and should ask the existing parties to join it.² On November 13 and 14,1976 representatives of BLD, Congress(O), Jana Sangh and Socialist Party met Jayaprakash

1. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.46

2. Ibid.

Narayan at Patna. No concrete result could be achieved in that meeting also.¹

In the first week of November, 1976, there was some correspondence between Asoka Mehta Congress(O) and the BLD leaders in which chairman Charan Singh wanted BLD to join Congress(O). The Socialist party was also approached for joining Congress(O) alongwith the BLD. Only the Jana Sangh was to be kept out. O.P. Tyagi of Jana Sangh told Jayaprakash Narayan that the Jana Sangh would not accept Charan Singh as the leader of the new party. He suggested the name of Justice Hegde for the chairmanship. Another important meeting of BLD National Executive was held on January 13 and 14, 1977 to discuss the political situation.²

On January 16, 1977 it was announced by Mrs. Indira Gandhi that the Lok Sabha elections would be held in March.³ She advised the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha and order the elections. Emergency was relaxed. Mrs. Indira Gandhi in her broadcast on January 18, 1977 assured the political parties that they would be able to place their point of view before the electorate. She told her cabinet colleagues on the same day that the process of democracy must have its way and that

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, November 15, 1976

2. Brahm Dutt, Op.cit., p.109

3. Ibid., p.104

all parties must go back to the people who are the real masters. The information about the Lok Sabha Elections was also given to the Chief Ministers who met in New Delhi, the same day. In her broadcast the Prime Minister told the Nation that the conduct of business was possible only if people lived by codes and norms of behaviour. None should imperil the welfare of any section of the people or safety of the Nation. "If India is to live and prosper, there will have to be no preaching of hatred, no practicing of violence, no encouragement of subversive activities or lowering of standards of public life." Emphasising the supremacy of the people she said: "We strongly believe the Parliamentary government must report back to the people and seek sanction from them to carry out programmes and policies for Nation's strength and welfare." She declared her unshakable faith in the power of the people.

On January 13, 1977 the AICC(O) informed the BLD leaders on joining move of both the parties and that it would amend its constitution.¹ Asoka Mehta would resign from the chairmanship of Congress(O) and Charan Singh would be elected its chairman.

For this the BLD suggested that the AICC(O) should adopt a resolution electing Charan Singh its chairman and dissolving itself and the State and district units. The newly elected

1. Brahm Dutt, Op.Cit., p.110

chairman should be authorised to nominate a new Working Committee, new AICC and new units at state and district level. Only then the BLD will have its proper place in that organization otherwise the BLD people will remain merely ordinary members. As some of the BLD leaders expected, the Congress(O) was not ready for it.

On January 18, 1977, Lok Sabha elections were declared.¹ The President of India dissolved the Fifth Lok Sabha the next day. The opposition leaders were yet undecided about their future move. After the declaration of elections and dissolution of Lok Sabha, Leaders of the 4 non-communist parties began exploring the possibility of their merger. The first meeting was held at Morarji Desai's house, where it was felt that even if regular merger is not possible after dissolving those old parties the opposition should unite to contest the elections.

On January 20, 1977, the BLD, Congress(O), Jana Sangh and Socialist party decided to set up a Committee to contest the elections jointly.² Morarji Desai started acting as the opposition leader and decided for opposition parties to contest election in the name of Janata Party. On the same day the

1. Brahm Dutt., Op.cit., p.112

2. Ibid.

Government declared suspension of Emergency and issued instructions to the State governments to speed up the release of political detenus. Public meetings and normal political activities were to be allowed. On January 22, the socialist party Executive met in New Delhi and decided to join the Janata Party.

On January 23, 1977 the Janata Party was launched with Morarji Desai as chairman and Charan Singh as Deputy Chairman.¹

Here it may be pointed out that all through the opposition parties failed to unite into a responsible, responsive, credible and viable alternative to the ruling party on their own, the declaration of elections united them. The basis of the unity was not a common ideology but political expediency. The elections put this heterogeneous group in power. The Congress had been assigned the role of opposition by the electorate.

The Janata Party was formally inaug^urated on the May 1, 1977.² Soon after the formal inauguration of the party the 'Congress for Democracy' led by Jagjivan Ram also announced its decision to merge itself with the Janata Party. Chandra Shekhar was elected as the new president of the party.

1. Brahm Dutt., Op.cit., p.114

2. Ibid.

The Janata Party gave a remarkable performance both in the Lok Sabha and Assembly elections. It secured 345 seats out of 539 seats.¹ In the U.P. Assembly out of 423 seats, the Janata secured 350 seats, Congress 46 seats, CPI 9, CPM 1, Independents and others secured 16 seats.²

The Janata Party interpreted its victory at the Centre as a defeat of the Congress and a challenge to the moral right of Congress to continue to rule the Northern States. As most of these Assemblies had already completed their term of five years (though their term had been extended to six years under the 42nd Amendment), the Janata Party thought it desirable to seek the verdict of the people. The Union Home Minister requested the Chief Ministers of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal to advise their Governors to dissolve the Legislative Assemblies and order fresh elections. But when the Chief Ministers of these nine States refused to oblige the Janata Party, the Government decided to invoke Article 356. Without the recommendation of Governors of these States, the President of India dissolved these Assemblies.

1. Chhabra & Sones, Op.cit., p.439

2. Ibid., p. 443

CHAPTER - IV

JANATA PHASE IN U.P. & RAM NARESH

YADAV'S CHIEF MINISTERSHIP

After the Lok Sabha polls in the first trial of strength in U.P. Assembly on April 1, 1977, the Congress, with the help of CPI, defeated the non CPI opposition's amendment to the motion of thanks for the Governor's address by 46 votes, thus frustrating the attempt to topple the N.D. Tewari Ministry. 223 members including 15 of the CPI voted against the amendment and 177 for it.¹ Though the Congress win was a forgone conclusion, there was a lot of excitement and tension.

According to the position the Congress strength in the House was 208 and the CPI's 16. The Janata Party's latest strength 132 and CJD's 44.

On the advice of the Prime Minister (There was Janata Government at the Centre) the acting President B.D. Jatti dissolved 9 State Assemblies including U.P. on May 1, 1977.²

The UPCC Parliamentary Board, on May 9, 1977 decided for an alliance with the CPI and the Republican Party (Gawai faction) in the ensuing State Assembly elections.³

The CPI wanted to contest 60 to 70 seats and desired an adjustment with the Congress. The CPI State Executive took a decision that the CPI and the Congress would not contest

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, April 2, 1977
2. Ibid., May 2, 1977
3. Ibid., May 10, 1977

elections against each other. However both the Parties were free to put forward their political points of view freely, even on points on which they did not agree.

There was great rush for Janata Party tickets. Thousands printed forms had already been taken away by applicants. There was such a great demand that private typists were selling the forms on their own. Thousands of aspirants for the party ticket had arrived in the State capital with their supporters.

The State committee of the CPI(M) had set up a five men committee to conduct negotiations with the Janata Party for adjustment of seats for Assembly Elections. In a statement the party secretary said that the party would have 'no truck' with the CPI because the latter was still continuing to support the Congress.

A meeting of the U.P. Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Samiti had demanded 50 percent representation for youths in the selection of candidates. At a meeting the samiti declared that it would not allow selection of candidates "who had stabbed the J.P. movement in the back."

All the decisions taken by the Tiwari Ministry during the last days of its existence which were against the interest of the people were to be reviewed. For this purpose the Governor

M. Chenna Reddy set up a three men review committee comprising of the Revenue Board Chairman, the Chief Secretary and the Law Secretary.

Satish Chandra, the Governor's advisor declared that there were mainly two tasks before the administration. First there should be free, fair and peaceful elections. Secondly the tempo of development and economic welfare scheme should be maintained at the existing level if not increased. On May 3, 1977 the Governor distributed work among his advisors. Satish Chandra was allocated 12 departments and Qidwai 18 Departments.¹

The Janata Party Working Committee on May 10, 1977, appointed observers for 11 States and two Union territories going to polls with the authority to take a final decision in consultation with the President. Where the State Election Committee fails to arrive at a consensus on the selection of candidates. Accordingly Charan Singh was authorised to be observer for U.P. and to finalise the U.P. list.

The Election Commission on May 10, 1977 finalised the date for Assembly Elections to be held between June 10 and 14 and apart from other States, it was declared that Uttar Pradesh

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, May 3, 1977

will have three days polling.

On May 18, 1977, the All India Congress Committee released the list of candidates to contest elections on Congress tickets.

Till May 19, 1977 with only 48 hours left for the withdrawal of names - the Janata Party seemed nowhere near finalising a unanimous list of candidates for Uttar Pradesh. The problem was the Janata leaders then were not as united as they were when they contested the Lok Sabha elections.

On May 20, the Janata Party released the list of its candidates for U.P. State Assembly. Raj Mangal Pandey, Udit Narain Sharma and Ram Prakash Gupta, all former Ministers, were among the 425 candidates from U.P., which included 87 members of the dissolved State Assembly.

The Hindustan Times wrote: "The Janata Party in Uttar Pradesh is threatened with the defiance by a large number of Party men who appear to be keen to contest the coming Assembly elections as independents in disregard of the Party directives. This unusual situation has been largely created by the inordinate delay in declaring the list of Party candidates."¹

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 23, 1977

The Janata Party which decided to go it alone against the Congress - CPI combination fielded as many as 132 members of the dissolved House. While a large chunk of 425 party tickets went to the Bhartiya Lok Dal, the Jana Sangh earned the second position. There were 43 Muslim candidates in the list including Habib Ahmed, the State Chief of the Muslim Majlis.

The Congress on the other hand left 38 out of total 425 seats to its allies - 30 for CPI, 5 for RPI and 3 for National League. In a bid to regain power in the most populous and politically important state in the country, the party fielded a total of 160 members of the dissolved House including former Chief Minister N.D. Tiwari, nine Ministers and 12 Ministers of State. There were 41 Muslim candidates in the Congress list.

With hardly a week left for the three day polling to start in Uttar Pradesh, a hurried survey of the northern, western and central parts of the sprawling state, revealed that the Janata wave witnessed during the Lok Sabha election 10 weeks ago, was persisting. It had not evaporated; however for a variety of reasons, it was diffused, enabling a more objective assessment on the basis of individual candidate's merits. There was a fair possibility of the congress consolidating itself as an opposition party.¹

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 21, 1977

Even the best supporters of Congress could not persuade themselves to wish it better. Having derailed the whole nation during the emergency, the Congress leadership was living in its own paradise while imagining that the party was "staging a come back". Polling 195,31,434 votes, the Janata Party had secured 68.06 percent popular support in the March elections. The Congress had obtained 71,70,180 votes representing 25.03 percent of the valid votes polled.

1. Analysis of Assembly Elections (May 10 - 14, 1977)

The Janata Party won 350 of the 422 seats in U.P. The Congress could secure only 46 seats. Three more than the number required for being recognized as an opposition. The party had won 216 seats in the 1974 elections. Its poll ally, the CPI could secure only nine seats as against 16 in the last Assembly elections. The CPI(M) which got two in the last elections had to be content with only one this time.

Of the 20 members of the Tiwari Ministry who contested, as many as 16 were rejected. Only the former Chief Minister N.D. Tiwari, his former cabinet colleague, Laxmi Shankar Yadav and two former Ministers of State Chhed Ram Gangawar and Yash Pal Singh could get through. Those defeated included the UPCC President Mrs. Mohsina Qidwai, former Agriculture Minister and

member of the Congress Working Committee, Virendra Verma, former PWD Minister, Baldeo Singh Arya, former LSG Minister, Rajendra Kumari Bajpayee and former Education Minister Ammar Rizvi.

The Janata rebels who had won, included Indiramani Badori, Babu Singh and Kanhai Singh. Most of the rebels were rejected by the people.¹

As many as 41 members of the dissolved House had been reelected. 110 of them belonged to the Janata Party, 26 to Congress, 4 to CPI and one to CPI(M). Banarsi Das was the only member of the Rajya Sabha to have contested and won. Among the candidates of national Parties who had forfeited their deposits, the Congress accounted for eight, the Janata Party two, CPI(M) 11 and CPI 3. Out of 1,380 independent candidates only 48 could manage to save their deposits.²

The newly elected seventh Uttar Pradesh State Assembly had 283 new faces of whom 242 belonged to the Janata Party, 20 to the Congress, 5 to the CPI and 16 Independents. Among the newly elected were 10 women members of whom 8 were new. This included two members Mrs. Qudsia Begum (Independent) and Shakuntala Nayyar (Janata) who had previously been members of the House.³

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, May 15, 1977

2. Ibid., June 19, 1977

3. Ibid., June 21, 1977

The Janata Party had also claimed the bulk of 82 out of 90 seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes while the Congress got only 7. One seat was won by an Independent. Among 82,56 were new. 3 out of 7 Congress members and the one Independent elected from reserved seats were also new.

Three women also figured among the Janata Party's members elected from reserved seats. Two of them were new. Of the 49 Muslims elected to the House, 30 belonged to the Janata Party, 5 to the Congress, one to the CPI and 4 were Independents. Twenty six out of the 39 Muslim members belonging to the Janata Party were new while two of them belonged to the Congress and four were Independents.¹

2. Yadav Elected Leader in U.P.

On June 21, 1977 Ram Naresh Yadav, M.P. was elected leader of the Janata Legislature Party, defeating his rival Ram Dhan, M.P. by a big margin. Yadav Polled 277 votes as against Ram Dhan's 103. Two members were absent. Yadav was known to be Charan Singh's choice. It was obvious that he received the solid backing of the erstwhile BLD and Jana Sangh constituents. On the other hand, despite the open support of C.B. Gupta for Ram Dhan's candidature there was division in the Congress(O) ranks, while the erstwhile Socialists were

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, June 21, 1977

divided.

Efforts were made in the morning of June 21, to avoid the contest. Raj Narain the Union Health Minister and Banarsi Das met C.B. Gupta in a bid to get the candidature of Ram Dhan withdrawn. But Gupta did not agree.

Ram Naresh Yadav, a lawyer by profession, was elected to the Lok Sabha in March, 1977 defeating Charanjit Yadav from the Azamgarh constituency. He earlier had worked for sometime in the Socialist party under the leadership of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia. His rival Ram Dhan, a harijan, also came from Azamgarh and was also elected to the Lok Sabha.

On the evening of June 28, 1977 allocation of portfolios among the members of the new five men U.P. cabinet was announced. Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav held charge of as many as 17 departments and subjects including general administration, home, finance, planning, confidential, appointments, vigilance, election, home guards, economics and statistics, sales tax, registration, stamps, court fees and entertainment tax. He had also been allocated the portfolios of industries which included heavy industries, small industries, handlooms and handicrafts, habitations environment and ecology.¹

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 29, 1977

The first set of major administrative changes by the new Janata Government involved the transfer of over two dozen officers both at the State secretariat and district level. The officers had been transferred for administrative reason and in public interests.¹

R.N. Yadav, Chief Minister had a talk with the leader of opposition N.D. Tiwari on the choice of Speaker and there was unanimity on the name of Banarsi Das, who on July 12, was declared elected unopposed as the Speaker of the seventh U.P. Assembly.

The Uttar Pradesh Ministry was expanded on July 4, 1977 with 41 new incumbents. In all there were 21 Cabinet Ministers, five Ministers of State and 15 Deputy Ministers.

On May 2, 1978 Ram Naresh Yadav added 7 new Ministers and promoted another seven from the Deputy Ministership to the rank of Minister of State. With this, strength of the Ministry had gone up to 48 from 41.²

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 1, 1977

2. The National Herald, Lucknow, May 13, 1978

Among the seven new entrants three belonged to the erstwhile BLD group, two to the former Congress(O) and one each to the Jana Sangh and the Socialist constituents of the Janata Party. The expansion took the Cabinet strength to 24, Ministers of State to 15 and the Deputy Ministers to 9. In the fully expanded 48 member Council of Ministers there were five Muslims, five Harijans and three women.¹

On May 2, 1978 all the 11 official Janata Party candidates were declared elected to the U.P. Legislative Council in the biennial elections from the Assembly constituency.² The other two candidates were Congress(I) nominee Mrs. Indira Mohani and the Congress supported CPI member Dr. Z.A. Ahmed.

On August 4, 1977 the U.P. Governor Chenna Reddy, on the recommendation of the Chief Minister dropped Mr. Jogeshwar Deputy Minister of Health from the Council of Ministers. In his statement the Chief Minister said that Mr. Jageshwar had sent him a conditional resignation following the development after his surprise inspection of the Kanpur Medical College, where doctors, Junior Doctors, Nurses and students had gone on strike. The Deputy Minister released the contents of his resignation letter to the press before the Chief Minister could arrive at any decision.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 5, 1977

2. The National Herald, Lucknow, May 13, 1978

On September 28, 1977 the Deputy Minister for Excise, Arif Mohammad Khan resigned from the State Ministry in protest against the State Government policy in regard to the Shia Sunni situation in Lucknow.

On September 28, 1977 President N. Sanjiva Reddy, appointed G.D. Tapase, a former Minister in the Bombay State, as the Governor of Uttar Pradesh in succession to M. Chenna Reddy who had resigned. Tapase had to join from October 2, 1977.¹

3. Rebels for the removal of R.N. Yadav.

On May 3, 1978 the dissident Janata Party legislators in Uttar Pradesh threatened open revolt unless the party High Command intervened by May 8 to remove Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav. In a joint letter to the party Chief Chandra Shekhar 22 legislators condemned as "Unconstitutional, undemocratic and dictatorial", Yadav's action in dropping from his Cabinet Satiya Prakash Malviya, Minister for Local Self Government.²

In reply to this threat the Party President Chandra Shekhar described the dismissal of Malviya as unfortunate and unparalleled in the history of parliamentary democracy. Chandra Shekhar said that he was upset because "the Chief Minister had chosen to ignore the Central Parliamentary Board

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Aug 5, 1977

2. Mukhtar Anis, a Minister of State announced his resignation in protest against Malviya's dismissal. However he withdrew his resignation later.

in this matter; and also because this might lead to intensification of dissident activity in the State." The State Janata Chairman Abbas Ali announced on May 7, 1977 that he would ask the Chief Minister to clarify on what basis he had dropped Malviya from his Cabinet.

The crisis in U.P. was discussed on May 5, 1978 by the Party President Chandra Shekhar, with Prime Minister Morarji Desai, Party secretaries and some members of the High Command, who disapproved of any move by the dissidents in the Uttar Pradesh Legislature Party to bring a vote of no confidence against Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav in the State Assembly.¹ The High Command wanted the dissidents to air their views at a meeting of the Legislature Party and not impair party unity by forcing a showdown on the floor of the House.

Pandemonium broke out in the U.P. Assembly on May 8, 1978 while it was discussing the admissibility of an opposition adjournment motion on the dismissal of Local Self Government, Minister S.P. Malviya from the Cabinet. Three Janata dissidents were physically removed by the House Guards and one of them, Arif Mohammad Khan, a former deputy minister was suspended for the rest of the session; but later the punishment was reduced

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, May 6, 1978

to three days only. The dissident whose protest spilled over in an organized and demonstrative manners on the floor of the House, shouted slogans like "S.P. Malviya Zindabad" and "Tana Shahi Naheen Chalegi" during the uproar which was sparked by the Chief Minister moving for the suspension of Arif Mohammad Khan.

On April 11, 1978 Union Health Minister Raj Narain held talks with about a dozen Ministers and some party legislators to resolve the tangle over the suspension of six party members for anti party activities.¹

The party president Chandra Shekhar had talks with the Chief Minister and the issue was resolved on a formula which provided that the suspended members will address a letter to U.P. Janata Legislature Party deputy leader Ram Prakash giving portions of their representation to Chandra Shekhar dealing with their replies to the charges against them contained in the show cause notices. The understanding was that on the basis of this letter the suspension would be revoked.

Union Home Minister Charan Singh, who arrived in Lucknow on April 17, 1978 had very brief talks with his close associates including Mr. Yadav and members of the Lok Sabha Madhav Prasad Tripathi and Gauri Shankar Rai.² The purpose

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, April 12, 1978

2. National Herald, Lucknow, April 18, 1978

of Charan Singh's visit was, his wish to impress on Janata legislators the need for unity and cohesion.

On April 19, 1978 the executive of the U.P. Janata Legislature Party revoked the suspension of six party legislators, who were alleged for anti party activities; but with a warning that they should not indulge in anti party activities in future.¹

The Union Home Minister Charan Singh, on April 29, 1978 resigned from the Janata Party's National Executive and Parliamentary Board in protest against the High Command's move to oust the Chief Minister of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh.² He alleged that the dissidents in these states were being encouraged by a section of the central leadership of the party.

Though he had not mentioned the names of the High Command members, but his reference was, among others, to Chandra Shekhar, Party Secretary, Mahu Limaye, Jagjivan Ram, H.N. Bahuguna and others. He was also not satisfied with the attitude adopted by the Prime Minister in party matters.

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, April 20, 1978

2. Ibid., April 30, 1978

4. Crisis in the U.P. Janata Party

The Janata Party debacle in the three by-elections in a row in the State had deepened the crisis in the party. The Congress(I) on May 9, 1978 won its first Lok Sabha seat when its candidate Mrs. Mohsina Qidwai defeated her nearest Janata Party rival Ram Bachan Yadav by 35,385 votes in the Azamgarh by-election.¹ The Congress also annexed the two Vidhan Sabha seats of Soron and Mankapur, the strength of the party in the Vidhan Sabha had risen to 40.

The State Janata Party President Abbas Ali had in a telegram to the party Chief Chandra Shekhar demanded his "immediate intervention" to resolve the grave crisis created by the party defeat in all the three by elections, the dismissal of S.P. Mulviya and the resignation of Mukhtar Anis.

The dissidents had held the Chief Minister responsible for the defeat and demanded his resignation if he did not go voluntarily. Meanwhile the Janata Legislature Party executive *ved* to remove Arif Mohammad Khan and recommended his expulsion from the State party organization since he campaigned for the Congress(I) candidate Mrs. Mohsina Qidwai in the Azamgarh

1. National Herald, Lucknow, May 10, 1978

Lok Sabha by-election.

The Janata Central Parliamentary Board on May 10, 1978 decided to summon Chief Minister R.N. Yadav, State party president Abbas Ali and the dismissed Minister Malviya to Delhi to sort out the crisis which had caused doubts about the stability of the Government.¹

On behalf of the Parliamentary Board which was supposed to regulate the affairs of the various Janata Governments, two of its members A.B. Vajpayee and George Fernandes dealt with the Chief Minister and others involved in the dispute. They held consultations with Home Minister Charan Singh. Vajpayee, Fernandes and Abbas Ali later met Prime Minister Morarji Desai.

Yadav impressed upon the central emissaries the fundamental need of discipline at all levels for the smooth functioning of the Party, Legislature and Government. He had also stressed the need for evolving a code of conduct for partymen. There should be some norms for running the party and the Government, he said.

1. National Herald, Lucknow, May 11, 1978.

The Chief Minister H.N. Yadav in the Janata Legislature party meeting on June 4, 1978 secured 278 of the 388 votes. The voting took place under the party's High Command observer George Fernandes.¹

On June 29, 1978 the crisis in the Janata Party deepened further when the Prime Minister Morarji Desai asked Charan Singh and Raj Narain to resign from the Union Cabinet.² The Prime Minister objected in particular to Charan Singh's statement of a day before blaming the Government for delay in taking legal action against Mrs. Indira Gandhi and calling for her immediate arrest.

Rama Shankar Kaushik, Excise and Labour Minister and the Janata Legislature Party General Secretary warned that if Charan Singh resigned all the Janata ruled Governments would fall. Janata Party's General Secretary Ram Saran Das also warned that if there was a break in the party, the Central Government would collapse and nobody would be able to save it.

Chief Minister Yadav felt that the development at the Centre would not have any effect on the stability of U.P. Government. He spoke high of Charan Singh's efforts for the

1. Dawat, the Urdu daily, New Delhi, June 5, 1978

2. 'Janata Count down to split', Link, July 1, 1978, p.21

uplift of the downtrodden and backward people and for the farmers generally. On the other hand Dr. Rakesh Chaturvedi, a dissident, congratulated the Central Cabinet and Party leaders for their "historic and timely decision." On July 1, 1978 Charan Singh announced that he would continue in the Janata Party. Confidence was expressed that he won't advise the Chief Minister H.N. Yadav to resign. A meeting of prominent BLD leaders held at U.P. Niwas at New Delhi on July 2, 1978 decided to organise a massive rally on July 17 to protest against the ouster of Mr. Charan Singh from the Union Cabinet.¹

Atal Bihari Vajpayee, External Affairs Minister expressed a desire to step down from his government job to take up party work.² Prime Minister Morarji Desai rejected Vajpayee's idea. Desai was keen on maintaining a balance among the various Janata constituents in the Cabinet. Charan Singh on the other hand in a letter to Party President Chandra Shekhar wrote that his resignation from the party Central Parliamentary Board and the National Executive was final.

On Charan Singh's organized rally move scheduled for July 17, it was feared that if any U.P. Minister takes part in the rally, and the Central leadership takes action against

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 3, 1978

2. Ibid.,

him, it would precipitate a crisis in U.P. too. The U.P. Ministers belonging to the former BLD faced a big dilemma whether to join the rally and face action or leave their leader Charan Singh in lurch.

Later on it was understood that section of Ministers and legislators, belonging to the erstwhile BLD, appeared to be determined to participate in the July 17 rally, even if the party High Command placed restriction against it. But as a surprise move Charan Singh declared on July 6 the cancellation of July 17 rally. Once again on July 7 Charan Singh threatened that the proposed Kisan Rally on July 17 would be held as scheduled unless the differences were ironed out by July 10 a day before the Janata party National Executive met.

The Janata Party National Executive on July 11, 1978 made a determined effort to refurbish its image by unanimously adopting a resolution which called for unity with discipline. The resolution asked Charan Singh to withdraw his letter of resignation dated April 28, 1978 from the National Executive and Parliamentary Board and continue to serve on these bodies. On July 12, Charan Singh communicated in writing to Chandra Shekhar that he was withdrawing his letter of resignation.

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 3, 1978

The division between supporters and opponents of RSS in the Uttar Pradesh Janata Party surfaced on December 25, 1978 when three party legislators, Sivanadd Nautiyal, Lalji Tandon and Jagat Narayan, demanded the resignation of Cabinet Minister working for the proposed Kisan Rally in New Delhi on December 23.¹ Party General Secretary, Ram Saran Das also criticised attempts by two of his colleagues to make the RSS synonymous with the Janata Party.

The U.P. Muslim League General Secretary Mukhtar Ahmed said in Moradabad that the reports of the two General Secretaries of the State Janata Party on the Aligarh riots had only tried to cover the misdeeds of the RSS in the Aligarh riots at a time when a judicial inquiry had already been ordered. In a signed statement, he said even Janata leaders like Prime Minister Morarji Desai and Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav had avoided comments. The statement of the Janata Panel at this juncture was a calculated attempt to influence the judicial commission, he said.²

RSS Chief Balasaheb Deoras said it was unfortunate that RSS workers had been blamed for the Aligarh riots. He

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 26, 1978

2. Ibid.

denied any RSS hand in the incident and said the people should wait for the judicial inquiry verdict. Addressing a rally of RSS workers of Faizabad and adjoining districts, Deoras said the RSS had been blamed for communal riots in the country without any basis.

5. Dissidence in U.P. Janata

On January 1, 1979 a meeting of the dissident Janata Legislators demanded in a resolution demanded the removal of Mr Yadav and said it was unfortunate and undemocratic that he had not immediately resigned. It said Yadav was in a minority now and the party image under his leadership was getting tarnished every day.

The meeting held under the Chairmanship of State Janata Party President Abbas Ali was attended by 163 Legislators, four Members of Parliament, four out of six State Party Vice Presidents, three General Secretaries and the Treasurer.

Ignoring the Party High Command publicly expressed reactions, Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav not only got accepted by the Governor the resignation of the four Ministers—two Cabinet Ministers and two Deputy Ministers, whom he had asked to quit, but also went a step ahead and elevated all the six remaining Deputy Ministers to the rank of Minister

of State.¹

The U.P. Ministry would then be a two tier one, and there was to be no Deputy Ministers. Its strength was reduced to 43 after the resignation of four Ministers. There would be 21 Cabinet Ministers and 22 Ministers of State. The Chief Minister declared that there was no possibility of any further reshuffle or addition to hhs Cabinet.

The campaign against Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav within the Uttar Pradesh Janata Party received a boost with the first joint meeting of leaders of practically all constituents except the BLD to plan their line of action. They had also consultation with C.B. Gupta, about the form of requisition to be submitted within a few days to the Chief Minister for a Legislature Party meeting, with copies to the Party President and the Prime Minister. Immediately thereafter a telegram signed by various leaders was sent to all the party legislators supporting the demand for the ouster of Chief Minister to meet at Lucknow on February 1, 1979.

An important development had been the coming out into the open of the Jana Sangh constituent against the Chief Minister. Their strength in the Lower House was 95 and in

1. The Hindustan Times, January 28, 1979

the Upper House seven. In fact it was the Jana Sangh legislators who were most active in collecting signatures on the requisition for the party meeting. A fresh requisition had now been drafted as the earlier text, signed by about 70 members, was found defective. The Prime Minister and the Party President to whom copies were sent were requested to intervene immediately if the Chief Minister did not call a party meeting.

The four ousted Ministers held a joint news conference and levelled allegations against the Chief Minister. Meanwhile former Minister S.P. Malviya charged the Chief Minister with entering a "secret deal with the Congress to continue in power" and said the Janata Party would not permit him to form a Government with Congress support. Malviya also discounted the fear that the Chief Minister could get the Assembly dissolved.

The U.P. Janata Party Chief Abbas Ali had said that the ouster of four Ministers by Yadav was an unwise and unfortunate step which would have serious repercussions. He said that there was no doubt it was the Chief Minister's prerogative to demand resignation of any minister, but in the wider interest of the party it would have been better if the Chief Minister had consulted the persons involved as also the party leaders. He further said that the political crisis at the Centre which was settled after prolonged efforts could occur at the State and national level with such unwise action

by Yadav.¹

A Lok Sabha member and two State legislators from U.P. supported Yadav's action in throwing out some Ministers. In a joint statement, Rasheed Masood, M.P. and Ajab Singh and Mrs. Bimla Rakesh, both MLAs expressed, the confidence that the Chief Minister would definitely secure majority support in the State Legislature party in a trial of strength. According to them the image of the State Government would improve after the exit of Ram Singh and other Ministers who had been removed by the Chief Minister.

The crisis in the Uttar Pradesh Janata Party further deepened on January 30, 1979 when 14 dissidents belonging to different constituents met the Governor G.D. Tapase,² to handover a memorandum asserting that the Chief Minister was in minority and requesting that his advice on no subject be accepted until he proved his majority.³ The memorandum alleged that not only was the Chief Minister threatening to get the House dissolved but he was also offering inducements to members to

1. The Hindustan Times, Jan 29, 1979

2. Those who met the Governor included S.P. Malviya, Raj Mangal Pandey, H.K. Srivastava and Muzaffar Hasan.

3. The Times of India, New Delhi, Jan 31, 1979

regain majority. Certain legislators had been nominated to corporations and boards in the last two days, it said.

A delegation of legislators, demanding a change in the party leadership, left for Delhi on the night of January 30, 1979 to submit a memorandum to party President Chandra Shekhar requesting him to direct Yadav to call a meeting of the Legislature Party at which the Chief Minister should test his majority. They also met the Prime Minister and other members of the Parliamentary Board.¹ Malviya stated that as mentioned in the memorandum to the Governor, more than 100 members had claimed in writing that the Chief Minister had lost the majority. Yadav had asserted that the dissidents were indulging in a "futile exercise". He said that he enjoyed the confidence of the party legislators. There was no need for him to seek a confidence vote on his own, he added. He denied that the four Ministers had been asked to resign because of "political malice". He warned that he would take action against those Ministers who were hatching a conspiracy to oust him.

The political crisis sparked off by Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav's action against four of his Ministers took a critical turn on the night of February 3, 1979 when all the

1. The delegation which left for Delhi included Malviya, Moti Ram, Ramji Singh, Avsant Singh Yadav, Budhu Ram, S.K. Srivastava and Shatrudh Prakash.

eight Cabinet Ministers belonging to the erstwhile Jana Sangh constituent of the Janata Party sent their resignation letters to the Party Chief Chandra Shekhar. The remaining five Ministers of State belonging to the erstwhile Jana Sangh group were likely to despatch their resignations letters to Mr. Chandra Shekhar by February 6.¹

The Ministers in their separate but identical letter wrote that they were unable to continue in the Ram Naresh Yadav Ministry in view of the atmosphere of "Lack of trust and suspicion". They maintained that the attitude of the Chief Minister towards them was not cooperative.

State Janata Chief Abbas Ali appealed to the party's central leadership and legislators "to liberate the State from Yadav's leadership as soon as possible."²

With the battle lines between Yadav and the growing number of dissidents, backed by a powerful Ministerial group, getting clearly drawn, the Janata Central leadership was now looking for a successor who could command fuller support of the party legislators and who did not have a sectional image. The dissident leaders present at Lucknow on February 6 declared that there could not be any compromise short of the

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 4, 1979

2. Ibid., Feb 5, 1979

ouster of the Chief Minister and complete freedom to the Legislature Party to elect a leader of its own choice.

The Janata Parliamentary Board which met on February 7, 1979 in Delhi directed the Chief Minister R.N. Yadav to call a meeting of the Janata Legislature Party on February 15 to seek a vote of confidence.¹ The Board asked Railway Minister Madhu Dandavate to act as the Central observer at the meeting. Dandavate could decide in consultation with the Party President whether, if necessary a new leader should be elected at the meeting or later, depending upon the circumstances.

According to Kaushal Kishore, one of the dissidents, the memorandum against Yadav which the Board considered, was signed by 187 Janata MLAs. Dissident leaders including former Ministers, Ram Singh, Raj Mangal Pandey and Muzaffar Hasan, in a joint statement welcoming the Parliamentary Board's decision appealed to the Party legislators to prove that Mr Yadav did not have a majority by boycotting next day's meeting at his residence. Ministers of the Yadav Government said that they were sure of proving the Chief Minister's majority at the February 15 meeting.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 8, 1979

Pro Chief Minister Janata Legislators of Uttar Pradesh at a meeting at Lucknow on the night of February 8, 1979 demanded the dismissal of 13 Ministers belonging to the erstwhile Jana Sangh without any further delay as they were trying to sabotage the working of the Government from within the Government.¹ The members also urged the Chief Minister to direct the administration not to carry out order of these Ministers who had submitted their resignations to Party Chief Chandra Shekhar instead of sending them direct to the Governor or the Chief Minister.

They alleged that Ministers belonging to the erstwhile Jana Sangh were busy giving last minute orders to influence the legislators. This should not be allowed, they said. The Chief Minister assured the meeting that he would definitely take action against those Ministers very soon. The U.P. Janata Legislature Party General Secretary and Labour and Excise Minister Rama Shankar Kaushik claimed at the meeting that 239 of the 383 Janata Legislature Party members were with the Chief Minister.²

Addressing the meeting former Union Health Minister Raj Narain said the current struggle was between democratic and dictatorial forces. He informed the legislators that Deputy Prime Minister Charan Singh had refused to give any

1. National Herald, Lucknow, Feb 9, 1979

2. Ibid., Lucknow, Feb 10, 1979

advice to him on the current political crisis in the State and had authorised him to study the situation and take action that he (Raj Narain) deemed fit to deal with the crisis.

Raj Narain advised the Chief Minister to take strong action against the dissident Minister. The Minister who had difference with the Chief Minister had no moral right to stay in office and fight against the leader, he said.

The Uttar Pradesh Governor G.D. Tapase was understood to have apprised the Centre, in a special communication on February 9, 1979 of the critical political situation in the State.

The Ministerial ^{Crisis} took a deeper plunge on the morning of February 9 when the Jana Sangh Ministers refused to give an explanation as demanded by the Chief Minister, Yadav, for siding with the dissidents in their attempt to oust him. While the Chief Minister declined to divulge the nature of his talks with the Governor at a 45 minute meeting on February 9 morning, it was believed that Yadav mentioned his intention to sack the 11 Jana Sangh Ministers.¹

The dissidents had already submitted a memorandum to the Governor urging him not to take any action on the advice of the Chief Minister since "he had been reduced to a minority

1. The National Herald, Lucknow, Feb 10, 1979

in the State Legislature Party." Kaushal Kishore describes Yadav's action as highly objectionable.

The U.P. Ministry was plunged into a first rate crisis on February 10, 1979, when Chief Minister Yadav advised the Governor to dismiss 13 Ministers belonging to the former Jana Sangh, on their refusal to resign.¹ The Chief Minister called on the Governor, accompanied with Parliamentary Affairs Minister Madhukar Dighe and Labour Minister Ram Shankar Kaushik and handed over a letter advising him to dismiss the Ministers.

On February 11, 1979 the Governor accepted the resignation of 13 Ministers - all belonging to the former Jana Sangh on the advice of Chief Minister. Eight of them were Cabinet Ministers and five Ministers of State.²

The resignation which had been sent to the Janata Party President Chandra Shekhar by these Ministers on February 4, were handed over to the Governor on the morning of February 11 by two State Janata Party Secretaries on instructions from Chandra Shekhar, though they were addressed to the Chief Minister.

1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, Feb 11, 1979

2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 12, 1979

The Governor informed Yadav on telephone about the receipt of the resignations, and apparently summoned him. After meeting the Governor, Yadav disclosed that the latter had accepted the resignations. Yadav also said that dismissing the 13 Ministers, as advised by him yesterday, was now redundant in view of the receipt of their resignations.

The Janata Party General Secretary Madhu Limaye claimed that if Bahuguna and the Party President, Chandra Shekhar came out openly in favour of Ram Naresh Yadav, the U.P. Chief Minister would win the trial of strength with greater majority. Limaye appealed to all secular elements within his party to come together "to defeat the designs of the RSS." Limaye, who was known to be a supporter of Charan Singh also claimed that majority of the former Congress(O) and former socialist members of the Janata Party were supporting Yadav. This claim was contested by anti Yadav leaders.

The breakdown of different elements within the Janata Legislature Party (MLAs only) was BLD-155, Jana Sangh-93, Congress(O)-29, CFD-31, SP-19, Chandra Shekhar Group-9, and Majlis-8 and others-6 to make a total of 350.¹

There was a perceptible hardening of attitude at the top level of the constituent units of the Janata Party on the eve of the U.P. Janata Legislature Party meeting scheduled for

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Feb 14, 1979

February 16, 1979. At the end of a hectic day of meetings, Madhu Limaye, supporters of Chalan Singh, claimed that "we will win". The former CFD elements, on the other hand, expressed their determination to vote against Yadav.

Yadav lost the fiercely contested trial of strength in the Janata Legislature Party by a wafer thin margin of nine votes - 190 members casting their ballots for him and 199 against.

Accepting his defeat at the State Janata Legislature Party meeting on the evening of February 16, 1979, Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav at late night submitted his resignation to Governor G.D. Tapase.¹ On his resignation move, he said "I have submitted my resignation to uphold the democratic tradition." He further said that he was leaving the Government, he and his supporters would continue to fight against the RSS. He would have nothing to do with any Government which was dominated by "the RSS and other fascist elements."

Most leaders from the State as well as from the Centre appeared to favour a consensus candidate rather than a contest to choose a new leader of the Janata Legislature Party. Yadav was keenly interested to contest for U.P. leadership again as

1. The National Herald, Lucknow, Feb 17, 1979

was evident from his replied to questions at a news conference on the evening of February 18, 1979. He said he would contest again if the legislators wanted him to do so and that in that case "his victory was certain", for he said legislators themselves were taking vigorous initiative in this regard.¹

Asked about consensus, Yadav said that it was not necessary in a democracy and the views of the majority should prevail. He said the Government to be formed would be quite broad based and every section would have adequate representation." But it would consist of secular elements and there would be no place for those associated with the RSS, he emphasised. He said: "There was no question of dissidents or separate camps of 199 and 190 members now. All were following the same line now."

Janata Party President Chandra Shekhar had a 90 minutes meeting on the night of February 19, 1979 with Deputy Prime Minister Charan Singh amid reports that the Central Party leadership and several Uttar Pradesh groups were nearing agreement on a consensus choice for the leadership of the State.² All indications were that the choice was veering round to H.N. Bahuguna, Minister for Petroleum.

1. The National Herald, Lucknow, Feb 19, 1979

2. Ibid., Feb 20, 1979

Apart from being approached by Janata Legislators belonging to warring groups, Bahuguna was understood to have been sounded by Prime Minister Morarji Desai himself. However, Bahuguna was reluctant to undertake the responsibility. He reportedly told all those who requested him to shift to U.P. again that he would not be able to deliver the goods unless the Party legislators were prepared to give up their factional loyalties and that "there should be no wire pulling by anyone in any manner from the Centre."

A contest for the leadership of the U.P. Janata Legislature Party between Banarsi Das, Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and Raj Mangal Pandey, MLA, appeared to be inevitable. Banarsi Das was the nominee of the former BLD group which had ultimately decided against putting up Ram Naresh Yadav, the outgoing Chief Minister, again for the contest being held at Lucknow on February 4¹. Banarsi Das enjoyed the support of Charan Singh.

The pro changers on the other hand had decided to field Raj Mangal Pande, a prominent leader of CFD. He was to have the support of 103-member-Jana Sangh group, crucial for any candidate for Chief Ministership.

1. Yadav resigned on Feb 16

The ministrrialists were said to be divided over the selection of someone who was from upper caste (Banarsi Das is vaishya) and not from a backward community or Harijan. The pro rebel BLD leaders such as Ramdhar Rai, Shatrudra Prakash and H.K. Shrivastava felt that Satya Prakash Malviya was the most suitable candidate.

A three member committee consisting of H.N. Bahuguna C.B. Gupta and Nanaji Deshmukh was to take the final decision on the pre changers candidate.

C.B. Gupta withdrew from the contest for party leadership on the evening of February 26, 1979. This withdrawal was on a technical objections, barely 18 hours before the voting next day, and instead named Raj Mangal Pande of the CFD as the candidate of the pro changers. Other leaders of the camp who had authorised Gupta to make the choice also announced their support for Pande.

The rival ministerialist candidate, Banarsi Das resigned from his office of Speaker on 26 Feb. and immediately swung into hectic canvassing. He was going from room to room in the legislators hostel commenting that probably the prechangers would change their candidate once again. He did not consider Pande as a serious candidate.¹

1. The National Herald, Lucknow, Feb 27, 1979

The consultations among the Central Janata leaders and the new alignments in the offing, indicated that Banarsi Das would become the next Chief Minister. The exploratory talks between Charan Singh and H.N. Bahuguna on February 25, 1979, followed by Charan Singh's discussions with Jagjivan Ram on February 26 and subsequent consultations of Jagjivan Ram with Bahuguna seemed to have brought the BLD and CFD faction of the Janata Party considerably closure, atleast for the time being.

Jagjivan Ram and Bahuguna were assured that Banarsi Das would not act in the sectarian fashion that Yadav had tried to do. He would form a composite ~~of~~ Government with the best talents available from all groups. No efforts from Delhi will be made to influence the Chief Minister in his day to day functions.

On February 27, 1979 the U.P. Janata Ministerialist turned their recent defeat into victory by a convincing margin of 35 votes, when their nominee, Banarsi Das, was elected leader of the Janata Legislature Party, defeating the dissident leader Raj Mangal Pande by 212 votes to 177.¹

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 26, 1979

Banarsi Das described Raj Mangal Pande, his opponent in the leadership contest, as a valued colleague and co-worker and also appreciated the sportsman spirit of others who had differed with him on this occasion. He said the chapter was closed and everybody must forgive and forget and the party must work unitedly.¹

Banarsi Das left for Delhi immediately after the oath taking ceremony for consultation in Delhi on Ministry making, particularly with Charan Singh, Jagjivan Ram, H.N. Bahuguna and Raj Narain. He also met Prime Minister Morarji Desai and Party President Chandra Shekhar.

About the significance of his election, Banarsi Das said the biggest achievement was that Chafan Singh, Jagjivan Ram, H.N. Bahuguna and Raj Narain had come together at one place. He said the ultimate aim was transformation of the Party. "We are the true Janata Party", he remarked.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 26, 1979

Chapter - V

JANATA PHASE IN U.P.

- (A) Crisis in Central Leadership
- (B) Janata Government During Banarsi Das's Chief Ministership: Crisis in the Party, and its End.
- (C) Some of the Decisions Taken and Promises made by the Janata Government in U.P.

(A) CRISIS IN CENTRAL LEADERSHIP

The Janata Parliamentary Party leadership remained unperturbed at the 13 resignation from the JPP, 10 in support of Raj Narain, reducing the ruling Party strength in the Lok Sabha from 302 to 289. The House had a total effective strength of 539¹. On July 10, 1979 14 more MPs quit the Janata Party. By this no immediate threat to Morarji Government was seen. It reduced the party's strength from 302 to 275 in a House of 539, excluding five vacancies. The support of Nine Akali members was assured to Janata Party.²

On July 11, 1979 the Morarji Government fell in minority as 19 more quit the Janata.³ Even with the party strength having dropped to 255 in a House of 539, Prime Minister Morarji Desai maintained that his Government was not in minority. Even as Morarji Desai confidently declared at the general body meeting of the Janata Parliamentary Party on the morning of July 12, 1979 that his Government would face the no-confidence motion being debated in the Lok Sabha, the party suffered another blow when Health Minister Rabi Ray and two Ministers of State resigned from office. This was followed by the resignation of 9 more MPs from Janata Party.⁴

1. National Herald, Lucknow, July 10, 1979

2. Ibid., July 11, 1979

3. Ibid., July 12, 1979

4. Ibid., July 13, 1979

As a result of continuous resignations of Ministers and defection of MPs the leader of Congress Party Y.B. Chavan met President Sanjiva Reddy and discussed the crisis in Janata Party. He said that the Congress Party in the Lok Sabha would like to be asked to explore the possibilities of forming an alternative Government.

On July 13 the fate of Janata Party Government hung in balance as Petroleum Minister H.N. Bahuguna and two more Ministers of State resigned from the Council of Ministers.¹ Earlier the same day Charan Singh and Bahuguna had told Desai that they could not continue in the Cabinet if the issue of dual membership was not resolved.² Chandra Shekhar and Jagjivan Ram used their best efforts to dissuade Charan Singh and Bahuguna but failed. As soon as Bahuguna's resignation was announced some Congress leaders met him to try to persuade him to join the Congress but they failed.

1. Resignation of Morarji Desai

In a dramatic turn of events within the Janata Party, Prime Minister Morarji Desai found himself under great pressure to step down. Faced with an imminent adverse vote against it, the leaders of the various constituents of the party came to

1. National Herald, Lucknow, July 14, 1979

2. One of the major issues which contributed to the split and downfall of Janata Party was the question of dual membership. Most members of the erstwhile Jana Sangh held on to their RSS membership and refused to give up the same.

the conclusion that the unity within the party could be maintained only if Desai stepped down. The consensus among them was that Deputy Prime Minister Jagjivan Ram should succeed Desai as leader of the Party.

With the strength of the Janata Party in the Lok Sabha depleting from 223 on the night of July 14 to a little over 200 in a House of 539 on July 15, Prime Minister Morarji Desai decided to step down and tendered his resignation to President Sanjiva Reddy.¹ The President accepted the resignation but requested Morarji Desai to stay till a successor was found. Judging from the consultations at various levels the most acceptable name for leadership in the Janata Parliamentary Party seemed to be Deputy Prime Minister Jagjivan Ram.

Janata Party President Chandra Shekhar strongly criticised George Fernandes, H.N. Bahuguna and others who left the party. Speaking of their resignations, he asked "is it political opportunism or expedience?" Chandra Shekhar rejected the suggestion that the RSS was the cause of the resignations. He said: "the RSS is not an issue before us."

On July 18, 1979 Y.B. Chavan, Opposition leader in the Lok Sabha was asked by President Sanjiva Reddy to explore the

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 16, 1979

possibility of forming a cohesive and stable alternative Government to replace Morarji Desai's caretaker Government at the earliest.¹ Chavan requested the President to give him three or four days to form his Ministry. He was confident of forming a cohesive and stable Ministry in coalition and with the support of other secular and democratic parties.

2. Congress-Janata(S) alliance

A new grouping of Political Parties with the Janata (Secular) and the Congress was taking shape for the formation of a Government at the Centre. But the question of leadership had not yet been decided. Contacts had not been established with the CPI-M, the CPI, AIADMK and other like minded groups which believed in secularism and were pledged to adopt progressive policies.

The only to stake his claim for the office of Prime Minister was Charan Singh who was elected as the leader of the breakaway Janata (Secular) soon after resignation from the Party of which he was the cofounder. Charan Singh told President Sanjiva Reddy that he had the support of over 300 members including 91 of his party.²

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 19, 1979

2. National Herald, Lucknow, July 20, 1979

The Congress Parliamentary Party leader YlB. Chavan reported to the President of India of the failure of his efforts to form a comprehensive and stable Government to replace the Desai Ministry. Driven to frustration by the Janata(S) insistence on Charan Singh being made Prime Minister of a coalition Government, Chavan gave up the efforts in desperation.

At a meeting at Desai's residence, Desai and Jagjivan Ram made a joint appearance when the latter announced: "we are together and will ^{remain} together". The members of the new Janata Executive who received the statements of Desai and Jagjivan Ram with jubilation were later told by Party functionaries that the reconciliation was "the result of day long efforts ~~by~~ by the leaders of several Janata groups who helped bring about heart to heart talk between Desai and Jagjivan Ram." Charan Singh's supporters, nevertheless, were hopeful that the breakaway Janata(S) being the largest among the opposition parties, would be the next to be called by the President to constitute the Government.

Janata(S) leader Charan Singh's persistent efforts to seek Mrs. Indira Gandhi's support in forming an alternative Government were rewarded on July 23, 1979 when the Congress(I) decided to cast its lot with him.¹

1. National Herald, Lucknow, July 24, 1979

Morajji Desai called on President Reddy in the evening of July 23, and maintained that he had the requisite majority support which included the support assured by other groups and independent members. He indicated that he would submit his list to the President within 48 hours. Charan Singh earlier in the day forwarded to the President a letter he had received in the morning from Y.B. Chavan, recognizing him (Charan Singh) as leader of the Congress-Janata(S) alliance.

Besides 75 Congress members, the Janata(S) had a strength of 79 in the Lok Sabha. The alliance also had the support of Bahuguna group and Socialist bloc. This raised their strength to 203. On July 24, 1979 Desai and Charan Singh submitted their lists to the President containing 279 and 280 names respectively. On July 27, 1979 Morarji Desai stepped down from the Janata Parliamentary party and said that he was disturbed by the recent developments which brought down to the lowest possible level political conduct and behaviour. He announced his decision to retire from active politics, indicating he might resign from membership of Lok Sabha also. However, when the leaders of the party Jagjivan Ram, Party President Chandra Shekhar, JLP deputy leaders, general secretaries and several MPs approached him with the request that he should continue to be available to the party to provide guidance as a respected leader, Desai agreed

to review his decision.¹

A nine member coalition government headed by Charan Singh was sworn in on July 28, 1979 Y.B. Chavan, leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party, who was the only nominee of his party to be sworn in, was later named Deputy Prime Minister with the portfolio of Home Affairs.² H.N. Bahuguna had been appointed Finance Minister and S.N. Mishra Minister for External Affairs.

The other portfolios were to be announced later after Congress had resolved its differences over its nominee and after the second batch of Ministers was sworn in. The other Ministers sworn in were Zulfiqarullah, Rabi Ray, Ram Kinkar and Purushottam Kaushik, all members of Desai's Council of Ministers.

The Congress Parliamentary Board resolved the crisis by retaining all the earlier six names and adding four others for inclusion to the Charan Singh Ministry.³ The new names had been so selected so as to give representation to the minorities, scheduled Castes and Women. The North-Eastern Region also found a place in the choice finalised. In addition to the six

-
1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 28, 1979
 2. Ibid., July 29, 1979
 3. Tbid., July 30, 1979

names (Brahmanand Reddy, Hitendra Desai, Subramanyam, T.A. Pai, Karan Singh and K.C. Pant), the Board decided to recommend the name of Mohd. Shafi Qureshi for Ministership of the Cabinet rank. Henery Austin (Kerala) and Mrs. Rashida Haque Chaudhry (Assam), wife of the late Moinul Haque Chaudhary were to be the Ministers of State. The third name for Minister of State was left to be finalised in consultation with Karnataka Chief Minister Devaraj Urs.

In the allocation of portfolios of his Government, which was announced late on July 30, 1979, Prime Minister Charan Singh allowed most of the former Janata Ministers to retain their portfolios and gave C. Subramanyam, Defence, Brahmanand Reddy Industry, T.A. Pai Petroleum and Chemicals, Karan Singh Education and Hitendra Desai Commerce and Civil Supply.¹ An unexpected addition to the Cabinet was former Supreme Court Judge and Law Commission Chairman H.R. Khanna who had replaced Shanti Bhushan as the Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs.

On August 5, 1979 Jagjivan Ram asked all "right thinking people to get together and bring down the Government of defectors and deserters" and said that the Janata Party itself would not mind voluntary help from any quarter including Indira

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 31, 1979

Gandhi's Congress.¹

On August 6, 1979 a Presidential Order summoning the two Houses of Parliament to meet from August 20 was issued. It was for a short session from August 20 to 24 for enabling Prime Minister Charan Singh to seek a vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha in term of the advice by President Sanjiva Reddy while inviting him to form the Government.² Leader of the Opposition Jagjivan Ram made it clear on August 9 that if Charan Singh's Government failed to win the confidence vote on August 20 in the Lok Sabha, the President was bound to call him to form an alternative Government.

The 24 day old coalition government headed by Charan Singh resigned on August 20, 1979 even before seeking the vote of confidence from the Lok Sabha which had been called for the purpose.³ Following the Congress(I) decision to oppose the Government, the coalition partners came to the conclusion that they would not be able to muster majority support. At an emergency session of the Cabinet in the morning of August 20, it was decided not to expose the Government to the judgement of the House.

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, August 6, 1979

2. Ibid., Aug 7, 1979

3. Ibid., Aug 21, 1979

Accordingly, as the Lok Sabha assembled to discuss the motion for the vote of confidence, Prime Minister Charan Singh drove to Rashtrapati Bhavan with the resignation of his Council of Ministers and its advice to the President to dissolve the House. The President accepted the resignations and asked Charan Singh and his colleagues to continue in the office till other arrangements were made. This communication from the President was read out by Speaker S.K. Hedge in the Lok Sabha after which he adjourned the House sine die.

On August 21, 1979 President Sanjiva Reddy rejected Janata leader Jagjivan Ram's claim to form an alternative Government. He dissolved the Lok Sabha and ordered fresh elections in mid-December 1979 to resolve the political crisis that has arisen following the resignation of Charan Singh's Coalition Ministry.¹

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, Aug 22, 1979

(B) JANATA GOVERNMENT DURING BANARSI DAS'S CHIEF MINISTERSHIP:
CRISIS IN THE PARTY AND ITS END

Banarsi Das, the newly elected Janata Party leader was sworn in on February 28, 1979 as the tenth Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. Six other Cabinet Ministers who were members of the outgoing Yadav Cabinet, were also sworn in by Governor G.D. Tapase. These Ministers were Jamuna Prasad Bose (erstwhile socialist) Madhukar Dighe, Ram Shankar Kaushik, Rajendra Singh (former Congress-O). Rest of the Ministers were to be appointed later on in consultation with the Central leaders.

Banarsi Das declared that he would not include anyone in his Ministerial team who had links with RSS. On March 6, 1979 he expanded his cabinet taking in 18 more Ministers including Ram Naresh Yadav who was made the Deputy Chief Minister, raising its strength to 25.¹

Of 25 Ministers the lion's share of 11 went to the BLD, eight to CFD, three including the Chief Minister went to the Congress(O) and one each to Muslim Majlis, Socialists and Jana Sangh dissidents. Banarsi Das proposed further expansion of his Cabinet. Dissident leader Raj Mangal Pande, meanwhile complained

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 1 and 7, 1979

to Prime Minister Morarji Desai and Party President Chandra Shekhar denouncing the expansion of the cabinet as "partisan and one sided" and demanded immediate intervention and appropriate action.

The Banarsi Das Cabinet was expanded again on March 7, 1979 to include two more Ministers S.P. Malviya and H.K. Srivastava, both well known BLD dissident leaders, raising its strength to 27.¹ It was announced that Narayan Singh (CFD) would also be designated Deputy Chief Minister, the first Deputy Chief Minister being Ram "aresh Yadav. Narayan Singh, a trusted lieutenant of H.N. Bahuguna would also be the leader of the Upper House. The portfolios were announced immediately after the ceremony.

The Cabinet was expanded for the third times on July 1, 1979 to include 16 more Ministers of State raising its strength to 43. Of these 16 Ministers 10 belonged to the erstwhile BLD, two to the Socialists, three to Congress(O) and one to the CFD. They included three Harijans and three from backward classes. None from the erstwhile Jana Sangh was included.

1. National Herald, New Delhi, March 8, 1979

On August 2, 1979 the U.P. Council of Ministers passed a unanimous resolution declaring that they were members of the same party of which Charan Singh and Raj Narayan are the leaders and they had no connection with the party led by Chandra Shekhar.¹ Chief Minister Banarsi Das said that they recognised the Janata(S) unit of which Ram Saran was the convener. The Council meeting which was attended by 25 of the 27 Cabinet Ministers and all 18 Ministers of States showed their loyalty to the Janata-S. Banarsi Das said that the Janata Legislature Party of the State would continue to be called so. Those who differed with him were free to leave, he added.

According to Banarsi Das it was a trial of strength between the RSS led dissidents and those who had elected him the leader, "In this the secular and democratic forces had won over the obscurantist forces", he said. He felt that the Janata Party had split both horizontally and vertically and that Chandra Shekhar and other leaders had failed to resolve the issue of dual membership and prove that the party was wedded to secular ideas.

On August 3, 1979 the Janata Party President Chandra Shekhar announced that Chief Minister Banarsi Das had been removed from the leadership of the Janata Legislature Party as well as

1. National Herald, Lucknow, Aug 3, 1979

from the ~~membership~~ of the Janata Party.¹ He said that he had no option but to take this unpleasant decision in view of Das's categorical statement that he owed his allegiance to the Janata(S)

The open confrontation between the Chief Ministers Legislature Party and the other Janata Legislature Party was carried a step further on August 4, 1979 when the Chief Minister's side announced as a retaliatory measure, the expulsion of 16 of its main opponents.² The latter in turn, met the Governor and in a memorandum urged him to treat the Das Ministry as a Caretaker Government and not to allow it to take policy decisions.

Health Minister Ram Shankar Kaushik, General Secretary of the Legislature Party led by Banarsi Das issued a warning that disciplinary action would be taken against those party members attending the meeting of the Janata Legislature Party announced by the party president Chandra Shekhar for August 9 to elect a new leader.

1. National Herald, Lucknow, Aug 4, 1979

2. Ibid., Aug 5, 1979: Those expelled included State Janata Chief Abbas Ali, their spokesman Raj Mangal Pandey, Ram Prakash Gupta, H.O. Shrivastava, Kesarinath Tripathi, Kalyan Singh, Chandra Bhakta Singh, Omprakash Singh and R.K. Sahi, All former Jana Sangh Ministers besides Muzaifur Ansari former Congress(O) Minister, B.P. Yadav MLA (Socialist), Padmakar Lal MLA, and SVS. Towar, both of Chandra Shekhar group, Ravindranath Tiwari MLA, and Raj Kumar Sama MLC (Jana Sangh).

Chandra Shekhar claimed that Banarsi Das would be reduced to minority, after the Janata Party MLAs withdrew support from him and elected a new leader on August 9.¹ He said that atleast 150 members of the 350 strong united JLP would attend the meeting. This would reduce the number of supporters of Das in the Assembly to about 200 in a house of 426 with two seats vacant.

Chandra Shekhar recalled that in the leadership contest in February 1979 Raj Mangal Pandey had polled 176 votes against Das of which about 144 were from the Assembly and 22 from the Council and that Banarsi Das had no chance of survival. On August 5, 1979 the Executive of the State Janata Party led by Chandra Shekhar passed a resolution calling upon the Governor to dismiss the Government led by Banarsi Das as he had by that time not been declared leader of the legislature party of any of the recognized political parties.² The resolution said that Das was no longer the leader of Janata Legislature Party as he had been removed from the primary membership of the Janata Party by Chandra Shekhar.

Three General Secretaries of the U.P. Janata Party at a meeting with Governor G.D. Tapase reiterated their Party's

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Aug 3, 1979

2. Ibid, Aug 6, 1979

demand for the dismissal of the Banarsi Das Govt. The Governor discussed every issue raised by them in detail and assured them that he would take appropriate action. It was pointed out that since Banarsi Das had been expelled from Janata Party by Chandra Shekhar the Chief Minister not only was no longer leader of the Janata Legislature Party but had also lost his position as a member of the J.L.P.

On August 9, 1979, Raj Mangal Pande, who was unimously elected leader of the Janata Legislature Party owing allegiance to Chandra Shekhar, had demanded from the Governor the dismissal of the Banarsi Das Government and a chance to form a new Government.¹

The split in Janata Legislature Party was officially and technically formalised when the U P. Assembly Acting Speaker Jagannath Prasad, recognised Raj Mangal Pande as the leader of the Opposition, and the two factions as two distinctly separate parties to be known as the U.P. Janata Legislature Party (Banarsi Das) and the U.P. Janata Legislature Party (Raj Mangal Pande). N.D. Tiwari ceased to be the leader of Opposition as soon as Pande was declared as the leader.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Aug 19, 1979

Pande was recognised as the leader of the opposition after he submitted a list of 160 members, all (except one Independent) being members of the undivided Janata Party, which had a strength of 354 in the House. This left 195 Janata members for the Chief Minister's Party. Banarsi Das had also the support of 9 CPI members, seven from Congress and five Independents, the total came to 216 while he required only 211 for a majority.¹

On August 20, 1979 Raj Mangal Pande, leader of the opposition, moving a no confidence motion in the State Assembly said that there had been all round deterioration in the State ever since the Government led by Banarsi Das assumed office.² He said that "the political atmosphere had got polluted, the economy was in bad shape with drought in 26 districts, the crime rate had gone up alarmingly and the bad power supply was adding to the miseries of the rural people."

The Congress For Democracy, headed by H.N. Bahuguna decided on November 14, 1979 to join hands with Mrs. Indira Gandhi in the forthcoming elections.³ As a result Lok Dal General Secretary Madhu Limaye said if CFD ultimately joined

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Aug 29, 1979

2. Ibid., Aug 31, 1979

3. The Times of India, New Delhi, Nov 15, 1979

the Congress(I) and deserted the anti authoritarian front, the CFD Ministers in U.P. should quit the Government. But at the same time he appealed to Deputy Chief Minister Narayan Singh (belonging to CFD) and his friends to consider the whole position and not to leave the anti authoritarian front. In response to the appeal CFD Ministers in U.P. had informed Chief Minister Banarsi Das that they would resign from the Cabinet if they joined the Congress(I) but would continue supporting his Government from outside.

Seven CFD Ministers of Cabinet rank resigned from Banarsi Das Government on November 17, 1979. The same day Bahuguna said at Delhi that the CFD was not in favour of elections at Present because of unprecedented drought in the State. It would not be fair to ask the people to go to polls there now. CFD would support the present Government from outside.¹

A section of the top Central Lok Dal Leadership favoured dissolution of the U.P. Assembly and its mid-term elections simultaneously with the Lok Sabha Poll in early January, 1980. But Chief Minister Banarsi Das was dead set against it and conveyed his opposition to the idea to Prime Minister Charan Singh. Banarsi Das met the Prime Minister on October 28, 1979

1. The Times of India, Nov 18, 1979

and it was decided that the U.P. Assembly would not be dissolved.¹

The month long speculation about the dissolution of U.P. Assembly was set at rest on November 12, when all the 27 Cabinet Minister unanimously expressed the view that there should be no mid-term poll.

Zulfiqarullah, Minister for Communications, resigned from the Union Cabinet on December 3 and announced that he and the Muslim National Front of which he was the convenor were aligning themselves with the Janata Party in Uttar Pradesh.² The President of the U.P. Congress for Democracy Subedar Singh and General Secretary B.N. Singh announced the merger of their party with the Congress.³

On December 24, Ram Singh, Former Home Minister and U.P. Janata Party General Secretary resigned from the party alongwith 18 other senior Saharanpur Partymen. They joined the Congress(I) on the plea that only Mrs. Gandhi would provide a stable and strong Government.⁴ Jamuna Prasad Bose Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Minister also resigned from the Banarsi Das Cabinet⁵.

1. National Herald, Lucknow, Oct 29, 1979

2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Dec 4, 1979

3. Ibid., Dec 9, 1979

4. Ibid., Dec 25, 1979

5. The Times of India, New Delhi, Dec 30, 1979

He was the ninth Minister to leave. Eight CFD Ministers had earlier resigned and joined the Congress-I.

After January 1980 General Elections it was indicated that a number of State Assemblies dominated by non-Congress(I) parties would be dissolved in the second week of February so that fresh elections could be held in March.¹ The U.P. Chief Minister Banarsi Das declared that the Janata Party and Lok Dal would jointly contest the Assembly elections, if the House was dissolved and mid-term polls held.² He was sure "the Congress(I) would meet its Waterloo in this State."

After a three hour stormy debate on February 6, 1980 the U.P. Assembly passed by voice vote without any dissent a resolution sponsored by all non-Congress(I) parties expressing the "definite opinion" of the House that there was no "appropriate basis" for its dissolution.³ Chief Minister Banarsi Das characterised the Prime Minister's Charges on the Narainpur issue against his Government as "misleading, baseless and politically motivated" and that they were aimed at frightening the members of State Assembly into defecting to the Congress(I)" by dangling the sword of dissolution on their heads.

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, Jan 29, 1980

2. Ibid., Feb 3, 1980

3. National Herald, Lucknow, Feb 7, 1980

"Any Chief Minister who cannot protect the life and honour of the people has no right to continue in the office." said Sanjay Gandhi. Blaming the Janata leadership he said: "Women were raped in Narainpur, houses broken into, the men beaten up and even minor girls were molested. The Chief Minister should resign for these atrocities. Dissolution of Assembly was not because of Party reasons but on moral grounds. It was a game started by Janata Party."¹

On February 11, 1980, Banarsi Das sought President Sanjiva Reddy's intervention to save his Government which, according to him, continued to have the confidence of the people as demonstrated by the majority it enjoyed in the State Assembly.² At his 30 minutes meeting with the President Banarsi Das maintained that the dissolution of the U.P. Assembly in the existing circumstances would be "malafide and constitutionally untenable." He therefore wanted the President to advise the Prime Minister "not to embark upon the precipitous course", which could lead to a chain of unfortunate reactions.

In a dramatic move on February 16, 1980 President Sanjiva Reddy appointed C.P.N. Singh as Governor of Uttar Pradesh to succeed G.D. Tapase who was moved to Haryana. The Times of India

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 11, 1980

2. National Herald, Lucknow, Feb 12, 1980

commented that the "change in the Governorship was linked to political crisis, with the gradual unfolding of Centre's plan to dissolve the Legislative Assemblies of U.P. and some other States."¹

On the night of February 17, 1980 President Sanjiva Reddy issued a proclamation dissolving nine non-Congress(I) ruled State Assemblies. The Assemblies dissolved were those of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Gujarat and Maharashtra. These nine States had come under President's rule.²

Formalising the parting of ways with the Janata Party, delegates attending the convention called by L.K. Advani on April 6, 1980 constituted a new party which they christened Bhartiya Janata Party and elected with one voice Atal Bihari Vajpayee as its first President.³ The new party, it was decided, would have a separate constitution, separate flag and a separate election symbol. L.K. Advani M.P., Sikandar Bakht and Murli Manohar Joshi were appointed as General Secretaries of the party.

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, Feb 17, 1980

2. Ibid., Feb 18, 1980

3. The Times of India, New Delhi, April 7, 1980

Immediately after the Assembly elections (1980) in which Congress won with overwhelming majority, the UPCC(I) President Dharamvir met the Prime Minister and Sanjay Gandhi for consultations regarding leadership. It was believed that a senior leader would be sent from Delhi to take charge of U.P., if no satisfactory choice was available from among the newly elected members of the Assembly. The names being mentioned in that context included those of C.P.N. Singh, Vishwanath Pratap Singh and Dharam Vir.

Members of the Youth Congress elected to the U.P. Assembly had launched a move for making Sanjay Gandhi the Chief Minister of U.P. "in the larger interest of the State and the Country." But to this move Mrs. Gandhi ruled out the possibility of Sanjay Gandhi being inducted as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh.

Following was the Party position in the elections of U.P. Assembly:¹

Party Position

Total seats	...	425
Seats declared	...	419
Congress(I)	305
J.C.S.	...	58
B.J.P.	...	11
J.P.	...	4
C.P.I.	...	7
Cong. (U)	...	13
J.R.N.	...	4
Independents	...	17

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 4, 1980

The U.P. Congress-I Legislature Party on June 6, 1980, unanimously elected Sanjay Gandhi as its leader, but authorised Mrs. Indira Gandhi to nominate any other suitable person in his place as the leader "in case Mr Gandhi's valuable services cannot be spared for U.P. in larger national interests".¹

Mrs. Indira Gandhi rejected this unanimous plea.

This had further brightened the chances of Vishwanath Pratap Singh M.P. and former Union Minister whose name for Chief Ministership had earlier been suggested by Legislators. Vishwanath Pratap Singh flew to Delhi immediately after the Party meeting. N.D. Tiwari the other notable candidate, C.P.N. Singh, Union Minister of State for Defence, Sanjay Singh, U.P. Youth Congress President, Dharamvir UPCC(I) President and Lokpati Tripathi, Vice-President also rushed to Delhi.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's intervention had averted a contest for the Chief Ministership of U.P. which was decided to be led by Mr. Vishwanath Pratap Singh.

A fifteen member Ministry headed by Vishwanath Pratap Singh was sworn in on June 9, 1980 at Raj Bhavan which consisted of all Cabinet Ministers including the Chief Minister. This was

1. National Herald, Lucknow, June 7, 1980

the 12th Ministry to be installed in U.P. since independence. The President's rule in the State came to an end with the installation of the new Ministry. There were 10 Cabinet Ministers besides the Chief Minister and five Ministers of State.¹

(C) Some of the Decisions Taken and Promises Made by the Janata Government in U.P.

The Janata Government in U.P. took a number of decisions during its short tenure. Of all the decisions taken, some major decisions are being referred to in this chapter. The performance of the Government had an impact on the general administration in the State and also affected the people at large. Many decisions were welcomed by the people; but some were subjected to criticism.

Some of the policies laid down by the Janata Government could not be implemented due to the short tenure of the Government. The Government had to go very soon and most of the schemes had to be shelved. Decisions taken and promises made in the political, economic, administrative, social and other fields are given below:

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 25, 1977

Action against government officers

On June 25, 1977 the Janata Government declared that stern action would be taken against officers responsible for excesses under the Emergency in U.P.¹ The Government emphasized on the need to establish the rule of law. Either the bureaucracy was demoralised under pressure or there was a compact between it and the politicians to protect each other. It believed the latter was true.

The benefits meant for the people at the lower level under the plans could not reach them as it was mostly eaten away on the warp which the Janata Government characterised as "daylight robbery". If the people were vigilant and kept a watchful eye on the implementation of Government policies and plans, it would be easier to solve their problems. The Government had pleaded with the people to have patience and to wait for the results of the work Janata Party had undertaken.

Relaxation to DIR and MISA Victims

The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh R.N. Yadav declared in a press conference that the Government servants arrested under DIR or MISA during the emergency would be taken back and paid full salaries and allowances during the period of their

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 26, 1977

absence.¹ Victimised employees would be rehabilitated to their original positions. Similarly labourers, whose services were terminated under MISZ and DIR would be reappointed with a view to providing a clean and efficient administration the vigilance establishment had been strengthened at the state and district levels to trap corrupt employees.

District Magistrates to ensure courtesy

All Divisional Commissioners and District Magistrates in the State were asked to ensure that Members of Parliament, State Legislators and other representatives of the people who call on them were shown due respect and courtesy by them and their subordinates. The instructions contained in the Chief Secretary's letter to all the Commissioners and District Magistrates also stressed that it was the duty of the Government servants to be polite towards all citizens and discharge their duties honestly and diligently.²

Draft for Criminal Law changed

The U.P. Government sent to the Centre for its clearance a draft ordinance providing for necessary amendments in Section

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 30, 1977

2. Ibid., July 17, 1977

167 of the Criminal Procedure Code to enable persons accused in criminal cases to surrender before courts. This was to overcome difficulties arising out of a High Court ruling that only those arrested by the police could be granted bail and not those surrendering voluntarily to the courts.¹

Orders Regarding Press Staff

The U.P. Government had ordered that no newspaper establishment shall terminate the services of any permanent non-journalist employee by dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or otherwise without the prior consultation with the Labour Commissioner of U.P. or any officer appointed by him in this behalf. This order prohibited suspension or reduction in rank of a permanent non journalist employee as a measure of punishment by any newspaper establishment. This order which came into force from September 13, 1977 was to remain effective for one year.²

Advisory Panel for Districts

The Uttar Pradesh Cabinet decided to appoint an Advisory Committee in each district to offer advice in respect of the

1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Aug 2, 1977

2. Ibid., Sep 19, 1977

exercise of rights and duties of Zila Parishad.¹ The Committee was to have the District Magistrate as its chairman. All the Legislators and Members of Parliament of the district, seven non officials including a woman and a scheduled caste member, all the district level officers and police superintendents were to be the members of the Committee.¹

U.P. Lok Ayukta Act

The U.P. Governor Chenna Reddy in a joint session of both the Houses of State Legislature declared the enforcement of the Lok Ayukta Act from July 12, 1977 to ensure clean administration. This institution, he said "would not only look into the charges of corruption against high ranking public servants but also be able to take effective action in case of specific public complaints of injustice."²

Establishment of Labour Courts

Three The more Labour Courts were set up in U.P. to ensure disposal of industrial disputes. They were located at Ghaziabad, Kanpur and Bareilly. This raised the strength of such courts in U.P. to 12. About 6000 industrial disputes were pending in the State industrial tribunals and industrial courts.³

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Oct 20, 1977

2. Ibid., July 13, 1977

3. Ibid., March 27, 1978

Ordinance to curb strikes in essential services

The Uttar Pradesh Government issued an Ordinance under which the provisions of preventive detention could be used for causing disruption in any of the essential services including the generation and supply of power. Under this Ordinance titled "The Uttar Pradesh Essential Services (Prevention of Disruption) Ordinance 1979", a person could be detained for a period of six months. The detention would be subject to a judicial review within two months. Besides power supply and generation, the services covered under the Ordinance were water supply, health and sanitation, transport and workshops, Collection of revenue, public order and conducting of elections.¹

Priority for Agriculture

The U.P. Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav said that his government was committed to fulfil all the promises made by the Janata Party during the elections.

Addressing his first press conference at the Council House, Yadav said that in keeping with the party line the State Government would accord priority to agriculture and ensure that availability of irrigation facilities and power were

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Nov 23, 1979

increased. As a first step, Yadav government had ordered that adequate power supply be provided to the farmers for irrigation of sugarcane crops.¹

The other point of attention for the Janata government would be providing a clean administration to the State. Efforts were to be made to encourage the growth of small scale industries alongwith an increase in agricultural production. Cases of all political prisoners would be reviewed, inquiries would be made into specific cases of excesses committed during the emergency. The government policy was to exempt all holdings having an area not exceeding 6.25 acres from land revenue.²

Relief to Farmers

The Janata Party Supplementary Manifesto for the U.P. Assembly Elections promised that uneconomic holdings would be exempted from land revenue and all other direct taxes. The manifesto issued on June 8, 1977 also assured refixation of just and reasonable irrigation rates and land revenue on other holdings. It said that the rates were cut on the eve of the last Lok Sabha polls but the farmers had not got full justice. It also promised adequate supply of agricultural inputs and

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 25, 1977

2. Ibid.

drinking water to each village.

The manifesto promised that the land grabbed illegally would be taken away and redistributed among the landless and needy. Efforts to take away land allotted to landless would be resisted and irregularities in land distribution removed. Arrangements would be made to ensure payment to cane growers within 15 days of supply. Small and cottage industries would be set up in villages to provide gainful employment in spare time.¹

Debt Relief for Weaker Sections

The State Assembly, on July 14, 1977, passed a Bill for debt relief to the weaker sections. While the Bill provided for complete liquidation of debts of landless agricultural labour, marginal farmers and villager artisans, it envisaged scaling down of the debts of small farmers according to their paying capacity. It also provided for debt relief to the rickshaw pullers, sanitation workers and urban labour.²

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 8, 1977

2. Ibid., July 15, 1977

Directive to Sugar Mills & Loans

The State government took a very serious view of the non-clearance of arrears of cane price by a number of sugar mills. Proprietors of 18 Sugar Mills were called to a meeting held at Lucknow under the chairmanship of the Minister for the Sugar Industry and Cane Development, Chandrawati, and directed to pay the arrears of cane price outstanding against them by the end of July, 1977.¹

The Cabinet decided to give financial assistance to the tune of Rs. 3.50 crore as loan to 16 sugar factories under U.P. Government control, to meet the expenses of off season repair and for payment of wages to the workers during the year 1977-78. A loan of Rs. 85 lakhs had already been sanctioned to the four sugar factories taken by the government at that time.²

Subsidy on Fertilisers

On September 15, 1977 the Government had decided to give 20 percent, subsidy to all farmers and 30 percent to new allottees of land on the purchase of phosphatic and potassic fertilizers. These fertilizers had been found to be effective in increasing the production of pulses, gram, peas, arhar and masoor. A sum of Rs. 5 crore had been earmarked for the purpose.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 15, 1977

2. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 18, 1977

Steps to aid small farmers

A sum of Rs. 22.42 crores had been spent till March 1977 to raise the income level of small and marginal farmers in 187 Development Blocks of 26 districts of Uttar Pradesh through various programmes launched under "small Farmers Development Agency."¹

Amendment in Land Record Rules

The U.P. Government had decided that provisions relating to entries in the land record "Khasara" and "Khatauni" regarding illegal possession of land of the tenants be abolished. Earlier in 1970, the State Government had decided that entries regarding illegal possessions of land in the remarks column of Khasara should not be made on an experimental basis for two years. This was extended on an year to year basis. It was now made a permanent feature.²

Cheaper land for Industrial Units

The U.P. Industrial Development Corporation had decided to allot plots of land for industrial purposes at 50 percent reduced premium in Faizabad, Basti and Banda districts.³

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 30, 1978
2. Ibid., Sep 24, 1978
3. Ibid., May 9, 1978

Plan for Industrial growth in Villages

Under a programme of rural industrialization the U.P. Government proposed to set up 100 rural growth centres in different parts of the State. Each such centre was to cover about 20-25 villages. It was proposed to cover the entire rural area of the State over a period of five years with thousands of small scale and cottage industries established in an estimated 5000 rural growth centres. During 1977-78 60 rural growth centres were established with at least one in each district.¹

New rules for cement distribution

The State Government, in a bid to impose partial control on the distribution of cement, laid down rules and procedures for distribution of cement to the public. The District Magistrates were instructed to follow a certain procedure in the distribution of cement to the public so that they may not be put to any inconvenience. Under this procedure, distribution of cement was made only after a gazetted officer had verified the stock received by the stockist.²

Water and Power Schemes

As many as 2,54,695 private tube wells and pumpsets had been energised in the State. The State Government had

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 26, 1977

2. Ibid., Aug 23, 1977

started preliminary work on a Rs. 60 crore scheme for drinking water facilities for which an agreement had already been signed with the World Bank.

Power generation and supply in was to be augmented at a cost of Rs. 259 crores. Under the augmentation scheme, 40,000 private tubewells and pumpsets were to be energised and 5,000 villages and 5,350 Harijan bastis provided with electricity.

Development of Hill Districts

The U.P. Government had made an allocation of Rs. 66 crores for the development of 8 hill districts of Garhwal and Kumaun during the 1978-79 financial year. The State Government had plans to give top priority to the construction of roads. In all 807 Km of existing roads repaired at a cost of Rs. 18 crores. Rs. 9 crores were to be spent on providing drinking water for the sparsely populated 1200 villages. For the promotion of education facilities, a sum of Rs. 7.90 crores was to be spent. As many as 297 primary schools, 19 High Schools and 5 Intermediate Colleges were to be provincialised in 1978.¹

Smaller cinema Houses

In order to encourage the Cinema Industry in Uttar Pradesh the State Government had decided to provide incentives

1. National Herald, Lucknow, June 1, 1978

for constructing mini cinema houses, having a maximum seating capacity of 350 in cities and other places to provide entertainment to a larger section of the population and also help in showing art films to a maximum number of people.¹

Removal of Toll Posts on Highways

The Government had decided to remove toll tax barriers on the national highways passing through the State. According to the Minister for Local Self Government Satya Prakash Malviya action had been taken to remove bottlenecks in road transport.²

Payment of Bonus

The sugar mill workers in the State got bonus @ 8.33 percent for the year 1977-78. This decision was taken at the State Sugar Industry tripartite conference held under the chairmanship of Minister for Labour and Excise, Rama Shankar Kaushik.³

Modification of Sales Tax Rates

To encourage trade and industry in the State, the Government had decided to modify, with effect from March 1, 1979

1. National Herald, Lucknow, June 1, 1978

2. Ibid., Sep 28, 1978

3. Ibid., Aug 2, 1977

the rates of Sales Tax on certain commodities.¹ Motor vehicles of all kinds would be taxable at the rate of 9 percent, soft drinks of all kinds at the rate of 10 percent, hosiery other than pure cotton at the rate of 7 percent at the point of sales and stationary at the rate of 4 percent.²

Plea for more Central assistance

The U.P. Government on September 4, 1977 submitted to the Centre schemes with a total outlay of Rs. 2,802.59 crores for maximum possible share out of assistance from International Agencies. This included schemes for Rs. 1406.66 crores in the power sector, Rs. 748.43 crores for area development, Rs. 315.44 crores for irrigation, Rs. 175.47 crores for road development, Rs. 58.82 crores in the agriculture sector, Rs. 27.20 crore for animal husbandry, Rs. 61.80 core in the horticulture sector and Rs. 9.65 crore in the urban development sector.

A Central team headed by P.K. Mukherjee, Project Economist, Union Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, had discussion with the State Chief Secretary and other concerned officials about the formulation of projects for IDA assistance in the agriculture and allied sectors.³

-
1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Sep 25, 1978
 2. Ibid., March 2, 1979
 3. National Herald, Lucknow, Sep 5, 1977

Distribution of Loans

The State Government launched a massive programme for the distribution of about Rs. 660 crores as loan to the people of various categories through cooperative societies. Of the amount to be distributed in 1978, Rs. 360 crores were for boosting agricultural production and investment in allied occupations and Rs. 300 crores for the supply of inputs and extending the network of cooperative marketing and consumer distribution agencies. With the completion of the first phase of elections in about 7000 panchayat level cooperative societies in the State, the cooperative movement had gained new vigour.¹

Schemes for Employment

On June 1, 1978 - a Rs. 17,800 crores employment plan was being implemented by the Government. Explaining the State employment policy and steps taken under it, the Chief Minister Yadav said in a statement that this movement for the five years term (of the current plan) would meet requirements of only 4.48 million unemployed and underemployed people. Even then a back log of about 1.6 million people would be left to be carried forward during the next plan.²

1. National Herald, Lucknow, June 15, 1978

2. Ibid., June 2, 1978

Productive employment for about three lakh people in 15 districts of Eastern Uttar Pradesh during 1979-80 with a total investment of Rs. 28.50 crores was envisaged under a plan prepared by the State Industries Department. This was based on the recommendations of a seminar on industrial development of Eastern U.P., presided over by U.P. Industries Minister Ram Prakash and attended by Union Minister of Industries George Fernandes.¹

About 30,000 persons, according to this plan, were to be provided employment with an investment of Rs. 60 crores in the small scale sector while 120,000 persons were to be employed in the handicrafts sector with a total investment of Rs. 11 cores. The craftsmen would be mainly engaged in the production of woolen carpets, Benarsi Zari, wooden toys and artistic pottery. Similarly 90,000 persons were to be provided employment through Khadi and Village Industries with an investment of Rs. 5.50 crores and 60,000 people in the handloom sector with an investment of Rs. six crores. It was also decided to set up two spinning mills in the State sector for the benefit of the local weavers and to cater to their specific needs of cotton yarn.²

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Dec 29, 1978

2. Ibid.

Recruitment of Teachers

The U.P. Cabinet had decided to remove the ban on recruitment to fill the vacant posts of teachers under the U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad. So as to bring the student teachers ratio to 40 to 1 - which was necessary to maintain the proper standard of teaching. As a result of this step 5000 more teachers were to be appointed immediately in the primary schools under the U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad.

The Government also decided that an additional teacher be appointed in 4,416 single teacher primary schools which were opened in 1973-74 and 1974-75. The number of students and classes had gone up in these schools and one teacher could not look after the teaching in all the five classes.¹

Recruitment of Harijans

The State Government had decided to frame a comprehensive legislation incorporating all the existing orders relating to reservation in services of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The quota was to be proportionate to the population. No condition of experience in case of technical posts was to be laid for candidates of these communities.

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 30, 1977

Special recruitment for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes would be made against class I, II, and III services within the legal framework.¹

It was also decided that the services of these communities in class III and IV employees should not be terminated without the prior approval of concerned heads of department. Provisions would be made for associating an officer of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in selection committees constituted by all autonomous bodies.

Reservation quota for U.P. Services

The Government had decided to fix the percentage quota in the reservation for the backward classes in direct recruitment to the State Services. This was to be 15% for Class I, II and III and 10% for Class IV jobs.² It was also decided to reserve 25% of posts in Class III till the quota of 18% already reserved for Scheduled Castes was completed. In Class IV the quota was to be 30% till the percentage of the Scheduled Castes reached 18.

1. National Herald, Lucknow, Dec 4, 1978

2. The Statesman, New Delhi, Aug 28, 1977

Consequently the quota percentage for reservation for different Classes of services was to be;

Scheduled Castes: 18% for Classes I & II, 25% for Class III and 30% for Class IV.

Schedule Tribes: 2% in each Class of services; Dependents of freedom fighters: 2% and 3% each in Class III and IV; incapacitated military officers, emergency commissioned officers, short service commissioned officers and ex soldiers - 6% each in Class I & II, 3% in Class III & IV.

Backward Class: 15% in Class I, II and III and 10% in Class IV.

It was also decided that the dependents of political detenus under MISA during the period of Emergency from June 1975 to March 1977 would also be included in the quota reserved for the dependents of freedom fighters. Only those persons among freedom fighters, who had served a Jail sentence of six months or above, were to be entitled to this privilege. These changes were to be implemented with immediate effect.

Reservation quota withdrawn

The U.P. Cabinet on February 15, 1980 decided to withdraw the reservation promotions in Government services for Scheduled

Castes and Tribes and backward Classes.¹

Also in direct recruitment, dependents of income tax payers and gazetted officers among Scheduled Castes, Tribes and backward classes would not have any special qualities and had to compete as general candidates. The same principle was to apply in admission to technical education and medical courses.

Further the minimum marks for eligibility were raised from 35% to 40% in the case of Scheduled Castes and Tribes and from 40 to 45% for backward classes for these courses as against 50% for general candidates.

Explaining the decision, Chief Minister Banarsi Das said, reservation had now been put on an economic and social basis. He said reservation in promotions was "unjust and inequitable", against which there were a lot of complaints. Also a person receiving one benefit should not get another.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 16, 1980

Chapter - VI

PATTERN OF LEADERSHIP IN U.P.

(A) Rural Leadership

(B) Muslim Politics

(A) Rural LeadershipPanchayati Raj Institutions and their Impact on Rural Leadership

The introduction of Panchayati Raj institutions in the State has given rise to a new pattern of rural leadership in Uttar Pradesh. These leaders are quite different from traditional leaders and has resulted in conflict between the two types of leaders. In the past there was confluence of social, economic and political power in the same group. This fact was responsible for the emergence of dominant caste which ruled supreme over all groups in the villages. But the forces of change which were generated as a result of political, social and economic changes have now broken the monopoly and tend to shift the axis of power from the traditionally high group to the other aspirant lower groups.¹

Rural leadership has undergone certain changes in authority and structure, which is applicable to most of the villages of Uttar Pradesh. Andre Beteille says that the halo about the traditional leaders and caste Panchayats is gradually becoming dim. There are various reasons for the waning influence of traditional leaders. Especially with the appearance of

1. Chhabra, HK & Jones, W.T., State Politics in India, Surjeet Publication, Delhi, 1980, p.216.

Gram Sabha on the village scene, the caste Panchayats have almost become defunct, for the Gram Sabha enjoyed the protection and patronage of the government. These days the judgement pronounced by the Caste Councils are not always accepted. Fines and Punishments are ignored. The power of Caste Panchayats, though on the decline, has not completely disappeared. Among the people there still lingers a fear of heavy fines and other kinds of punishments. During the elections for Gram Sabha, some of the qualities that seem to command respect and elicit votes are wealth, age, intelligence, honesty, kindness, being born of a good family etc. However all these qualities are rarely possessed by a single individual, neither are they all very essential hall marks of popularity. For instance a man may be poor and yet respected because of his intelligence and honesty.¹

But probably the most important feature of the new political order, according to Andre Beteille, "is the emergence of networks of interpersonal relations which ramify in every direction. The creation of new political opportunities and new bases of power has provided congenial conditions for the development of an elaborated network of patronage. Such networks

1. Andre Beteille, Caste, Class and Power, Asia Publishing House, Delhi, 1972, p.184

serve to link the village with territorial units of increasing wider scope and they also provide inter linkage between caste, class, panchayat and political party."¹

According to Andre Beteille, following has been the impact of Panchayat Raj development on rural leadership.²

(i) The village society has undergone Complete transformation. The traditional leadership which was based on religion, caste etc. is slowly giving way to a new leadership based on secular and merit consideration.

(ii) With the coverage of the village India by democratic institutions at the village, block and district level, the village now operates in another dimension. Their prestige in their own village may depend on the power they wield in higher bodies (i.e. block or district level).

(iii) Weaker Sections of society as well as women have been associated with the village administration, but they have not been able to play an effective role.

(iv) Power in rural areas is getting diffused rather than centralized, formerly, a number of functions were discharged by the same person, because many persons were not willing to share the responsibility. With the introduction of Panchayati Raj Institutions a new sense of responsibility has been instilled

1. Andre Beteille, Caste, Class and Power, Asia Publishing House, Delhi, 1972, p. 185

2. Ibid.

among the village people and more and more are sharing the responsibility.

(v) The position of the village headman, who previously used to be the nucleus of all power and authority, has been greatly weakened. Most of the powers formerly enjoyed by the village headman have been taken over by the Panchayat. However, within the Panchayat the Sarpanch has come to wield enormous powers.

(vi) Nature of leadership at the village level has undergone complete transformation. Instead of an autocratic leadership there is a democratic leadership.

(vii) The present rural leadership in India maintains a contact with the outside authorities, which is so essential for getting the approval and assistance for the various development schemes. This explains for the increasing participation of the Panchayat Samiti at the Block level, which is composed of representatives from several villages and is the chief financing agency. Even the State leadership is keen to have a linkage with the village Panchayats because of their political stakes.

Type of Rural Leaders in U.P.

The leadership in U.P. villages can be determined under following heads:-¹

Traditional Leaders: Their leadership is based on their hereditary status, position as well as wealth. They do not

1. Chhabra & Jones, Op.cit., p.210

Provide the requisite leadership to the community nor do they think in terms of the good of the community, yet they are respected by the rural people and their advice carries much weight with the local people. With democracy taking deeper roots in the village community the influence of this type of leaders is on decline, although they still exercise considerable influence on the social, economic and political life of the village community. The best example of this traditional leadership are the big zamindars and money lenders.

Sectional Leaders: These leaders have complete hold over a particular section of the community. The members of that community do not take any action contrary to the advice of these leaders. The leaders of various castes, factions as well as political groups fall in this category.

Functional Leaders: These leaders are those persons who have specialized in a particular field like agriculture, medicine, art etc. The people of village come to them for advice in their respective fields of specialization and hold them in great esteem.

Professional Leaders: Professional leaders are those who come to the villages to render certain professional services as well as to acquaint the village community with the new ideas and

scientific developments taking place elsewhere. These leaders do not belong to the village community and do not provide direct leadership to the village people. They exercise influence through the acknowledged leaders of the village community. The Gram Sevak and the School teachers belong to this category of leaders.

Institutional Leaders: In this category come heads of certain institutions like Panchayats, Cooperative Societies etc. They are able to play a vital role because they are vested with certain powers in their respective fields by the law.

According to Oscar Lewis,¹ following are the factors which influence the village Leadership:-

(i) Caste: Caste is the most important factor which determines the rural leadership. A person born in high caste has an edge over the members belonging to middle and lower castes. In majority of U.P. villages leaders hail from high castes. A person from lower or middle castes may also get a chance to become a leader but he does not exercise much influence. Efforts made by U.P. Government to uplift the backward people have failed, and they have not been able to assert themselves.

1. For detailed study see Oscar Lewis: Village Life in Northern India, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1978

(ii) Land Ownership: Uttar Pradesh is an agricultural State and seventy percent of its population living in villages represents mostly zamindars as village leaders. No doubt during the Congress, SVD and BKD governments in Uttar Pradesh, due to the imposition of ceiling on land holdings and distribution of land to the landless farmers, the importance of Zamindar has declined, but decline in their accepted leadership by the village community will take years to come.

(iii) Wealth: Land and property as a source of immense wealth and sound financial status of a person has been a factor for his acceptance as a leader of village.

(iv) Family Status: In India, the family status which is determined by financial soundness, wide relations and high connection, also helps a lot in making a person leader. In recent years, because of change in social set ups, change from agrarian to industrial and bureaucratic societies decline in leadership on account of family status has also been marked.

(v) Sufficient Leisure: In U.P. villages it has been noted that usually leaders are financially well off and have enough time to spend. Helping villagers financially (in the form of loan), solving their quarrels and disputes, attending meetings of the Village Panchayat etc. All these factors force the villagers to accept continuation of their leadership.

(vi) Maturity of age: In U.P. villages, one factor which counted most in making one a leader was ripen age. But now this trend is changing because of youth taking part in political parties and active politics.

(vii) Education: Education which had always been given respect in villages has now become less important. The factor that counts now is capabilities of a person and his influence over the village.

(viii) Good Contacts: Person possessing good contacts with high ups outside the village and with the local people has greater chance of emerging as their leader.

Village Politics in U.P.

India is essentially a rural society since the very ancient times. The rural side of the country has played a dominant role in building up traditions of rural administration. The ^{term} Panchayat which denotes three tier structure at the district, block and village level is modern. It aims at making democracy real by bringing the activities of the millions into the functioning of democracy. It is a system of grassroot democracy which seeks to link the individual family in the remotest village with the government. In the words of Dr Zakir Husain: "with the introduction of Panchayati Raj we have laid the foundation for the extension of democratic form of government and democracy to the village level."

The end of this process is to realise the basic objectives of an enlightened political liberty, equality and welfare. Decentralized pattern of local self government is necessary not only for the purpose of community development but also for building up democracy from grassroots.

(B) MUSLIM POLITICS

Muslim in U.P., Delhi and neighbouring areas of Delhi had become socially, economically and educationally backward just after the rebellion of 1857. After the formation of the Congress some of the Muslims joined it. In the beginning of the 20th Century Muslims formed the Muslim League with the patronage of Government. Till the Non Cooperation Movement both the Muslim League and Congress were very close.

In U.P., the rupture between both occurred over the Coalition Ministry which led to drifting away of the two organizations and in 1937 the Muslim League became a mass organization and more anti-Congress and communal in approach. In 1940 the Muslim League demanded a separate sovereign State for Muslims and as a result Pakistan was formed. Muslims in India, educationally and socially became most backward and economically ruined. Communal riots (Hindu Muslim riots) also spoiled Muslims a lot.

A convention of Muslim leaders was held at Lucknow in 1964. Muslim leaders of all shades of opinion joined hands together to solve their problems, and an organization came into existence known as Majlis-e-Mushawarat.¹

A consultative meeting was held on August 8,9,1964 at Nadwatul Uloom, Lucknow.² It was attended by seventy five delegates belonging to many parties and groups. This meeting was presided over by Dr Syed Mahmood, veteran Congress Muslim leader. The inaugural address was delivered by the rector of Nadwatul Uloom, Maulana Abdul Hasan Ali Nadvi. A number of resolutions were passed at the meeting. The main resolution urged to remove Muslim grievances.

The main grievance was that Muslims were not recruited in the CID and the police. They demanded Muslim representation in Police department in adequate number. This was believed to be one of the effective remedies for communal riots. The attitude of Muslim legislators towards communal disturbance was most disappointing to the Muslims. It was decided to constitute a Committee of Jamate Islami, Muslim League, Jamaatul Ulema and Tamir-e-Millat of Hyderabad and leaders of other Muslims organizations. The Committee elected Dr Syed Mahmood as the President and "All

1. The Sivasat, (Urdu Daily) Kanpur, July 13,1964

2. Khan, Laiqur Rehman: Role of Muslim Majlis in U.P. Politics from 1967-77, M.Phil Dissertation, Department of Political Science, AMU,Aligarh, 1982, p.44.

India Muslim Majlis Mushawarat" was formed which, it was expected, would bring unity among all the Muslim Parties in order to boost political action at all levels.

The Mushawarat presented a number of demands regarding the status of Urdu, restoration of the minority character of AMU, the Preservation of Muslim Personal Law, the revision of text books etc. before the Government. In U.P. the Mushawarat started functioning withholding a meeting at Allahabad on March 26, 1966 and at Rampur and Moradabad on April 1, and April 9, 1966 respectively.¹

Some of the federating units of Mushawarat were not in favour of its taking part in active politics especially in contesting elections. Dr Faridi, a prominent Muslim Leader of U.P. was of the view that opposition parties of secular outlook should be supported by the Mushawarat. On July 21, 1966 The All India Muslim Majlis Mushawarat adopted a manifesto at Delhi based on following points.²

1. Dr A.J. Faridi's Presidential address at the first annual conference of U.P. Muslims Majlis Mushawarat held at Rampur on Aug 9, 10, 1967.

2. Ibid.

1. Reform in field of education.
2. Change in election system i.e. introduction of proportional system.
3. Establishment of a welfare state
4. Safeguarding Muslim Personal Law
5. Preservation of Urdu Language
6. Formation of minority commission
7. Preservation of the fundamental character of any institution
8. The management of religious auqafs by the elected members, elected by the Community to which the Waqf belonged
9. Social reforms including prohibition

The fall of Congress in U.P. elections of 1967 can be attributed to the role of Mushawarat. In some constituencies Muslims damaged the prospects of Congress. The Congress, as against 390 seats in 1952, 286 seats in 1957 and 249 seats in 1962, could bag only 198 seats in 1967. The Congress government was installed with the support of Independent MLAs, but lasted only for 18 days and Charan Singh after defection from Gupta ministry, installed the S.V.D. Government headed by him. C.B. Gupta, in an interview with Dr Faridi, had admitted that it was mainly because of opposition of Mushawarat that the Congress had to step down.¹ The U.P. Majlis Mushawarat became very much disillusioned by the attitude and performance of U.P. Assembly members whom it had supported in the Fourth General

1. Khan, Laiqur Rehman, Op.cit., p.51

Election of 1967. It was thus felt by Muslims that they should enter politics directly and send maximum number of Muslims to the U.P. Assembly. Jamate-Islami did not concur to this idea. Thus it was decided to form a new political party in U.P. and the Muslim Majlis came into existence. But it was decided that Muslim Majlis shall be a federating unit of the Central Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat and would cooperate with it in all common matters relating to the community.¹

Dr Faridi was of the view that the problems of minorities scheduled castes and backward classes were same. He called a convention of backward classes, scheduled caste and other minorities which was held at Lucknow on October 12 and 13, 1968. In this convention representatives of Muslim Majlis, Scheduled Castes, Backward Classes and other minorities participated. The convention decided to constitute an organization known as the Federation of Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and other Minorities. A manifesto containing an eleven point programme was prepared in which main emphasis was given on reform of educational system, electoral reforms, establishment of welfare state, safeguarding of Muslim personal Law, preservation of mother tongue, establishment of a ministry for backward classes.

1. Dr Faridi's Presidential address at the first annual conference of the Muslim Majlis, Feb 1970, p.3

scheduled castes and other minorities, social reforms and religious trusts.¹

In November 1969 there was split in the Congress Party over the issue of Presidential election in which Mrs. Gandhi's Government fell in minority. As a result in December 1970 the Lok Sabha was dissolved and fresh elections were to be held in 1971. Under such circumstances, the Majlis renewed its policy and on invitation by Congress(N), Dr Faridi met Mrs. Indira Gandhi and appraised her of the grievances and problems of the Muslims. He also met other Congress leaders. Mrs. Gandhi and other leaders assured Dr Faridi that Muslim grievances and problems would be looked into and sought support for the Congress. Following is the text of assurances given to Muslims by the Congress party:

"An Urdu University would be established at Rampur. The Government would give all possible facilities for Urdu to regain its due place which had been denied to it so far. Schemes for the uplift of the economic conditions of Muslims would be drawn up, as was being done for the other weaker sections of the population. Inadequate representation of Muslims in Central and State services, especially in Police, would be made up. The autonomy and the minority character of Aligarh Muslim University, as defined in Article 30 of the Constitution,

1. Khan, Laiqur Rehman, Op.cit., p.56

would be restored. Text books which were being taught in our schools would be revised according to the recommendations of the Sayyadain Committee".¹

After getting assurance from Congress(N), Muslim Majlis decided to support it wholeheartedly. Muslim Majlis candidates contested in the Constituencies of Moradabad, Kanpur, Amroha, Ghazipur and Muzaffar Nagar, but all the five were defeated the Congress did not contest in these Constituencies.

The overall performance of Muslim Majlis was very poor. Constituencies where Muslim Majlis contested had adequate Muslim population but even in those constituencies it failed to secure the support of the Muslims.

²
Parliamentary Elections of 1971

Constituencies	Total votes polled	Secured by Majlis	Percentage of votes secured by Majlis.
1	2	3	4
Kanpur	2,44,185	1258	0.2
Ghazipur	2,73,828	3,463	1.2
Amroha	2,48,312	18,154	14.7
Muzaffar Nagar	3,75,460	4,061	1.0
Moradabad	2,37,937	7,880	3.4

1. First Annual Conference, Muslim Majlis Presidential Address, A. Faridi, Allahabad, May 6, 1972

2. Source: Khan, Laiqur Rahman, Op.cit., p.61

Dr Faridi claimed that the greatest achievement of the Majlis was that it had infused a sense of confidence and courage among the Muslim community and had made them feel that they commanded balancing power in the politics of the country.

Promises made by the Congress were only not fulfilled but the new Amendment Act of 1972 deprived the autonomy and minority character of A.M.U. This act of Government completely alienated Muslim Majlis from Congress(R) and a number of Muslim volunteers including its President Dr Faridi, the SSP leader Raj Narain and Vishwanath Kapoor MLA were arrested. This agitation was against the closure of A.M.U. and for the restoration of minority character. Muslim Majlis then decided not to support the Congress in the Assembly elections of 1974, and made an alliance with BKD and SSP. These parties entered in an electoral adjustment and decided to contest the election on BKD tickets. BKD and SSP included the demands of Muslim Majlis in their manifestoes.² In 1974 U.P. Assembly Elections the Muslim Majlis contested twenty six seats, but only three were elected (Masood Khan from Azamgarh, S.A. Faiz from Ghazipur and Nanhelal Kureel from Fatehpur)³

1. National Herald, Lucknow, May 10, 1973

2. Pioneer, Allahabad, May 16, 1973

3. National Herald, Lucknow, Feb 25, 1974
 Also see: Humayun Kabir, Minorities in a Democracy
 Firma Mukhopadhyaya, 1960.

Muslim Majlis Alliance with Janata Party

In the elections to Lok Sabha in 1977 the Muslim Majlis decided to support Janata Party.¹ Under this alliance two seats were allotted to Muslim Majlis. Zulfiqarullah from Sultanpur and Bashir Ahmad Advocate from Fatehpur. Both were elected. Zulfiqarullah was taken as a Minister of State by Janata government at the Centre.

The All India Muslim Majlis Working Committee met on April 28, 1977 and decided that the Majlis should have an election agreement with Janata Party in the U.P. Assembly Elections. An eleven member Committee reached an agreement with the Janata Party. According to this agreement 10 seats were allotted to the Majlis out of 425.² Among the Majlis candidates were Marijans, Qureshis, and Ansaris. The main issues of Majlis were A.M.U., Urdu as second official language, representation of Muslims in services and establishment of Urdu University at Rampur. The Majlis leaders toured all constituencies of U.P. and campaigned for Janata Party. The result of this campaign was that out of 10 Majlis candidates 8 were elected in U.P. Assembly elections.

1. Qaumi Awaz, Lucknow, Feb 4, 1977

2. Ibid., May 6, 1977

Masood Khan a leader of the Majlis was appointed a Minister in Janata Ministry in U.P. Out of 351 Janata Party MLAs the number of Muslim MLAs was 37. Among these 37, Majlis MLAs numbered only 8.

The Majlis had representation in the Central as well as in U.P. governments having one Minister in both. But they never raised voice for Muslim problems or Majlis issues. Selfish attitude of Muslim legislators, rivalry with Muslim League and death of Dr Faridi, lack of leadership have contributed to the poor performance and negligible role of the Majlis.

Chapter - VII

ELECTIONS AND DEFECTIONS IN U.P.

- (A) Elections
- (B) Defections

(A) ELECTIONS

Uttar Pradesh has been a stronghold of the Congress from the very beginning. Till the Fourth General Elections of 1967 the Congress continued to be in undisputed control of the State government, although there were factional fights within its ranks. After the Fourth General Elections of 1967, and the Congress split of 1969 in particular, the State witnessed the formation of various coalition governments, which greatly contributed to the political instability in the State. It was only after the sweeping victory of Congress(N) in the mid term elections of 1971, that the Congress acquired a hold on the state politics and the state once again experienced political stability.

The other political parties which have exercised significant influence on the politics of U.P. have been the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Bhartiya Kranti Dal (BKD), the SSP and the Communist parties. The lot of these political parties has been influencing a great deal in various elections, as shall be evident from the table given on the next page.

The Second General Elections - 1957: The Election Commission recognised only four parties as national parties. These parties were the Congress, Praja Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the Jana Sangh, Eleven other parties were recognised as State Parties. Besides, more than 30 parties or group fought

Party Position in U.P. Legislative Assembly

S. No.	Party	Elections of 1952	Elections of 1957	Elections of 1962	Elections of 1967	Elections of 1969	Elections of 1974	Elections of 1977	Elections of 1980
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1.	Congress	390	286	249	200	211	-	46	306
2.	Socialist	19	-	24	-	-	5	-	-
3.	KMPP	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4.	Communists	-	9	14	13	4	16	9	4
5.	Jana Sangh	2	-	49	98	49	61	-	-
6.	Others	4	91	10	8	3	-	-	-
7.	Independents	14	-	31	39	18	7	16	17
8.	PSP	-	44	38	11	3	-	-	-
9.	Swatantra	-	-	15	13	5	1	-	-
10.	CPM .	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	-
11.	SSP	-	-	-	42	33	-	-	-
12.	BKD	-	-	-	-	98	106	-	-
13.	Congress(R)	-	-	-	-	-	215	-	-
14.	Congress(O)	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-

contd....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
15.	Muslim League	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
16.	Lok Dal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	59
17.	Janata	-	-	-	-	-	-	351	4
18.	Janata - S	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
19.	BJP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11
20.	Congress-U	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13

Author compiled the above table with the help of data collected on Assembly Elections in U.P.

the election on their own or in association with one another in different states. The Congress gained a few seats in the Lok Sabha but lost 300 to 400 seats in the State Legislative Assemblies. Its heaviest losses in popular votes as well as in seats in the Assemblies were in Kerala and Uttar Pradesh. However the Congress still retained a clearcut majority in all the states except Kerala and orissa.

A full idea about the position of the major political parties in the State Assembly Election (U.P.) of 1957 can be had from the following tables:

Total seats	Congress	Praja Socialist Party	Communists	Others
430	286	44	09	91

Source: Chhabra, HK & Jones, W.T., Op. cit., p. 424

The Third General Elections, 1962

The Third General Elections were held in February 1962. By then the number of voters had reached the figure of nearly 21 crore which was 1.7 crores more than in 1957 and 3.7 crore more than in 1952.

Total seats	Congress	Swatan- tra	Communist	PSP	Jana Sangh	Socialist	Others	Ind.
430	249	15	14	38	49	24	10	31

The Fourth General Elections 1967

The Fourth General Elections were held in February 1967 which can be considered as major watershed in the political development of India. It completely altered the pattern of political power in the country. Hitherto, the Indian National Congress exercised virtually unchallenged monopoly of power at the Centre as well as in the States. The Fourth General Election ended the era of one party domination. Though Congress retained power at the Centre its majority in Lok Sabha was drastically reduced. In eight of the seventeen states Congress lost its majority and non-Congress coalition governments came into power.

Total seats	Cong- ress	Swatan- tra	Jana Sangh	SSP	CPI	CPM	PSP	Others	Ind.
425	200	13	98	42	13	01	11	08	39

Mid Term Elections of 1969: The Coalition Governments formed after Elections of 1967 could not work smoothly in all the states and soon defecti ns started. This created an element of uncertainty in the State Politics necessitating the dissolution of the Assembly. As a result mid-term elections were held and Congress was able to improve its position in Uttar Pradesh, which can be seen from the following table:-

Total seats	Cong- ress	Jana Sangh	PSP	SSP	CPI	CPM	Swatan- tra	Others	Ind	BKD
425	211	49	03	33	04	1	5	3	18	98

Elections of 1974

In 1974 mid-term Elections were held to the Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, in which the Congress secured a clearcut majority and succeeded in forming Ministry in Uttar Pradesh. The position of different political parties in the Assembly is indicated in the following table:-

Congress(R)	...	215
Congress(O)	...	10
BKD	...	106
Jana Sangh	...	61
Socialists	...	5
CPI	...	16
CPM	...	2
Swatantra	...	1
Muslim League	...	1
Utkal Congress	...	-
Jana Congress	...	-
Independents	...	7
Total	...	424

Elections of 1977:

In 1977 Mrs. Indira Gandhi announced the dissolution of Lok Sabha and ordered fresh elections. The newly formed Janata Party (consisting of BLD, Jana Sangh, Congress and Socialists) which contested elections in cooperation with CFD (Congress for Democracy) swept the polls. The Congress was wiped off in the States of Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana and Bihar. In the State of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan it could secure only one seat each. In short the Janata sweep virtually put an end to the thirty years old Congress rule in Northern India.

The Janata Party interpreted its victory at the Centre as a defeat of Congress and a challenge to the moral right of Congress to continue to rule in the Northern states. As most of these Assemblies had already completed their term of five years (though their term had been extended to six years under the 42nd amendment) the Janata Party thought it desirable to seek the verdict of the people. The Union Home Minister requested the Chief Ministers of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal to advise their Governors to dissolve the Legislative Assemblies and order fresh elections. However these Chief Ministers refused to comply with this request of Home Minister. Under the circumstances the Central government decided to invoke Article 356 without the recommendation of Governor of these

States and dissolved the Assemblies of the above nine States. The position of different political parties in the U.P. Assembly where elections were held in June 1977 is indicated in the table given below:

Result Declared	Janata	Congress	CPI	CPM	Other	Independents
423	351	46	9	1	-	16

Source: Chhabra & Jones, Op.cit., p. 436

Elections of 1980:

The mid term Elections were called all of a sudden because nobody ever expected that the ruling Janata Party, with such a commanding majority in Lok Sabha would be forced to tender its resignation. The process started in July 1979 when Y.B. Chavan, the opposition leader in Lok Sabha moved a motion of no confidence against Morarji Desai's Government. It may be noted that Chavan's no confidence motion was merely a routine procedure and he could not expect the disintegration of Janata Party and the fall of Desai's Government as it did happen. Defections started from Janata Party when 10 of its members walked out and declared to sit as a separate group in the House. Raj Narain left the Janata Party and was formally elected as the leader of this break away Group. Thereafter more members of Janata Party defected and ultimately Party's majority was

reduced to just three. On July 11, 1979 Janata Party lost its majority and four days later Morarji Desai tendered his resignation as Prime Minister under heavy pressure from his party men. On 16 July the two Houses of Parliament were adjourned sine die. The same day the break away group of the Janata Party members elected Charan Singh as the leader. Soon after he also tendered resignation from Desai's caretaker Govt.

The President then invited Y.B. Chavan to form an alternative Government. But he could not do so and reported his inability to the president. Thereupon the President asked Desai and Charan Singh to provide him with a list of their supporters within eighteen hours. Both the leaders submitted the list of their supporters on 25th July; on 26th July 1979 the President asked Charan Singh to form the Government. While communicating his decision he wrote to Charan Singh after consideration of all relevant aspects of the matter. I find that you enjoy support of more members of Lok Sabha than Morarji Desai." He also suggested to Charan Singh to seek a vote of confidence of the Parliament at the earliest. This decision of President was strongly resented by the Janata Party and it openly talked of launching impeachment proceedings against the President.

Charan Singh formed the Government but before he could seek confidence vote from the house, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Party

made it public that it would oppose the vote of confidence in the House. Under the circumstances Charan Singh tendered his resignation without facing the House. He also advised the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha. The President after due consultation with Mrs. Gandhi, Jagjivan Ram (Leader of Janata Party) and the Attorney General of India (C.K. Daphtary) decided to dissolve the Lok Sabha and ordered fresh election.

In the General Elections there were three major Groupings contending for supermacy-Congress(I) led by Mrs. Gandhi, the Janata Party led Jagjivan Ram and Lok Dal-Congress alliance under Charan Singh. However, the last group could not work and due to mutual bickerings they fought on separate manifestos and Election Symbols.

The Election of 1980 was really on a gigantic scale. This is evident from the fact that the total Electorate during the election consisted of over 360 millions, which is a half time the population of USA. 1049457 ballot Boxes were used and over 430 polling stations were set up.

In the Elections Congress(I) achieved a remarkable success by capturing 351 seats and scoring two-thirds majority. Lok Dal emerged as the second largest Party with 41 seats. The Party position in the Lok Sabha of U.P. State is given in the

table below:

Total seats	Congress	Janata Party	Lok Dal	CPI	CPM	Others	Independents
85	51	03	29	1	-	-	01

On February 17, 1980 President of India issued a proclamation dissolving 9 State Assemblies, but gave no reasons for this action this action was taken under Article 356 of the Constitution on the basis of the recommendation of the Central Council of Ministers.

One of the main factors which weighed with the Congress(I) in recommending dissolution of these 9 Assemblies to the President of India was that one third of the members of Rajya Sabha were due to retire on 2 April 1980 - it was feared that if elections were held on the basis of Assemblies ruled by the Janata Party, the Lok Dal and other non-Congress(I) parties would stand to gain and it would not be able to increase its strength in the Upper House.

As soon as elections to Assemblies were announced defections set in the rank of Janata Party. A number of members left Janata Party on the plea that the issue of membership of RSS had not been reasonably settled. Ultimately, even the Jana Sangh

dominated group in the Janata Party also left and formed the BJP. Within the ranks of Congress-I also there were dissensions, specially on the issue of giving too much representations to the younger elements while allotting tickets for the Assembly elections. But despite these bickerings the Congress(I) won a stupendous victory. It was returned to power in eight states.

The Party position in the U.P. Assembly (after the election of May 1980) is given below:-

Cong (I)	Lok Dal	Janata (S)	Janata Party	Bhartiya Janata Party	CPI	Cong (U)	Indepen- dents
306	59	4	4	11	4	13	17

(B) POLITICAL DEFECTIONS IN U.P. POLITICS

Political defections have been one of the outstanding features of State politics of India since the General Elections of 1967. No doubt, even before the Fourth General Elections there were certain cases of defections, but their number was so small that they did not attract public attention and did not affect the fortunes of the ruling party. After the Fourth General Elections, political defections assumed such dimensions that they not only attract the attention of the Political Scientists but also posed a serious threat to the stability of the governments in various states.¹

In the General Elections of 1967, the Congress failed to secure clearcut majority in a number of states and the opposition saw in it a grand opportunity to seize power. The numerous political parties ignoring their ideological differences joined hands on the basis of some minimum common programmes to form the government. A large number of members of the State Legislative Assemblies and Councils renounced allegiance to their parent organizations and joined the other groups in the hope of certain political gains. This frequent crossing of floors and change of party loyalty came to be known as defection in State politics.

1. A.G.Noorani 'The Defection Game: Futility of Legislative Approach', Indian Express, New Delhi, Aug 27, 1979

Fourth General Elections And Defections

The Fourth General Elections held in January, 1967 constitute the watershed in the post independence political history of India. In this election, of the 16 States of India that went to polls (Kerala had mid-term elections earlier and did not have general elections in February 1967), the Congress party lost absolute majority in eight of the States. These States were Bihar, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, U.P. and West Bengal. With the exception of Tamil Nadu where the DMK secured a clearcut majority and formed the government, in all the other States the non-Congress parties saw an opportunity to seize power from the Congress.¹ A new process of non-Congress parties shedding their loyalties and coming forward together to share power on the basis of agreed minimum common programmes set in motion. United Fronts were forged and coalition governments were formed in Kerala, Bihar, Punjab and West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Madhya Pradesh. Thus for the first time majority of the Indian people came under the rule of non-Congress coalition ministries at the State level, with the Congress opposition constantly trying to pool them and recover lost ground before it was late. The Congress with the help of defectors succeeded in ousting the United

1. Subhash C. Kashyap, The Politics of Power: Defections and State Politics in India, National Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies in India, Delhi, 1974, p.37

Front Governments from office in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Punjab, and West Bengal. This necessitated mid-term elections in all these States.

The defections which took place in the wake of Fourth General Elections were responsible for the collapse of one government nearly every month. It is said that of the 3500 odd members of the State Legislative Assemblies and Union Territories roughly about 500 members changed their party affiliations. Some of the legislators changed their party affiliations so frequently that they began to be termed as Aya Ram Gaya Ram.¹ This phenomenon of large scale defections in State politics came to be known by different names such as "Politics of Opportunism", "the politics of defections", "the politics of instability", or "the politics of transition". The seriousness of this new development shall be clear if we remember that in the years between 1957 to 1962 there were only 299 legislators who defected from their parties.²

It may be noted that the practice of defection prevailed not only in those states where the Congress failed to form ministries but the other states also fell prey to it. An idea about

1. Paras Diwani, 'Aya Ram Gaya Ram': The Politics of Defection', Journal of Indian Law Institute, July-Sep 1979

2. Kashyap Subhash, Op.cit., p.37

the defections in the various States between March 1967 to March 1970 be seen below:

Defections in India from March 1967
to March 1970¹

Defections among party members	...	1,642
Defection by independents	...	337
Total defections	...	2,019
Defection among party members in Uttar Pradesh	...	294
Defection by independent members in Uttar Pradesh	...	58
Total defection in Uttar Pradesh	...	352

Defections in Uttar Pradesh

The defection politics played havoc in the biggest State of India; Uttar Pradesh too. Though the Congress was successful in forming a minority government under C.B. Gupta after the Fourth General Elections, its existence was never certain. Congressmen, defected alongwith followers from the Congress party and joined hands with the opposition. Soon after Charan Singh formed a coalition government as leader of the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal. The defection within the United Front continued Unabated. While five of its members left to form the progressive party, subsequently even the members of Swatantra Party and Communist Party of India also withdrew their support. Ultimately

1. Chhabra H.K., Johnes, W.T., State Politics in India, Surjeet Publications, Delhi, 1980 p.39

Charan Singh was forced to tender his resignation on February 17, 1968 and the State was placed under Presidential rule a week later.

In the mid-term elections of February, 1969 also no party could secure a clearcut majority, although the Congress emerged as the largest party. Once again Congress Ministry was formed under C.B. Gupta and it managed to stay in office with the support of the Swatantra party and certain independent Legislators. This Congress Ministry however soon fell due to defections and counter defections which took place in the Congress party in the wake of its split in November, 1969. This resulted in another coalition Ministry under Charan Singh with the support of Congress (O)¹

However, soon differences appeared within the ranks and files and Congress Ministers tendered their resignation, making it obligatory for the Governor to recommend the imposition of Presidential rule in the State. After about two weeks another coalition Ministry under T.N. Singh of Congress (O) was formed. The new Ministry was supported by Jana Sangh, SSP, and Swatantra

1. Abraham, A.S. Preventing Party Defections; Need for a Moral Bench Mark; The Times of India, July 17, 1978

party and stayed in office for about six months, when the Chief Minister tendered his resignation following his defeat in the by election.¹

The mid-term elections in U.P. resulted in a landslide victory for the Congress. However, defections continued in favour of Congress from other parties. A full fledged Congress Government was formed under Kamlapati Tripathi. After some time Tripathi was brought to the Centre as a Cabinet Minister and H.N. Bahuguna was made the Chief Minister. He was followed by N.D. Tiwari. In the wake of 1977 elections large scale defections took place. Thus the process continued during the Janata rule as well as in the years after that.

1. Sharma, Moolchand: Political Defections and Democracy, Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, July-Sep, 1977

CONCLUSION

Conclusion

In the state of Uttar Pradesh, since independence right upto 1967 General Elections the Congress maintained its stronghold and ruled the state. The first non-Congress Government of various allied political parties, named Samyukta Vidhaya Dal was formed for the first time in 1967 under Charan Singh's Chief Ministership. The change was not sudden but was the result of efforts of Opposition at the national and state levels.

An alliance to oust the Congress was for the first time made in Kerala in 1957. Several opposition parties with the Communist party playing the leading role formed a united front. That was the first non-Congress Government in the country. When the Communists came to power in 1957, the Congress allied itself with the communal organizations which had a medieval outlook, like the Muslim League and the Nair Service Society to replace the Communist party. Thus the Ministry in Kerala was dissolved by the Central Government in 1960. After the dismissal of Communist Government a mid-term poll was held in Kerala in February, 1961 after which coalition Government consisting of non-Communist parties was formed.

In the second General Elections the decline of the Congress party was only at the level of Assemblies, but the third General Elections had shown an unexpected fall in the

percentage of votes polled by the Congress even at the Parliament level.

After the Fourth General Elections (1967) the Congress position in the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies showed a steep fall. Out of total 507 seats in Lok Sabha the Congress secured only 280 seats and at state level out of total 3,563 Assembly seats Congress secured only 1,090 seats.

In U.P., the biggest State of India, the Congress could secure only 198 seats out of 425 seats. The opposition in U.P. which was moved into the treasury benches on April 1, 1967, after the fall of Congress Government, consisted of eight parties. The Jana Sangh had 57 seats, PSP-44, Communist(R)-14, Swatantra-12, POP-11, Republican-9, and the Communist(L) one seat only.

In the election of 1967, the linguistic grievances accounted for certain amount of fall in the Congress vote including those of Muslims.

While on the one hand efforts of the non-Congress parties were going on to give a straight fight to the Congress, on the other hand public opinion on the basis of performances and practices of the Congress too was not encouraging for the Congress as what they had observed in Kerala State.

By the time of 1967 General Elections most of the people grew sore about what they regarded as abuse by the Congress party of the constitutional provision meant for emergencies. All opposition parties were distressed and annoyed. From this arose a bitter feeling, and many of those who had been voting for the Congress became its opponents. The opposition parties of states grew more conscious and stood solidly against the Congress. They formed various Fronts to give Congress a straight fight in every constituency. The result gave the allied parties a clear working majority.

Thus the stronghold of Congress in Uttar Pradesh which was continuing since independence came to an end. No doubt even after 1967 General Election in U.P. Congress was the largest single party but C.B. Gupta had to form the Government with the support of independent members. Here it can be noted that since in other 8 states the non-Congress Governments were formed (1967) and it seemed that there was a wave of non-Congress movement, on account of this only the C.B. Gupta Ministry could not last long and soon it collapsed because of too many defections of the members which resulted in the formation of Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD) with Ram Chandra Vikal, an independent MLA as its leader. Subsequently Charan Singh, a prominent leader of Congress whom the blow of anti

Congress wave could not spare, left the party and joined Jana Congress. This party also merged itself with the SVD and Charan Singh was elected as its new leader. Thus the ground was clear for the formation of the first non-Congress Government in Uttar Pradesh under Charan Singh.

Following the resignation of C.B. Gupta Ministry in the wake of defeat in the Assembly, Charan Singh was invited to become the Chief Minister. However, no sooner had the SVD Ministry been formed cracks started appearing. The first to withdraw from the SVD was a CPI member who alleged that the party had failed to carry out the nineteen point programme.

The demand of the Jana Sangh and BSP Ministers adoption of Hindi as the language of correspondence also caused tension amongst supporters of the SVD Ministry, particularly the Muslims. These Ministers also tried to use their position to pack their own party members in various positions in the State. In view of these frictions the SVD was ultimately defeated on July 6, 1967. However, the SVD Ministry continued in office with great difficulty till February 19, 1968 when it tendered its resignation. On February 24, 1968 the President of India suspended the Assembly. But subsequently when he found that no stable Government could be formed under the existing circumstances he dissolved the Assembly on April 15, 1968.

The collapse of the SVD Government can be attributed to two reasons: (i) SVD was a party of parties with different ideologies, programmes and principles who were united with one point programme and that was ouster of Congress Government from the state. After the SVD rule in state the allied parties wanted their programmes to be implemented, which was rather impossible since the aim and gain or achievement of one party was loss against the interest of the other coalition partner. Thus separate interest of each party dominated over the allied party interest.

(ii) Personal interest of the leaders was also a reason for the break of SVD. As evident even from Congress rule on the quitting of C.B. Gupta as Chief Minister. It may be noted that the election of Mrs. Sucheta Kriplani was not unopposed and she had to face a rival in Kamlapati Tripathi. Though there were factions within the Congress ranks the Congress party continued to head the Government. Charan Singh once a prominent leader of Congress too did not seem happy with the Congress, that's why resigning from Congress he joined Jana Congress, and then merged Jana Congress with the SVD just for the sake of power. It was not the people of Uttar Pradesh who either formed or replaced SVD Government but only and only the leaders shifting and quitting from party to party for personal gain.

Another major development that took place in U.P. was after the mid-term poll of 1969 where no single party could secure a clearcut majority. The non-Congress coalition made an attempt to form a coalition Ministry but because of the strong opposition of Jana Sangh and BSP to Charan Singh becoming the Chief Minister coalition Ministry could not be formed. Ultimately on February 16, 1969 the Congress Government headed by C.B. Gupta with the support of Independents and Swatantra was formed.

In the elections of 1969 though the collective strength of the opposition members was more than the strength of the Congress (Congress had 211 seats = 33.69%) but the Opposition could not oust Congress due to division in their own ranks. It was not only the Opposition but the Congress too was divided on certain issues and as a result Gupta Ministry could not last long and stability was shaken due to split in the Congress.

After the resignation of Kamapati Tripathi from the presidentship of UPCC, under the directive of the AICC, the group rivalries within Congress became prominent. While C.B. Gupta favoured Banarsi Das for the Presidentship, Kamapati favoured Bahuguna. At the intervention of the Central leadership the crisis was tided over for the time being. However, when the split in the Congress party took place C.B. Gupta supported Congress(O), while Tripathi group suppor-

ted Congress(N). The two sections were divided in such a manner that none of them could form the Ministry. A stable Ministry could be possible only with the support of BKL (having 98 seats). Consequently both the sides started wooing Charan Singh, and ultimately Charan Singh decided to cooperate with the Tripathi group to topple the Gupta Ministry. In the meanwhile the Gupta group secured the support of Jana Sangh (having 49 seats) and also made efforts to win the support of BSP (having 33 seats).

Though negotiations between Charan Singh and Kamalapati Tripathi continued for the formation of the Government, no agreement could be reached on the issue as to who should head the Government. Finally on February 10, 1970, C.B. Gupta tendered his resignation advising the Governor to invite the opposition leader Charan Singh to form the Government. One thing to be noted here is, resignation of Gupta was not any kind support to Charan Singh but it was a move to prevent a Government under Kamalapati Tripathi. Despite C.B. Gupta's resignation, political situation in the state took a new turn after few days when Charan Singh broke alliance with Congress(O) and reached an agreement with Congress(N) to form a single party government and the Congress(N) was to extend full support to his Ministry. The BKL Ministry formed by Charan Singh in U.P. as an one party Government survived for two months only, from February 17 to April 16, 1970 and then it was a BKL-

Congress(N) coalition Government from April 17 to October 1, 1970.

The reason for the short tenure of BKD Government in the state was strained relations which developed between the two coalition partners. The Congress(N) came out with open allegations that the coalition Government was deviating from the policy line approved by Congress(N). This was not liked by Charan Singh and he called on them to quit the Ministry. The friction between the two was further accentuated following the decision of BKD MPs to vote against the abolition of Privy Purses in the Parliament.

The tension between the two partners grew so high that Charan Singh asked thirteen Congress(N) Ministers to resign from his Council of Ministers. When they refused to comply with his request he asked the Governor to dismiss them. At this stage Kamlapati Tripathi withdrew his support. The Governor, on the advice of Attorney General asked Charan Singh to resign and sent a recommendation for the imposition of President's Rule in the state. The state was duly placed under President's rule on October 2, 1970. However, the State Assembly was not dissolved to enable the parties to reach some sort of accord regarding the formation of Government.

Here it can be noted that the short tenure of non-Congress Governments i.e. SVD Government and BKD Government, and

their immediate collapse is not related with people in general in any aspect. The responsibility for these changes and developments least goes to state level leaders even, but to national level party leaders - Too many alliances between political parties or entirely different and divergent ideologies clearly indicates one point programme and that was to remove Congress(R) from power.

The resignation of Charan Singh from SVD government, prior to this his defection from Congress (or which he seemed to be an integral part), then formation of Jana Congress, defection from Jana Congress and joining BJD — all this is enough to show that Charan Singh was not satisfied with any party. Besides this I am not wrong, he never left any chance to head the Government in Uttar Pradesh. What I feel the height of lust or power was that on the one side C.B. Gupta (Congress(O) resigned from Chief Ministership on February 10, 1970 with a move to prevent Charan Singh to make any alliance with Congress(N) to form Government in Uttar Pradesh. Moreover he advised Governor Gopala Reddy to invite Charan Singh to form Government since BJD had 98 members in the Assembly and also had the support of Opposition Front (opposition to Congress-R). The Congress(R) had only 211 members in the Assembly and having just 33.69% of the total strength of the House. Ignoring all such friendly and sincere

gestures of C.B. Gupta, Charan Singh made an alliance with Congress(N) and thus formed BKD Government in Uttar Pradesh in coalition with Congress(N) on February 17, 1970.

At the time of Mid-term poll of 1969, the BKD was also entering into politics and had prepared to contest elections. Its list contained 51 Rajputs, 36 Muslims, 17 Banias, 48 Ahirs, 88 Harijans, 10 Jats, 5 from backward communities and 26 others. The Congress list contained 115 Brahmins alone besides representatives of other castes. The greatest development in U.P. after the mid-term poll was that the long continued dominance of Upper Castes was broken.

Another blow given to U.P. politics and as a strength to non-Congress parties was rift in the Congress itself. After the 1969 polls, C.B. Gupta (Congress) with the support of Independents and Swatantra formed the Ministry on February 16, 1969. Stability could not last long because of the split in Congress. The New Congress under the leadership of Kamlapati Tripathi started opposition and joined hands with the BKD to topple the C.B. Gupta Ministry, and succeeded in the mission.

The coalition Government between the BKD and Congress(N) was not on the basis of any kind of similarity in the ideologies, policies and programmes of the two. On the contrary it

was on give and take basis. It was sheer personality of Charan Singh only who became a hero at that crucial moment. All non-Congress parties and Congress itself were looking towards Charan Singh to reach a compromise for alliance and form a coalition ministry. All parties were ready for any terms and conditions. But it was perhaps the farsightedness of Charan Singh who gave preference to Congress(N) to form the Government. One reason to form a coalition ministry in alliance with Congress(N) might have been that Congress was in power not only ^{at} the Centre but also ⁱⁿ many states. Anyway whatever might have been the reason the fact is that the main aim of all parties was just to come in power irrespective of their varying ideologies. If it was not a fact then BKD could never have come in alliance with Congress(N) when both did not see eye to eye. The Congress(N) was dominated by higher castes (as general impression was) and BKD was a party of workers, farmers and peasants.

Away from power tactics if we see the achievements or failure of opposition Government then it comes out that it was mainly due to the assertive personality of Charan Singh that the BKD could take certain popular decisions. Many of the decisions were welcomed by people.

The policies of the BKD Government provided some relief to people in terms of their deteriorating conditions.

As a relief to farmers, the BKD Government decided to abolish land revenue on holding upto 3.125 acres which was considered the average uneconomic holding. It decided to withdraw sales tax on fertilizers, withdrawal or restriction on export of Gurh, to distribute surplus land among landless labourers and to take over the sugar industry. The BKD Government also decided to lower the ceiling on land holdings from 40 acres to 30 acres.

Regarding administration and law and order in the state the BKD Government took decisions like setting up a Law Commission for judicial efficiency and elimination of corruption from Courts; to reconstitute the regional transport authorities with a view to eliminate corruption; to appoint a commission headed by a High Court Judge to investigate the concealment and minimization of crimes and suggest remedies for the wide-spread evils in the police department; to promulgate an ordinance making the membership of union for students voluntary; and to promulgate an ordinance empowering the state Government to detain any person so as to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of state or the maintenance of public order or or supplies and services essential to the community.

Regarding law and administration Charan Singh was very strict against unlawful activities by Government personnel,

students, common public land grabbers and politicians. An Ordinance for preventive Detention was issued on August 5, 1970 under which many students were arrested in Kanpur and Lucknow for unlawful activities. Besides students, 6 MPs and 11 MLAs were also arrested. This led the opposition parties to criticise Charan Singh ruthlessly.

The BKD neither believed in capitalism nor in socialism or communism; it believed in middle Gandhian path, an economy based overwhelmingly on self employment where exploitation was reduced to minimum if not eliminated altogether. It believed that democracy was founded upon the ownership of property. But concentration of economic and political power should not be in the same hands.

The BKD did not believe in parliamentary form of Government. It was in favour of Presidential form. Besides this a resolution for the abolition of the Legislative Council was also passed on April 19, 1970, under which the existence of Upper House was declared as superfluous and a sheer wastage of time and money.

Soon after the declaration of President's rule in U.P. on October 2, 1970, the five opposition parties, Congress(O), Jansangh, Swatantra, SSP and BKD joined hands to form the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD). On account of its

strength of 250 in a House of 426, it asked the Governor to invite T.N. Singh (a Congress-O) member of Rajya Sabha) to form the Ministry. On October 18, 1970 T.N. Singh was sworn in as Chief Minister.

Here one important thing to be noted is, though at the time of formation of BJD Government when both Congress(O) and Congress(N) were wooing Charan Singh to gain his support in order to form Government, Charan Singh, despite C.B. Gupta's obligations and sacrifices, chose Congress(N) as its coalition partner to form BJD Government. But now on account of his failure to keep his ministry in power and after collapse of his ministry neither Charan Singh nor Congress(O) hesitated while coming together in efforts to prevent Congress(N) from coming to power in the state. Instead they made an alliance to make SVD Government. Keeping in view the past experience, the fate of such an alliance could have been easily predicted. It had to fail. And the same happened just after five months. The T.N. Singh SVD Ministry which was installed on October 18, 1970 collapsed on April 4, 1971 when Kamalapati Tripathi (Congress) was sworn in as Chief Minister.

The collapse of T.N. Singh Ministry was because of two reasons. Firstly the allied parties could not adjust with each other on various issues and as a result defections in SVD started; the second reason was T.N. Singh's defeat in the

Maniram by election in 1971. After his defeat it became difficult for the parties of alliance to find a suitable leader. Many defected from SVD and joined Congress(N). Thus the Congress(N) with 222 members behind it urged the Governor to dissolve SVD Ministry and Tripathi was sworn in as Chief Minister whose Ministry lasted till 1974 elections, and then H.N. Bahuguna from the same party (Congress-N) took over as Chief Minister on March 5, 1974.

The drama of alliances, coalition governments and defections from one party to another lasted from 1967 to 1974 in the first phase of U.P. Government. It appears that the people were tired of the political game and got confirmed that apart from Centre, in U.P. too it was only the Congress(N) which could give the state a stable Government. This strengthened the position of Congress, as witnessed by the 1974 elections in which in a House of 425 Congress(N) secured 213 seats as against 211 out of 425 in 1969. But other parties except Jana Sangh were almost drowned. The reason why this time opposition parties did not come together was that the leaders of opposition parties had perhaps realised and were convinced that joint ventures would not work any more.

After Bahuguna, N.D. Tiwari took over as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and the Congress in U.P. remained in power throughout the emergency phase (1975-77).

The emergency period (1975-77) in India as well as in the state of Uttar Pradesh gave such a lesson to the people in just 19 months that they never had in 25 years span. The Allahabad judgement will go down as a landmark in Indian history. It gave a sharp turn to Indian Politics setting a new frenzied pace to events and initiating an entirely new style of Government in the country with different norms and values.

The election petition filed by Raj Narain against Mrs. Indira Gandhi resulted (on June 12, 1975) in her disenfranchisement for six years. The judgement promptly granted an absolute stay for 20 days. She was held guilty of corrupt practices under Section 123(7) of the Representation of People Act under two counts: obtaining assistance of Government officials for constructing rostrums and supplying power for loudspeakers at the meetings addressed by Mrs. Gandhi in Rae Bareilly on February 1 and February 25, 1971 and obtaining and procuring the assistance of Yashpal Kapoor (a gazetted officer, Officer on Special Duty in the Prime Minister's secretariat) during the period from January 7, 1971 to January 24, 1971 in furtherance of Mrs. Gandhi's election prospects.

As a result emergency was declared in the country by the President of India Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad on the night of

June 25-26, 1975. The actions during emergency period even in Uttar Pradesh, the Prime Minister's home state, talked a different language. Besides family planning excesses, the people were angry over the MISA and DIR arrests. Even in the villages now people listened to BBC for true news.

One can criticise the emergency period to any length. Apart from its destructive and evil aspects one cannot deny that it brought certain things good also for the state; efficiency in Government offices, prompt services, halt to corruption of any kind in any sphere, and consciousness even among the villagers.

The 1977 election results gave a violent shake to the Kaleidoscope of Indian politics. RSS, Jana Sanghis, Jamaatis, Muslim Leaguers, Old Congress men, BLD, and Socialists, all came under the common whiplash of Mrs. Gandhi's authoritarian oppression. They shared jail cells and suffered together for nineteen months, and came to know and understand each other from close quarters; had plenty of time to discuss dispassionately each others ideologies and politics.

So that when they were all released in January and
and
February 1977, they came out/decided to bury the past and turn a new leaf and work as a team, on a single front. In the "supreme common cause of banishing dictatorship once for all" and restoring democracy in the country.

The formation of Janata Government at the Centre and state levels was so very much same as that of SVD Government (twice) in Uttar Pradesh. It was obvious that the cementing factors to different political parties except the CPI was not a common ideology or principles but rather a common programme that too one only, just removal of Congress(N) rule from centre and from states.

Soon Janata Party met the same fate as SVD had met in U.P. Thus cracks had emerged. It was not U.P. politics this time but national politics where Charan Singh played exactly the same role as he had played in U.P. during non-Congress rule in the state.

It was Raj Narain's criticism (with full backing of Charan Singh) of the party president Chandra Shekhar because of which Morarji Desai asked both Raj Narain and Charan Singh to resign from the Union Cabinet. Not only both of them resigned but the whole lot of Charan Singh supporters resigned from the party. At the state level, in U.P. 200 members of Janata Party submitted a memorandum demanding removal of Chief Minister, Ram Naresh Yadav.

It was Charan Singh who managed to bring Banarsi Das as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, who continued till the Assembly was dissolved and 1980 elections held. In the election of 1980 the Congress(I) swept the poll and captured

306 seats in a House of 425 as against only 46 in 1977. The Janata was almost wiped out securing only 4 seats. Its breakaway group Bhartiya Janata Party secured 11 seats and Janata only 4 as against 351 seats in the House of 425 in the year 1977. Thus once again Congress(I) Government in the State was formed under the Chief Ministership of Vishwanath Pratap Singh.

The Janata Government at the Centre as well as in U.P. took decisions with an aim to give maximum relief and freedom to the people. To all the victims of emergency not only relief was given but stern action against guilty was taken. More courts were opened to expedite the judicial process. Compensation to those who lost their jobs during emergency was given and they were reinstated.

Decision to open more schools, to recruit more teachers, to increase salaries of teachers, technical staff and Medical staff etc. were taken. It was not only salaried class but farmers and peasantry was also rewarded in different forms. To farmers relief was given regarding fertilisers irrigation, powercut in taxes etc. To small industries also cheaper land was to be given as decided by the Government. considerable amount was spent for the development of Hill areas. A grant of Rs.660 crores was approved to be distributed as loans, Rs. 17,800 crores employment plan for U.P. was

approved. Rs. 25 crores job plan only for Eastern U.P. was promised, under which 30,000 people were to get employment.

On the basis of the above analysis it can be concluded that since independence there was no remarkable development in U.P. till 1967. It was only after the Elections of 1967 that some sort of life came into U.P. Politics. In other words it was the beginning of non-Congress movement that brought a change in the otherwise slow momentum of affairs in the state. A remarkable change could be observed, specially in the post-Emergency period. It looked as if the excesses of Emergency and the resultant trauma had the greatest impact on the people and politics of U.P. The reaction was unprecedented. For people who have been looking forward to a change in Government, opportunity came their way in the 1977 Elections and no doubt full advantage has been taken of the rare opportunity. A non-Congress wave of such proportions and intensity was never experienced in the post-independence politics of U.P. The rest is history.

But this is only one side of the turbulent period, otherwise known as the Janata phase which has been discussed in the main body of this dissertation. More surprise were to come. The political situation took so many turns in U.P. during the Janata phase that it calls for an extremely sharp

memory to recall and recount all the happenings and episodes (chapters IV & V).

If the Janata victory brought jubilation and relief to the people of U.P. unfortunately it was for a very short period. The developments that took place during the Janata phase were of such nature that the people as well as leaders started to have second thoughts on the whole political system existing at that time. The Janata phase was characterised by uncertainty, absence of consensus, instability, disunity and therefore became most notorious for inaction, pettyfogging, personal rivalries and political skullduggery. The reader may refer to the relevant chapters in this dissertation for a detailed account of the political situation in U.P. during this most disturbing phase of politics in the state.

Public memory may be proverbially short, but this is more often not true. The people of U.P. have gone through many non-Congress Governments like SVD and BKD: but it was Janata Government which gave them a jolt and made them sit up and opened the doors for a vigorous thought process and retrospection.

There is too much evidence to show that the people of U.P. alongwith others who had to bear the Janata brunt have ultimately reconciled to the fact that they had had enough

of the SVD, BKD and Janata and that it was time to go back to their original moorings. They have always been ruled by the Congress when they wanted to have a change, they had it, but they felt that it was a change for the worse. The people cannot be blamed for this. It was the performance, rather non-performance of the various nonCongress Governments that put the people off. They saw through the politicians game, and decided that there is nothing like the good old Congress, the only party which could give them a modicum of stability, and continuity. And so it was the Congress again in 1980.

Compared to many states in India, U.P. had a comparatively peaceful time. Politically speaking, the state had been more fortunate in the sense that it was not notorious for political defections as was the case with Haryana and Bihar. But the fact cannot be denied that nothing remarkable happened in U.P., the premier state of India which gave top class leaders like Jawaharlal. Nehru and Indira Gandhi to the country.

The political situation in U.P. as is evident from the present study, has more often than not been guided, directed, and controlled by the central leadership. The centre in its own interest had never allowed any man of independent views to continue as Chief Minister in U.P. for a reasonable period to enable him to give a good performance. A good and astute politician poses a threat to the central leadership whose self imposed importance stands questioned. Such state level

leaders are either replaced or called to the Centre and provided a berth in the Union Council of Ministers. A case in point is that of Vishwanath Pratap Singh. By all counts he would have given a better administration to U.P. than Sripat Misra had he been allowed to continue.

Another factor that has to be taken care of is that U.P. is too big a state to be administered from Lucknow. It goes without saying that it needs to be divided and reorganized into two states for administrative convenience. The immediate need is eradication of corruption in administration. The people should learn to nurse only honest politicians with commitment and integrity. A major surgical operation is the immediate need. An entirely new approach is called for. Total overhauling of the political situation and administration is the need of the moment. The people of this great state can look forward to better times, but only if they show more maturity and give evidence of political awareness of the appropriate kind.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

1. Bhagwati, Jagdish, N. & Others: Election Politics in the Indian States, Manohar Book Service, Delhi, 1975
2. Bose, T.C. (Ed.): Political Development in North-East India, Department of Political Science, Dibrugarh University, 1978
3. Burger, Angele Sutherland: Opposition in a Dominant Party System; A Study of the Jana Sangh, the PSP and the Socialist Party in Uttar Pradesh, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1969
4. Chhabra, H.K. & Jones, W.T.: State Politics in India, Surjeet Publications, Delhi, 1980
5. Dhawan, Rajeev: President's Rule in the States, N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1979
6. Dua, B.D.: Presidential Rule in India, 1950-1974 - A Study of Crisis Politics, S.Chand, Delhi, 1979.
7. Dutt, Brahm: Five Headed Monster, Surge Publications, Delhi, 1978
8. Gupta, N.S.: Issues in Political Development and Economic and Social Change, Light and Life, Delhi, 1978
9. Hinckley, Barbara: Coalition and Politics, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1981
10. Jag Mohan: Twenty Five Years of Indian Independence, Vikas, Delhi, 1973
11. Kabir, Humayun: Minorities in a Democracy, Firma Mukhopadhyaya, Delhi, 1960
12. Kashyap, Subhash, C.: Indian Political Parties, Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, Delhi, 1971

(ii)

13. Kamal, K.L. & Meyer, R.C.: Democratic Politics in India, Vikas, Delhi, 1977
14. Kashyap, Subhash.C.: The Politics of Power, Defection and State Politics of India, National Publishers, Delhi, 1974
15. Krishna, Daya: Political Development- A Critical Perspective, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1979
- Mareshwari, Shriram: State Governments in India, Macmillan, Delhi, 1979
17. Mareshwari, Shriram: State Politics in India, Macmillan, Delhi, 1979
18. Manekar, D.R. & Manekar Kamla: Decline and Fall of Indira Gandhi, Vision Books, Delhi, 1977
19. Mehta, Asoka: A Decade of Indian Politics, 1966-77, S.Chand, Delhi, 1979
20. Mitra, Kumar Subrat: Government Stability in Indian States: West Bengal, Bihar, U.P. & Punjab, Ajanta Publishers, Delhi, 1970
21. Naik, A.J.: The Great Janata Revolution, S. Chand, Delhi, 1977
22. Narain, Iqbal (Ed.): State Politics of India, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut
23. Pandit, S.C.: End of An Era: The Rise and Fall of Indira Gandhi, Allied Publishers, Delhi, 1977
24. Poplai, S.L.: 1962 General Elections in India, Allied Publishers, Delhi, 1962
25. Ram, Gopal: Spotlight on Democracy in India, Pustak Kendra, Lucknow, 1970

26. Ray, Anand and Others: Political Development and Constitutional Change, Vikas, Delhi, 1982
27. Shastri, K.N. Ramnath: An Analytical Study of 1967 General Elections in India, Vishva Bharati Prakashan, Agra, 1968
28. Singhvi, L.M.: Indian Parties and Politics, The Indian Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies and Research, Delhi, 1972
29. Siwach, J.R.: Politics of President's Rule in India, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla
30. Shourie, Arun: Institutions in the Janata Phase, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1980
31. Thakur, Janardan: The Naye Hukmaran (English), Vikas, Delhi, 1978
32. Thapar, Romesh: The Indian Dimensions - The Politics of Continental Development, Vikas, Delhi, 1977
33. Uma Vasudev: Two Faces of Indira Gandhi, Vikas, Delhi, 1977
34. Zaheer, M. & Gupta Jagdeo: The Organization of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, S. Chand, Delhi, 1977
35. Statistical Abstract of Indian Union, The Central Statistical Organization, Department of Statistics, Government of India
36. Techno-Economic Survey of Uttar Pradesh, National Council of Applied Economic Research, Delhi, 1965

Articles

1. Das, Banka Behari: 'Between Non-Congress States and Centre' Thought, March 4, 1967
2. Das, Banka Behari: 'Non-Congress Governments, Promises, Failure and Prospects, Janata, Jan 26, 1968

3. DeCosta, E.P.W.: 'Mid-Term Poll', Indian Express, Aug 28,29,30,31,1979
4. Dewan, Berindranath: 'Volcano Called Uttar Pradesh', Democratic World, Vol.8, No.5, Feb 1979
5. Dilip Mukerjee: 'Squabbles in Congress', The Special Problem of Uttar Pradesh', The Times of India, May 17,1975
6. Gandhi, Rajmohan: 'Performance of State Governments under Janata Rule', Deccan Herald, April 7,1979
7. Hazarika, Sanjay: 'Search for a New U.P. Leader', Himmat, Feb 23,1979
8. Hazarika, Sanjay: 'Tussle in Uttar Pradesh' Himmat, Feb 9,1979
9. Jain, Girilal: 'Changing Political Balance: The Allahabad Verdict and After', The Times of India, June 18,1975
10. Jain, Girilal: 'Failure of Alliance Politics', The Times of India, Dec 12,1979
11. Joshi, P.C.: 'Rural Base and Power', Seminar, No. 133, 1970
12. Kala, S.C.: 'Dissidence in U.P. Congress; Caste Pressure Groups', The Times of India, April 26,1975
13. Kothari, Rajni: 'Political Transition', Seminar, No. 221,1977
14. Katyal, K.K.: 'Uttar Pradesh Crisis-Fallout in Delhi', The Hindu, Feb 12,1979
15. Moin Shakir: 'Crisis in the Indian Political System', Janata, Jan 26,1979
16. Namboodiripad, EMS.: 'A Record of Congress Intrigues in States' Patriot, Dec 1,1967
17. Palmer, Norman, D.: 'India-the Politics of Coalition and Survival', Current History, Vol, 54, No. 320, April 1968

(v)

18. Pandit, C.S.: 'After U.P. The Centre Again', Amrit Bazar Patrika, Feb 15, 1979
19. Ragan, N.: 'Lesson From U.P.', Mainstream, Oct 17, 1970
20. Rangaswamy, K.: 'Uttar Pradesh Drama', Foreign News and Features, March 3, 1979
21. Sarkar, S.C.: 'Has there Been Any Political Change since 1947', Janata, August 15, 1979
22. Sethi, D.L.: 'Social Basis of the Political Crisis', Seminar, No. 271, 1981
23. Sethi, D.L.: 'Politics of Caste Conflict', Seminar, No. 233, 1978
24. Shekhar, Chandra: 'Betrayal of Janata Party', Indian Express, Aug 16, 1979
25. Srivastava, K.B.: 'Election Politics in India: A Study of U.P. Elections of 1974', Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies and Research, Delhi, Jan-March, 1975
26. Surendran: 'State Governments Unable to Govern', Himmat, April 6, 1979

Theses

1. Brennan, L.: Political change in Rohilkhand, 1932-52, University of Sussex, Thesis, 1972
2. Brown, Richard Martin: Indian States Legislative Behaviour: Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly, 1952-68, American University Thesis, 1971.
3. Hebsur, R.K.: Social Mobilization, Political Development and Civil Violence in Indian States, American University Thesis, 1975
4. Khan, L.R.: Role of Muslim Majlis in U.P. Politics, 1967-77, M.Phil Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, 1982.

5. Meyer, Ralphchristian: Political Elites in an Under Developed Society: The Case of Uttar Pradesh, India., Pennsylvania

Periodicals

A. News Digest

1. Asian Recorder, A Weekly Digest of Asian Events, Delhi
2. Data India, Press Institute of India, Delhi

B. Quarterlies

1. The American Political Science Review, American Political Science Association, New York.
2. Asian Review, East India Association, London
3. British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, London.
4. India Quarterly, Asia Publishing House, Bombay
5. Indian Journal of Politics, Department of Political Science, Aligarh.
6. Indian Journal of Political Science, Indian Political Science Association
7. Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, Delhi.
8. Journal of the Society for the Study of State Governments, Society for the Study of State Governments, Dept. of Pol. Science, B.H.U. Varanasi.
9. Pacific Affairs, Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu
10. Political Science Review, Political Science Department, Rajasthan University, Jaipur.

C. Monthlies

1. Asian Affairs, Royal Society for Asian Affairs, London
2. Asian Survey, Institute of International Institutions, California

3. Current History, Current History Institution, Philadelphia
4. Secular Democracy, Delhi.
5. Seminar, Delhi
6. Socialist India, Delhi

Weeklies

1. Capital, Calcutta
2. Eastern Economist, Delhi
3. Economic Affairs, Calcutta
4. Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay
5. The Illustrated Weekly of India, Bombay
6. Janata, Bombay
7. Link, Delhi
8. Mainstream, Delhi
9. Mankind, Delhi
10. New Age, Delhi
11. Organiser, Delhi
12. People's Democracy, Calcutta
13. Political and Economic Review, Delhi
14. Swaraiya, Madras
15. Thought, Delhi
16. Weekend Review, Bombay

Newspapers

1. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta
2. The Free Press Journal, Bombay
3. The Hindu, Madras
4. The Hindustan Times, Delhi

5. The Indian Express, Delhi
6. The Indian Nation, Patna
7. The Motherland, Delhi
8. National Herald, Lucknow
9. Northern India Patrika, Allahabad
10. Patriot, Delhi
11. Searchlight, Patna
12. The Statesman, Delhi
13. The Times of India, Delhi
14. Tribune, Ambala
15. Navabharat Times (Hindi), Delhi
16. Al-i-amiyat (Urdu), Delhi
17. Qaumi Awaz (Urdu), Lucknow
18. Sivasat (Urdu), Kanpur